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Lay Summary  
The aim of this thesis is to contribute to the understanding of paranormal beliefs 
and experiences. The introduction provides a review of past research in the field and the 
rationale for our decision to focus on a specific type of paranormal experience – 
precognitive, or prophetic, dreams. We address several different hypotheses that have 
been proposed to account for such experiences. Chapter II describes an online dream 
precognition study testing the so-called psi hypothesis (Study 1). Participants collected 
their dreams over four weekly periods. Independent judges rated the similarity of the 
dream reports to a set of video clips. The dreams were found to be more similar to the 
video clips than could be expected by chance alone. However, based on further 
exploration of the data, we concluded that these results did not support the notion that 
dreams can provide information about the future. They did, however, illustrate the 
potential theoretical and methodological issues with the psi hypothesis and the way it is 
commonly tested. Chapter III focuses on explanations of precognitive dreams in terms 
of unconscious cognition. Two studies test the hypothesis that precognitive dreams arise 
as a result of unconscious inferences about likely future events based on subtle cues 
from the environment perceived in the absence of awareness. We predicted that 
participants with prior precognitive dream experience would perform better at measures 
of learning without awareness. However, no such relationship was found. Additionally, 
we predicted that performance on a task assessing perception without awareness would 
be related to belief in and experience of precognitive dreams. The results did not 
support this prediction. Study 4, reported in Chapter IV, explores several demographic 
and sleep- and dream-related variables and their relationship with precognitive dream 
belief and experience. We hypothesised that precognitive dream experience is associated 
with erratic patterns of sleep behaviour. As predicted, we found that a higher subjective 
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frequency of precognitive dreams was associated with more nocturnal awakenings, 
higher dream recall, lower overall sleep quality, and a higher likelihood of using sleep 
medication. We also explored the demographic factors of precognitive dream belief and 
experience, namely gender, age and education. Women were more likely to believe in 
the reality of precognitive dreams as well as report experiencing them. And there was a 
negative relationship between completed years of formal education and the precognitive 
dream variables. Frequency of these experiences was positively related to age. Moreover, 
we found support for our prediction that both precognitive dream belief and experience 
would be positively related to the subjective importance ascribed to one’s dreams in 
general. Finally, the study investigated the relationship between the belief in and the 
experience of precognitive dreams. Although, as could be expected, we found these two 
to be strongly positively related, we argued that this relationship is not sufficient to gloss 
over the conceptual distinction. In order to further develop our line of research, we 
identify a need for a new measurement tool addressing attitudes towards one’s 
precognitive dream experiences. Study 5, reported in Chapter V, concerns the 
development of such a questionnaire. A subset of people who reported having had such 
experience completed the questionnaire. After removing problematic items, the 
questionnaire was found to be satisfactory and additional variables collected on the 
sample were subsequently used to test its validity. Overall, the predicted relationships 
were confirmed by the analyses, which indicates the questionnaire is validity. 
Importantly, we found that personal significance of one’s precognitive dreams was 
related to the frequency with which they are experienced. Chapter VI, reports two 
studies exploring the relationship between precognitive dream belief and experience, 
their personal significance and memory. Study 6 tested three hypotheses: earliest 
precognitive dream experiences would tend to date to a period of identity formation in 
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one’s life; the vividness of the memory of this earliest experience would be related to the 
frequency of precognitive dream experience; and this relationship would be accounted 
for by the personal significance ascribed to one’s precognitive dreams. All three 
hypotheses were supported. Finally, Chapter VII summarises the findings of the six 
studies conducted for this dissertation. We discuss our results in the context of the 
existing literature and highlight the main theoretical, methodological, and empirical 




Thesis abstract  
The aim of the present dissertation is to contribute to the understanding of putative 
paranormal beliefs and experiences. The introduction provides a conceptual analysis of 
past research into the paranormal and establishes the rationale for our decision to focus 
on a specific type of paranormal experience – precognitive dreams. The dissertation 
evaluates several different hypotheses that have been proposed to account for such 
experiences. 
Chapter II describes an online dream precognition study testing the so-called psi 
hypothesis (Study 1). Participants (N = 50) collected details of their dreams over four 
weekly periods. Independent judges rated the similarity of the dream reports to 
randomly selected target and decoy video clips. Compared to the chance baseline of 50 
hits out of 200 trials, the obtained 64 hits was significantly more than could be expected 
under the null hypothesis. However, based on a post hoc exploration of the data, we 
concluded that Study 1 yielded no evidence of any anomalous cognition within 
participants’ dreams. It did, however, illustrate the potential theoretical and 
methodological issues with the psi hypothesis and the way it is habitually assessed. 
Chapter III focuses on explanations of putative precognitive dreams in terms of 
unconscious cognition. Two studies test the hypothesis that precognitive dreams arise as 
a result of unconscious inferences about likely future events based on subtle cues from 
the environment perceived in the absence of awareness. Study 2 explores individual 
differences in implicit processing and their relationship to precognitive dream belief and 
experience. Participants (N = 50) completed the serial reaction time task as well as a 
series of questionnaire measures. Contrary to prediction, no relationship was found 
between precognitive dream experience – or belief – and implicit task performance. 
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Following these null findings, Study 3 tested another prediction of the same 
hypothesis. Participants (N = 49) completed a modified change detection task. The 
modification allowed for assessing explicit and implicit change detection separately. The 
results of Study 3 did not support the hypothesis, as the measure of explicit change 
detection was not related to precognitive dream experience. They did, however, provide 
a conceptual replication of the findings of Study 2, since we again found no relationship 
between implicit detection and precognitive dream experience. 
On a large sample of participants (N = 672), Study 4, reported in Chapter IV, 
explores several demographic and sleep- and dream-related variables and their 
relationship with precognitive dream belief and experience. We hypothesised that 
precognitive dream experience is associated with erratic patterns of sleep behaviour. 
Consistent with this hypothesis, we found that a higher subjective frequency of 
precognitive dreams was associated with more nocturnal awakenings, higher dream 
recall, lower overall sleep quality, and a higher likelihood of using sleep medication. We 
also explored the demographic factors of precognitive dream belief and experience, 
namely gender, age and education. Women were more likely to believe in the reality of 
precognitive dreams as well as report experiencing them. And there was a negative 
relationship between completed years of formal education and the precognitive dream 
variables. Frequency of these experiences was positively related to age. Moreover, we 
predicted that both precognitive dream belief and experience would be positively related 
to the subjective importance ascribed to one’s dreams in general. We found support for 
this hypothesis. Finally, the study investigated the relationship between the belief in and 
the experience of precognitive dreams. Although, as could be expected, we found these 
two to be strongly positively related, we argued that this relationship is not sufficient to 
gloss over the conceptual distinction. In order to further develop our line of research, 
15 
we identify a need for a new measurement tool addressing attitudes towards one’s 
precognitive dream experiences. 
Study 5, reported in Chapter V, concerns the development and validation of such a 
tool. A sample of people who reported having had a precognitive dream experience (N 
= 330) completed an initial 49-item questionnaire. After removing items with 
unsatisfactory psychometric characteristics an exploratory factor analysis coupled with 
exploratory structural equation modelling revealed a well-interpretable 5-factor structure 
with good internal consistency. Additional variables collected on the sample were 
subsequently used to test the validity of the derived subscales. Overall, the predicted 
relationships were confirmed by the analyses, which indicates both convergent and 
divergent/discriminant validity of the questionnaire. Importantly, we found that 
personal significance of one’s precognitive dreams was related to the frequency with 
which they are experienced. 
The final empirical chapter, Chapter VI, explores the relationship between 
precognitive dream belief and experience, their personal significance, and memory. 
Study 6 tested three hypotheses: earliest precognitive dream experiences would tend to 
date to a period of identity formation in one’s life; the vividness of the memory of this 
earliest experience would correlate with the frequency of precognitive dream experience; 
and this relationship would be accounted for by the personal significance ascribed to 
one’s precognitive dreams. All three hypotheses were supported. 
Finally, Chapter VII summarises the findings of the six studies conducted for this 
dissertation. We discuss our results in the context of the existing literature and highlight 
the main theoretical, methodological, and empirical contributions of our research. 
Directions for future research are also provided. 
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Recently, there has been an increase in scientific papers related to putative 
paranormal phenomena published in high profile psychological outlets. In 2010, a paper 
by Storm, Tressoldi, and Di Risio (2010a) appeared in Psychological Bulletin, reporting on a 
meta-analysis of 11 years of parapsychological research into extrasensory perception 
(ESP) research. Based on 30 ESP studies employing the so-called Ganzfeld protocol (see 
section 1.3.1 below), they reported a small but statistically significant mean effect size 
(ES = 0.152, Stouffer Z = 6.34, p = 1.15 × 10−10), which they interpreted as supportive 
of the existence of ESP. A year later, Bem’s (2011a) controversial paper was published 
in Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. In this paper, Bem describes 9 studies he 
conducted to test precognition, the reception of information regarding future events by 
means not currently acknowledged by science. In order to do this, he employed several 
novel and rather ingenious research paradigms. For instance, in “precognitive 
detection”, the participants’ task was to guess behind which of 3 curtains a stimulus (a 
picture) would subsequently appear. The number of correct guesses was then compared 
to a chance baseline and, if it was significantly higher, the result was taken as evidence 
for precognition. His “retroactive priming” paradigm was a spin on classic priming 
studies, however, unlike in these, the prime appeared after the response. Reaction time 
on the trials that were subsequently thus primed was compared to control trials. In the 
studies using the “retroactive facilitation of recall” paradigm participants recalled words 
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from previously studied word lists. A random subset of these words was then presented 
again. This additional, a posteriori presentation was hypothesised to improve the prior 
performance on the recall task compared to the words that were not re-presented in this 
way. Across all 9 studies, Bem reported an overall effect size of d = 0.22, with 8 studies 
yielding a significant result in the predicted direction.  
Given the controversial subject of these papers as well as the eminent standing of 
the journals in which these studies appeared, it is perhaps not surprising that a lively 
debate duly ensued. Hyman (2010) in his reply to Storm and colleagues (2010a) criticised 
the meta-analysis on grounds of inadequate homogenisation of a heterogeneous sample 
and inappropriate use of composite effect sizes and raised objections against reliance on 
the meta-analytic techniques to confirm or disprove claims of replicability of 
parapsychological effects. The authors of the original paper replied defending their 
practices and findings (Storm, Tressoldi, & Di Risio, 2010b). Rouder, Morey, and 
Province (2013) later replied with further criticism and provided a Bayesian reanalysis of 
the data and conclude that, when accounted for methodological flaws in the original 
meta-analysis, the results do not by far provide as strong a support for the so-called psi 
hypothesis (see sections 1.2 and 1.3.3.3) as Storm and colleagues claim. However, 
Storm, Tressoldi, and Utts (2013) subsequently published their own Bayesian reanalysis 
of their reassessed dataset based on the methods applied by Rouder and colleagues and 
claimed that the original conclusion remained valid. 
The reaction to Bem’s (2011a) paper was even more turbulent. Apart from Bayesian 
re-analyses discounting the evidence for ESP presented by the original paper 
(Wagenmakers, Wetzels, Borsboom, & Van Der Maas, 2011; Rouder & Morey, 2011), 
replies to these re-analyses also within the Bayesian framework (Bem, Utts, & Joohnson, 
2011), and strong methodological criticism (Alcock, 2011a; see Bem, 2011b and Alcock, 
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2011b for a back and forth), some prominent researchers have called for a change in the 
way in which data analysis is conducted in psychology (Wagenmakers et al., 2011). 
Others used the Bem paper as a case study to illustrate publication bias (Francis, 2012) 
as well as certain questionable research practices they thought were endemic in the field 
of psychology (and, by association, parapsychology; Simmons, Nelson, & Simonsohn, 
2011). Furthermore, the reported difficulties encountered by Ritchie, Wiseman, and 
French regarding the publication of their triple failure to replicate one of the original 9 
studies (Ritchie, Wiseman, & French, 2012) significantly contributed to the ensuing 
lively debate regarding what has been dubbed the crisis of replication in psychology 
(Pashler & Wagenmakers, 2012). The literature reviewed above as well as the social and 
methodological impact the Storm et al. (2010a) and Bem (2011a) papers have had on the 
entire field of psychology is indicative of the value in exploring the issue of paranormal 
phenomena. 
Indeed, surveys into supposed paranormal beliefs and experiences have consistently 
shown that this issue is by no means a marginal one. According to these surveys, 
between 59-73% (Blackmore, 1997; Moore, 2005) of the general population believe in, 
and about half as many people report having experienced, at least one such 
phenomenon (Ross & Joshi, 1992; Castro, Burrown, & Wooffitt, 2014). These levels of 
belief and experience seem to be fairly stable through time (e.g., Francis & Williams, 
2009; Gallup & Newport, 1991; Haraldsson, 1985; Moore, 2005) as well as across 
geographic regions. Similar level of endorsement of the paranormal can be found in the 
UK (Francis & Williams, 2009; Moore, 2005), the USA (Rice, 2003; The National 
Science Foundation, 2002), Canada (Ross & Joshi, 1992), Sweeden and Iceland 
(Haraldsson, 1985), the Czech republic (Quesnell, 2000), and South Africa (Williams, 
Francis, & Robins, 2007). Given the prevalence of paranormal beliefs and experiences, 
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coupled with the fact that there is no widely accepted evidence of the existence of 
paranormal phenomena,  we believe that the issue of paranormal belief and experience 
merits considerable scholarly attention. Providing it is the aim of this dissertation. 
In this introductory chapter, we first discuss the definition of the concept of the 
paranormal as well as some issues stemming from this definition. Next, we consider the 
three conceptual approaches to studying this topic. Subsequently, we review the 
scientific literature on the psychology of paranormal belief and experiences and analyse 
some conceptual problems in this field. This analysis will provide the rationale for our 
decision to focus our research on a specific type of paranormal phenomenon – 
precognitive dreams – which will subsequently be discussed in greater detail. Finally, we 
outline the research that forms the content of the five empirical chapters of this 
dissertation. 
1.2. The paranormal: Definition and conceptual issues 
From the examination of the relevant literature it is apparent that defining the 
concept of the paranormal is not a straightforward issue. For instance, Lindeman and 
Aarnio (2006) define the paranormal as encompassing superstition, the supernatural, 
and magic without further elaborating on the meaning of these terms. In her subsequent 
work Aarnio (2007) views paranormal beliefs as category errors, whereby core attributes 
of mental, physical, and biological entities are being conflated. While this definition may 
well be accurate, being clearly informed by an ontological position that assumes that the 
phenomena in question do not exist, it is not conducive to research into the question of 
the reality of the paranormal and is only useful for research in psychology or psychiatry. 
Others construe the paranormal in terms of the current state of scientific knowledge 
and philosophy of science. Broad (1949) describes paranormal phenomena as such 
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phenomena whose existence, if they indeed exist, defies the fundamental principles of 
science. In a similar vein, the oldest operating society dedicated to the study of these 
phenomena, the UK’s Society for Psychical Research (SPR, 2009), sees as paranormal a 
“[p]henomenon which is considered impossible according to the established scientific 
world-view”. French (1992) gives a slightly less radical version of this definition stating 
that they are those assumed phenomena that, if real, cannot be accounted for by current 
scientific knowledge.  
There are two principal issues with the concept of the paranormal. Firstly, its lack 
of conceptual clarity: The definitions given above do not provide sufficient guidance for 
deciding what qualifies as paranormal and what does not. As a consequence, there is a 
lack of consensus on the matter. Some authors, for example Tobacyk and Milford 
(1983), include under this umbrella term religion-related concepts such as the existence 
of deities, miracles, the power of prayer to affect reality, traditional superstitions 
regarding, for example, Friday 13th and touching wood, the existence of cryptids 
(mythical creatures, e.g., the Loch Ness monster, Yeti, and the likes), extra-terrestrial 
contact with the Earth, witchcraft, or telepathy. Lange, Irwin, and Houran (2000) then 
further divide the beliefs concerning these phenomena into traditional (religion-related, 
superstitions, witchcraft, etc.) and New-age (ESP, UFO, horoscopes, spiritualism, etc.). 
Others, however, find this breadth of scope – which would qualify for the paranormal 
label even such phenomena as vitalism or homoeopathy – undesirable. In an attempt to 
narrow down the definition, the SPR, in addition to the above-mentioned definition, 
describes the object of its interest as “the scientific investigation of the ways that 
organisms communicate and interact with each other and with the environment, that 
appear to be inexplicable within current scientific models” (SPR, 2009). Thus, apart 
from not being explicable by the current scientific knowledge, paranormal phenomena 
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are understood as interactions between organisms and the environment. However, this 
still does not preclude the examples of phenomena not usually construed as paranormal 
in the sense the researchers in the field use from being classified as such. For that 
reason, on its website, USA’s most notable Parapsychological Association (PA) opts for 
a definition by enumeration: “[members of the PA study] ‘psi’ (or ‘psychic’) experiences, 
such as telepathy, clairvoyance, remote viewing, psychokinesis, psychic healing, and 
precognition” (PA, 2010), subsequently describing the individual supposed phenomena. 
Psi here refers to a category of convenience, whose characteristics are that its 
membership is predicated on the fulfilment of the above-mentioned definitions of the 
paranormal but, at the same time, is restricted to only those phenomena that are of 
interest to parapsychologists. Other than this, we can see no other criteria for inclusion 
of the given phenomena and the exclusion of others. This ad hoc nature of the definition 
is problematic and not only reflects the absence of a theoretical framework within 
parapsychology but, it could be argued, even inhibits the development of one. 
The second, arguably even more critical issue is the negative definition of the 
concept. As Alcock (2003) in his excellent essay points out, the paranormal is invariably 
defined in terms of what it is not rather than what it is. Whichever constituent 
phenomenon of psi, the defining characteristic is always that it operates through means 
other than the ones widely recognised. For instance, telepathy is the exchange of 
information between two minds through channels other than the ones mediated by the 
senses. Similarly, precognition refers to the reception of information pertinent to future 
events that could not be obtained by “normal” intuition or rational inference. As 
demonstrated in Chapter II, this feature of the definition is problematic, as it presents 
issues for research. Due to the negative definition of the object of study, paranormal 
phenomena are operationalised as anomalies that cannot be accounted for by any 
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normal explanation. Since, as dictated by the maxim of philosophy of science that it is 
not possible to prove a universal negative, to declare that all normal explanations have 
been ruled out is a daunting task. It also provides opponents of the very idea of the 
existence of the paranormal with infinite grounds for reasonable doubt, thus hampering 
any consensus between psi proponents and sceptics. It is indeed difficult to imagine an 
end to this impasse unless both conceptual and operational definitions of the 
paranormal are developed characterising it in positive terms. 
Considering the above, even 15 years later we agree with Roberts and Seager (1999) 
that there is currently no universally accepted, unambiguous, and systemic conceptual 
definition of the paranormal. However, most authors agree that whatever the 
paranormal is, it should include at the very least ESP and psychokinesis (PK, direct, 
unmediated influence of the mind on physical objects). ESP then further breaks down 
into individual phenomena, such as precognition, clairvoyance, or telepathy, whose 
definitions can be found in SPR’s glossary (http://www.spr.ac.uk/page/glossary-
paranormal). This arguably unsatisfactory definition appears to be the most useful one 
available and it is therefore the one we adopt in this dissertation. 
1.3. Studying the paranormal 
The research into the topic of paranormal phenomena can be categorised into three 
principal approaches: testing the psi hypothesis, finding alternative “normal” 
explanations for these phenomena, and exploring the psychological factors of 
paranormal belief and experience. These categories are not always clearly demarcated 
and, sometimes, a single study will employ more than one approach. This is also not the 
only possible way to categorise research in the field. However, it provides a useful 
framework for the purpose of this dissertation. Below we discuss each one of the three 
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approaches in turn. It is not the aim of this chapter to give an exhaustive review of past 
research in every category. Our goal here is to introduce the topic of research into the 
paranormal and to highlight what we perceive to be the main conceptual issues in the 
area. The literature review is then limited to the topics most pertinent to the empirical 
chapters of this thesis. It should also be noted, that we use the term “parapsychology” 
in a specific way in further writing. Although many authors (e.g., Irwin & Watt, 2007) 
regard the field of parapsychology as encompassing all of the above-mentioned avenues 
of research, for the sake of clarity, we use the term to only refer to the endeavour to test 
the psi hypothesis, or the ontological reality of paranormal phenomena. As such, 
parapsychology can then be contrasted with anomalistic psychology (French & Stone, 
2014; Zusne & Jones, 1989) which, under our definitions of terms, deals with 
psychological factors responsible for experiences that are deemed paranormal.  
1.3.1. Parapsychology: Testing the psi hypothesis 
As stated above, one of the ways of approaching the topic of the paranormal is to 
test whether the purported phenomena actually exist. This question has been of interest 
to intellectuals and even eminent scientists of their time for over a century. With the 
establishment of the Society for Psychical Research in 1882 and the birth of 
parapsychology as a discipline, the effort to study the paranormal using the scientific 
method was institutionalised. Originally, the focus of the research in the new field was 
pointed at demonstrable putatively paranormal real-word phenomena, such as 
communication with spirits or what is nowadays referred to as macro-PK, that is 
manipulation of physical objects by means of direct mental influence (e.g., levitation). 
Claimants to extraordinary psychic powers and supposed spiritual mediums would often 
be the objects of study. Gradually, beginning in the 1930’s, the centre of gravity within 
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the field has moved towards a more laboratory-based, controlled setting, focusing, 
instead of “big” paranormal phenomena, on more subtle and inconspicuous effects 
detectable only by means of statistical analysis. Nowadays, this kind of research 
represents the majority of work in the field. As a consequence of this development, the 
very object of study has been modified. Parapsychology no longer deals primarily with 
impressive individual manifestations of what was once thought to be the paranormal 
(ghosts, the so-called physical mediums, etc.) and instead construes the paranormal as a 
subtle effect normally distributed in the population. 
The reasons for this conceptual and methodological shift are a matter of debate. 
Some, for instance Irwin and Watt (2007), see as its driving force the movement within 
parapsychology towards increasing scientific rigour, experimental control, and 
replicability of the measured effects. Others, such as Alcock (2003), provide a somewhat 
less charitable rationale: According to their view, the above-mentioned shift can be 
attributed to the failure of parapsychology to demonstrate that the feats of supposedly 
extraordinary individuals are anything but trickery. Thus, moving towards the 
exploration of ever more subtle statistical anomalies can be viewed as moving the 
goalpost in an attempt to preserve the raison d’être of the discipline in the face of failure. 
Parallels can be drawn between the apparent shrinking of the paranormal and the 
seemingly diminishing role of deities throughout human history, referred to as the God 
of the gaps (Coulson, 1955). Indeed, it is difficult to imagine the establishment of a 
research field focused on such minute statistical deviations without the benefit of the 
above-mentioned historical context. Although we do not doubt that the motivation 
voiced by Irwin and Watt has been a factor in the development of parapsychology, we 
agree with Alcock that the conceptual rift between the field’s original purpose and its 
current focus is problematic. In any case, the fact of the matter remains that these days, 
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laboratory-based parapsychological research has been focusing on detecting presumably 
subtle anomalous effects in samples drawn from the general population under strict 
experimental controls designed to prevent contaminating of the effects by those from 
normal sources (e.g., trickery or information leakage). 
There are two principal modes of investigation within parapsychology. On the one 
hand, studies that aim to test the existence of psi phenomena follow the proof-oriented 
research. On the other hand, the process-oriented research attempts to identify the 
mechanisms governing the detected effects as well as the conditions conducive to them. 
Apart from experimental studies, the latter may employ a phenomenological approach, 
using the exploration of qualitative characteristics of paranormal experience in order to 
gain insight into the processes by which psi operates. It is beyond the scope of this 
thesis to give a thorough review of the various methods and paradigms used in 
parapsychology. However, given that the main principles of this kind of research are 
relevant to parts of the following content, some discussion of the logic behind 
parapsychological research is appropriate. In order to illustrate this logic, we use the 
example of the so-called Ganzfeld protocol, a popular research paradigm in ESP research 
that has received substantial mainstream attention (see above). For a more in-depth 
review of research methods in parapsychology, we recommend the textbook by Irwin 
and Watt (2007). 
In a typical Ganzfeld setting, a participant (a receiver) is seated in a comfortable chair 
in a darkened room. Their eyes are covered by halved translucent table tennis balls 
illuminated by a red light. Additionally, headphones playing white or pink noise are 
placed over their ears. The receiver undergoes an initial period of relaxation in this 
setting. These conditions are created in order to induce an undifferentiated sensory field, 
resulting in a mild sensory deprivation, which is thought to be psi-conducive. This 
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reflects the aforementioned notion of psi as a weak signal that may be masked by 
cognitive and sensory noise under normal circumstances (Storm et al., 2010, Irwin & 
Watt, 2007). The receiver is then asked to verbalise their mentation. A target, usually a 
static picture or a short video clip is randomly drawn from a target pool. It is then, along 
with typically three decoy stimuli, judged for similarity with the receiver’s mentation. If 
the target is judged to be the most similar of the group, the trial is declared a “hit”, 
otherwise it is a “miss”. The overall number of hits is then tested against a mean chance 
expectation (MCE; in the example, MCE = 25%). If the number of hits is significantly 
higher than what could be expected under the null hypothesis of chance performance, 
the result is taken as evidence of psi. There are many variations to this basic paradigm. 
For instance, different ways of handling the target are used, based on the particular 
paranormal phenomenon being tested by the given study. If it is telepathy, there is also a 
sender present in another room viewing the target and attempting to mentally 
communicate its content to the receiver. In another case, if the phenomenon of interest 
is precognition, the receiver provides their mentation first and only after that, the target 
is randomly drawn. In order to study PK, however, there may be no mentation or 
targets at all and the participant’s task is to attempt to mentally influence the sequence 
produced by a random event generator (e.g., a sequence of heads-or-tails coin flips). The 
resulting sequence is then tested for randomness and the outcome is declared evidential 
of psi if the null hypothesis of randomness is rejected. In all such variations, due care is 
taken to guard against all sources of sensory leakage that could provide the receiver with 
information about the target via non-paranormal channels. Furthermore, crucial 
importance is placed on the absence of any bias in the target draw, since this is the only 
source of randomness in the setting, required by the assumptions of the statistical tests 
used to assess the significance of the results. 
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Other research paradigms used in parapsychology usually apply the same logic: a 
participant is faced with a task to influence/guess an outcome of a randomly generated 
event. A significant statistical anomaly is then equated with evidence for psi, provided all 
plausible alternative explanations for the detected effect have been ruled out. However, 
as mentioned in the preceding sections, there are philosophical issues associated with 
this kind of method stemming from the impossibility of confidently accounting for all 
possible alternative explanations. Furthermore, the negative approach to ascertaining the 
existence of psi (an anomaly not explainable by any known means), which is a direct 
consequence of the lack of a good conceptual definition of the object of study, is 
incapable of providing any information regarding the actual nature of psi. 
Having discussed what we perceive to be the main issues in parapsychological 
research, we now turn, one at a time, to the other two approaches to studying the 
paranormal. 
1.3.2. Pseudo-psi: In search for alternative explanations 
The second approach to the study of the paranormal assumes that even if the 
phenomena in question are not a result of any scientifically inexplicable mechanisms, 
they do in fact occur. Paranormal phenomena thus are not de facto paranormal but are 
rare and striking enough as to give the impression. These occurrences that are not psi 
yet look like it have been labelled pseudo-psi (Morris, 1986). Studies taking this 
approach search for potential physical (Lambert, 1959), physiological (Blanke et al., 
2005), and psychological (Wilson, 2002) mechanisms, that can lead to such apparently 
paranormal events. Thus, this avenue of research represents a transition between the 
parapsychological approach discussed above and the purely psychological which is 
introduced in the following section. This fact also illustrates the fuzzy demarcation 
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between individual approaches. On the one hand, there is considerable conceptual 
overlap between psi and pseudo-psi research. Some parapsychologists have 
hypothesised that psi operates through some, currently unknown, but ultimately natural 
and knowable mechanism (e.g., Wassermann, 1956). If this is the case for all the 
phenomena of interest, the distinction between psi and pseudo-psi ceases to exist. On 
the other hand, given that the construal of an event as paranormal is contingent upon 
the appraisal of the observer, no matter the actual external mechanism at play, 
psychology is necessarily going to be a relevant factor. For instance, it may be the case 
that, due to a pure coincidence, a person’s dream literally comes true. Even in face of 
such rare occurrence, it is still a matter of individual psychological setting whether or 
not the person attributes paranormal causation to this experience. 
Studies applying the pseudo-psi approach tend to employ emulation as the core 
principle of their methodology: they attempt to recreate a seemingly paranormal 
experience under controlled laboratory conditions through various mechanisms. The 
rationale behind this is that, consistent with the principle of parsimony, if phenomena 
that are for all purposes indistinguishable from purportedly paranormal events can be 
created by deliberate manipulation of well-understood normal mechanisms, then there 
remains little reason to assume the existence of genuinely paranormal phenomena. 
Alternatively these studies may seek to identify evidence of factors with known effects 
operating in putatively paranormal situations. For example, some researchers have 
suggested that poltergeist occurrences (such as “haunted” places) may arise as a result of 
mild tectonic or geophysical activity (Lambert, 1959). Also, it has also been suggested 
that certain naturally occurring environmental stimuli, such as infrasound emitted by 
wind, waterfalls, or thunder (Gužas & Viršilas, 2009), can induce anxiety, nausea, even 
optical illusions in people and thus can lead to putatively paranormal experiences 
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(Tandy, 2000; Tandy & Lawrence, 1998). Braithwaite and Townsend (2006), however, 
dispute the evidence for these phenomena. Other studies provide naturalistic accounts 
of various such experiences, invoking physiological processes. Mobbs and Watt (2011) 
review the existing body of relevant neurophysiological knowledge and suggest that 
near-death experiences are a result of events taking place in a stressed, oxygen-deprived 
brain. A related kind of experience, the so-called out-of-body experiences (OBEs), has 
been successfully simulated using several methods including brain stimulation (Blanke, 
Ortigue, Landis, & Seeck, 2002; Blanke et al., 2005) and complex multisensory illusions 
(Ehrsson, 2007; Lenggenhager,  Tadi, Metzinger, & Blanke, 2007). Furthermore, 
experiences such as alien abductions and the “old hag syndrome” (a terrifying 
experience of waking up to being suffocated by an evil presence, often in the form of an 
old hag) have both been linked to sleep paralysis, a situation of awakening from rapid-
eye-movement (REM) sleep, when voluntary control of muscles is suppressed, often 
accompanied by a feeling of terror (Blackmore & Cox, 1988; Firestone, 1985; French & 
Santomauro, 2007; McNally & Clancy, 2005). Finally, there have also been attempts to 
explain some seemingly paranormal phenomena through known psychological 
mechanisms. Wilson (2002) uses the hypothetical example of a woman who, on her way 
to work, crosses a footbridge every day. One day, she decides, for the first time, to take 
a different route to work only to learn later on that the footbridge collapsed around the 
same time she would have been crossing it, had she taken the usual route. After learning 
what happened, she may ascribe precognitive or clairvoyant character to her decision. 
However, she might have simply picked up on a slightly unusual behaviour of the 
footbridge the day before, perhaps a sign of structural damage, without consciously 
realizing it. This perception without awareness might have led to her putatively 
precognitive decision. In line with this hypothesis, Crawley, French, and Yesson (2002) 
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showed that subliminal cues can be exploited as a source of information even if one is 
not aware of doing so. In a supposedly ESP-focused experiment, they had their 
participants guess the pattern on a sequence of computer-generated cards. Half of the 
tasks were, unbeknownst to the participants, primed with a subliminal stimulus showing 
the correct answers. The researchers found that participants hypothesised to be more 
sensitive to subliminal priming were indeed more successful at guessing the correct 
answers on the primed trials (but not on the control ones) than less sensitive 
participants. 
Research, such as that of Crawley and colleagues (2002) reviewed above, focuses, in 
line with the pseudo-psi hypothesis, on potential psychological processes that can lead 
to genuine knowledge of a future event, albeit this knowledge is acquired via normal 
means. The last of the three approaches, to which we turn next, is concerned with those 
psychological factors that may be responsible for paranormal attribution in the face of 
an unusual experience. 
1.3.3. The paranormal as attribution 
The third approach to the study of the paranormal focuses on psychological factors 
that are likely to play a role in differentiating people with a propensity to perceive 
certain phenomena as paranormal from those who tend to reach for a “normal” 
explanation. A related but distinct object of study within this approach is the underlying 
psychology of belief in the existence of paranormal phenomena. Literature in this field 
tends to make few assumptions about the ontological validity of the paranormal (see e.g., 
Irwin & Watt, 2007). If such phenomena do not exist, it is all the more interesting to 
study the mechanisms responsible for above-mentioned beliefs and experiences. Even if 
they are genuine, they are probably not as frequent as reported, thus leaving a certain 
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proportion of the population whose beliefs and experiences are not a true reflection of 
paranormal phenomena. In either case, the effort to identify psychological mechanisms 
contributing to these beliefs and experiences is justified.  Thus, the issue of whether or 
not these things are ontologically real is not of primary relevance. In this dissertation, we 
also subscribe to this rationale and do not make any specific claims regarding the 
existence, or otherwise, of the paranormal. When it comes to assessing this matter, we 
would, however, argue that, as with other objects of scientific inquiry, the default 
position is that of open-minded scepticism and that the burden of proof lies with the 
proponents, whose task is to demonstrate the existence of these kinds of phenomena 
beyond reasonable doubt. Based on our evaluation of the existing parapsychological 
literature (Ritchie et at., 2012; Rouder et at., 2013; Storm et at., 2013; Wagenmakers et at., 
2011), we are of the opinion that this goal remains to be achieved. Therefore, from now 
on, when referring to ‘paranormal experiences’ or ‘paranormal phenomena’, we mean 
experiences and phenomena construed as paranormal by the particular person. 
Given the relevance of this approach for the aim of this thesis, we review the past 
literature in this area to a somewhat larger extent than we did with respect to research 
applying the other two approaches. In particular, we focus on the measurement of 
paranormal belief and experience, the main hypotheses framing the research into these 
topics, as well as the conceptual and methodological issues that, in our opinion, threaten 
its validity. 
1.3.3.1. Measurement of paranormal belief and experience 
There is a notable variety in the tools used to assess paranormal beliefs and 
experiences. Many studies use ad hoc scales (e.g., Blackmore & Trościanko, 1985; Beck & 
Millner, 2001; Lawrence & Peters, 2004; McGarry & Newberry, 1981). Some, usually 
clinical studies, address these topics (alternatively referred to as supernatural, magical, or 
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superstitious) as part of broader clinical constructs, such as the Magical Ideation scale of 
the Wisconsin-Madison scales (Chapman, Chapman, & Kwapil, 1995). However, several 
scales (e.g., Blackmore & Moore, 1994; Sheils & Berg, 1977; Wiseman & Morris, 1995), 
have been used in further research. Two of these, namely the Revised Paranormal Belief 
Scale (R-PBS, Tobacyk, 1988/2004) and the Australian Sheep-Goat Scale (ASGS, 
Thalbourne & Delin, 1993) have since become the most widely used tools for the 
assessment of paranormal belief and experience (Goulding & Parker, 2001; Irwin, 1993). 
Given the sheer number of available tools, it is not surprising that there is a 
considerable variability in the scope of phenomena these tools assess. On one end of 
the spectrum, there are scales that focus on a particular type of paranormal 
phenomenon, such as ESP (Thalbourne & Haraldsson, 1980). These have, however, 
been more often used for parapsychological research of the co-called “sheep-goat” 
effect (believers tend to outperform disbelievers at parapsychological tasks), rather than 
for exploring the psychological correlates and mechanisms of belief and experience 
(Irwin, 1993). Then there are scales that explore a variety of paranormal phenomena, as 
understood under the narrow parapsychological definition of the term. A good example 
of such a measure is the ASGS, a three-point forced choice (True/Uncertain/False) 
questionnaire of 18 items assessing the personal experience of and belief in ESP, 
telepathy, precognition, and phenomena related to the survival of mind after the 
physical death of the body. Finally, on the other end of the spectrum, scales such as the 
R-PBS address the belief in a broad range of phenomena from religious (deities, the 
devil) and superstitious (the unluckiness of the number 13) to extraordinary life forms 
(Loch Ness monster) and psi. This breadth of scope resulted in some researchers (e.g., 
Lindeman, Svedholm-Häkkinen, & Lipsanen, 2015) modifying the scale and excluding 
certain items for reasons of their cultural specificity or outdatedness. We suggest that 
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this variability in available measurement methods is symptomatic of the lack of 
conceptual clarity and consensus regarding the subject of study, which we discussed 
above (see section 1.2). 
Related to the above is the issue of dimensionality of paranormal belief and again, 
opinions on the matter differ (Irwin, 1993; Lindeman & Aarnio, 2006). For instance, 
Grimmer and White (1990) factor-analysed the data from an Australian psychology 
student sample and found seven oblique factors accounting for 2.68 – 10.04 % of the 
total variance each: traditional religion, obscure unbelief, popular science, alternative 
treatments, paratherapies, structural psi, and functional psi. Other analyses yielded a 
lower number of factors: two orthogonal factors, general superstitious belief and 
traditional religious belief, for Sullivan (1982); three factors related to belief in religion, 
psi, and the existence of extraordinary forms of life for Clarke (1991) and Sobal and 
Emmons (1982). Some authors have even suggested a general factor of paranormal 
belief (Zusne & Jones, 1989), although this view has attracted criticism (Irwin, 1993; 
Rattet & Bursik, 2001). Different still, Lindeman and Aarnio (2006) found a satisfactory 
fit for their hierarchical model with a single general factor of paranormal belief and four 
uncorrelated second-order factors. However, the scope of the measure employed was 
rather broad including all the R-PBS items and adding further ones. The resulting 68-
item scale encompassed topics such as beliefs in psi, astrology, magical beliefs about 
food, and more. 
The lack of consensus regarding the dimensionality of paranormal belief is also 
apparent in the scoring of the widely-used Paranormal Belief Scale. Tobacyk and 
Milford (1983) factor-analysed the original version of the PBS and found what they 
claimed to be 7 orthogonal factors. Identical structure was later advocated by Tobacyk 
(1988/2004) for the revised version of the scale. However, Lawrence (1995a) criticised 
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these findings and suggested that a 5 oblique factor solution is a more appropriate one. 
As a result of the ensuing debate (Lawrence, 1995b; Lawrence, & De Cicco, 1997; 
Lawrence, Roe, & Williams, 1997; Tobacyk, 1995a; 1995b; Tobacyk & Thomas, 1997) 
the claim of orthogonality of the factors was retracted. In the scale’s latest development, 
Lange, Irwin, and Houran (2000) used the Rasch model to explore the structure of the 
scale and, after excluding items with problematic psychometric properties, found that 
the items grouped into two clusters. They labelled them New Age Philosophy and 
Traditional Paranormal Beliefs. As we argue further in the text, the dearth of clarity with 
respect to the underlying structure of paranormal beliefs and experiences has 
consequences for research into these topics. Next, we provide an overview of the main 
theoretical frameworks that underpin this research. 
1.3.3.2. Theoretical frameworks 
The overarching idea informing the research under this approach that at least some 
paranormal beliefs and experiences arise as a result of one’s erroneous construal of a 
phenomenon, an event, or an experience as paranormal has been dubbed the 
“misattribution hypothesis” (Wiseman & Watt, 2006). Although originally proposed as,  
more-or-less, an alternative term for the cognitive deficit hypothesis (see below), we 
suggest that, given its principal tenets, it applies for and subsumes all the other partial 
hypotheses that have been proposed in order to explain paranormal belief and 
experience in psychological terms. There are four such hypotheses (Irwin, 1993; Irwin & 
Watt, 2007), which we discuss below. It is important to point out that the following 
section is not meant to be an exhaustive review of the empirical literature in psychology 
of paranormal beliefs and experiences. This literature is rather extensive and providing 
such a review is beyond the scope of this dissertation. To a reader interested in this 
literature, we highly recommend the review papers by Irwin (1993) and Wiseman and 
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Watt (2006), as well as the chapter on paranormal belief in Irwin and Watt (2007). Let us 
now provide an account of the aforementioned four hypotheses that have informed past 
research in this field. 
Firstly, it has been proposed that an important factor behind the misattribution is a 
disadvantaged social situation. This is known as the “social marginality hypothesis” 
(Bainbridge, 1978). This hypothesis is mainly tested by exploring various demographic 
correlates of paranormal belief and experience. The findings have, however, been 
mixed, which is a theme that permeates a substantial portion of research into 
paranormal belief and experience. For example, Haraldsson (1981), in his Icelandic 
sample (N = 568) found no relationship between age and paranormal belief, however in 
the British sample (N = 896), it seems that belief in the paranormal weakens with age 
for some phenomena, such as hauntings and poltergeists, witchcraft, or ESP, while 
remaining fairly stable for telepathy. Other studies exploring age (Castro et al., 2014; 
Irwin, 1993; Lindeman & Aarnio, 2006) also yielded conflicting results. When it comes 
to gender, the literature seems to paint a somewhat more homogeneous picture. Women 
have been consistently shown to report higher levels of both paranormal belief and 
experience (Castro et al., 2014; Haraldsson, 1985; Lindeman & Aarnio, 2006). This effect 
of gender varies between individual facets of the paranormal (Rice, 2003). However, 
Lange, Irwin, and Houran (2001) suggest that the observed differences might be a 
methodological artefact caused by differential item function of the used measures. Some 
studies have also investigated the relationship between paranormal belief on one hand 
and socioeconomic status and race/ethnicity on the other. No clear pattern of findings 
supporting the social marginality hypothesis has emerged (Emmons & Sobal, 1981; 
Irwin & Watt, 2007). 
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Secondly, the “worldview hypothesis” (Zusne & Jones, 1989) states that these 
beliefs and experiences are merely one facet of a person’s general life philosophy that 
entails a highly subjective, intuition-guided, and esoteric epistemology. Studies based on 
this hypothesis thus tend to explore various associated attitudes of these beliefs and 
experiences. Traditional religious beliefs and religiosity are among such attitudes but the 
results of the research into their association with paranormal belief are mixed. There is a 
small positive correlation between overall paranormal belief and belief in a deity 
(Thalbourne, 2003) but again, the effect varies across individual facets (Clarke, 1991; 
Hillstrom & Strachan, 2000; Tobacyk & Milford, 1983). Furthermore, there is evidence 
that the type of religiosity is also a factor in the relationship (Hergovich, Schott, & 
Arendasy, 2005). Further, it has been found that believers in the paranormal tend to 
subscribe to a more subjectivist personal philosophy (Zusne & Jones, 1989). Finally, 
perhaps unsurprisingly, belief in the paranormal has been associated with an inclination 
towards a substance dualist metaphysics (Stanovich, 1989; Svensen, White, & Caird, 
1992). 
Under the “cognitive deficit” hypothesis (Alcock, 1981), the misattribution of 
paranormal causation is seen as a result of a suboptimal cognitive system whose 
functioning is laden with irrationality, various biases, or even pathology. Researchers 
testing this hypothesis therefore look for various cognitive correlates of paranormal 
belief and experience. Several studies have focused on the topic of general cognitive 
ability. There is, however, a substantial methodological variability in the way cognitive 
ability is assessed (see Musch & Ehrenberg, 2004; Pennycook, Cheyne, Seli, Koehler, & 
Fugelsang 2012; Wiseman & Watt, 2002) and the results of these studies have been 
mixed, with some studies reporting a negative relationship between cognitive ability and 
paranormal belief (e.g., Gray, 1987; Messer & Griggs, 1989; Musch & Ehrenberg, 2002; 
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Otis & Alcock, 1982; Smith, Foster, & Stovin, 1998), others failing to find any such 
relationship (Dagnall, Parker, & Munley, 2007; Pennycook et al., 2012; Stuart-Hamilton, 
Nayak, & Priest, 2006; Thalbourne & Nofi, 1997; Wiseman & Watt, 2002), and others 
still even finding a relationship in the opposite direction (Emmons & Sobal, 1981; Jones, 
Russell, & Nickel, 1977; Haraldsson, 1985). Other correlates explored under the 
cognitive deficit hypothesis include preference for analytical versus intuitive thinking 
styles (e.g., Aarnio & Lindeman, 2005; Bensley, Lilienfeld, & Powell, 2014; Blackmore & 
Moore, 1994; Genovese, 2005; Saher & Lindeman, 2005), critical thinking ability (e.g., 
Alcock & Otis, 1980; Gray & Mill 1990; Hergovich, & Arendasy, 2005; Royalty, 1995), 
susceptibility to various cognitive biases (e.g., Tobacyk, Milford, Springer, & Tobacyk , 
1988; Willard & Norenzayan, 2013; Wilson & French, 2006 ), or probabilistic reasoning 
(e.g., Blackmore & Trościanko, 1985; Bressan, 2002; Brugger, Landis, & Regard, 1990; 
Brugger, Regard, & Landis, 1991; Dagnall et al., 2007; Musch & Ehrenberg, 2004; 
Roberts & Seager 1999; Stuart-Hamilton et al., 2006; Williams & Irwin, 1991). 
Considering the inconclusive outcomes of these studies, Wiseman and Watt (2006) note 
that while studies using decontextualised laboratory tasks, such as coin toss sequences or 
the birthday paradox, tend to yield significant results in support of the cognitive deficit 
hypothesis, more ecologically valid measures typically fail to replicate these effects. 
Finally, it has been proposed that these beliefs and experiences are fundamentally 
functional and serve to fulfil certain needs. This “psychodynamic function” hypothesis 
(Irwin, 1993) primarily informs research into personality and experiential correlates of 
paranormal beliefs and experiences. For instance, studies have explored the relationship 
between paranormal belief and experience and perceived control over the environment 
(Blackmore & Trościanko, 1985; Rudski, 2004). Irwin (1992; 1993) suggests that this 
illusion serves to satisfy the believers’ need to feel in control that arises as a consequence 
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of certain childhood experiences, such as trauma or a perceived lack of control over 
one’s environment and actions. However, it is not clear what predictions this hypothesis 
makes with respect to believers’ locus of control (LoC): do they feel that events in their 
lives are fundamentally controlable because of their tendency towards illusion of 
control, or do they feel passive with respect to these events as a result of their childhood 
experiences? Indeed, paranormal belief has been linked to both a tendency to an internal 
(McGarry & Newberry, 1981) as well as an external (Dag 1999; Dudley, 1999; Newby 
& Davis, 2004) LoC and both outcomes have been interpreted as supportive of the 
psychodynamic function hypothesis. While Newby and Davis (2004) argue that a person 
who believes in the existence of mysterious powers that govern the ways of the world 
will obviously have an external LoC, McGarry and Newberry (1981) suggest that one’s 
belief in one’s ability to influence the reality through paranormal means, such as 
psychokinesis, is logically connected to an internal LoC. We believe that the 
psychodynamic function hypothesis has yielded some promissing findings, however 
there is a need for more specific predictions, perhaps at the level of individual facets of 
paranormal phenomena. 
Having discussed the main hypotheses of the psychological approach to the 
paranormal, it should be noted that, once again, these hypotheses are not mutually 
exclusive. It is, for example, possible that it is the psychological motivation to satisfy 
frustrated needs that drives paranormal beliefs and experiences in socially marginalised 
individuals. Similarly, this sort of need fulfilment only provides motivation, not a 
psychological mechanism through which the paranormal misattribution takes place. 
That may plausibly be achieved through some of the many cognitive biases explored 
within the framework of the cognitive deficit hypothesis. 
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1.3.3.3. Further conceptual and methodological issues 
Having discussed the main hypotheses under which the research into the 
psychology of paranormal belief and experience is conducted, it is crucial to address two 
main conceptual and methodological issues within this literature that we believe deserve 
some attention. 
Firstly, a substantial proportion of the previous psychological research into 
paranormal beliefs and experiences has, in general, treated its object of study as a 
homogenous entity, thereby tacitly assuming that all the individual facets  of the 
paranormal (ESP, PK, life after death, etc.) are a result of more-or-less the same 
mechanisms. There is, however, no good evidence to support this assumption. Indeed, 
some researchers have previously pointed out that different paranormal beliefs have 
different structures and correlates (e.g., Irwin, 1993; Lindeman & Aarnio, 2006; Perkins 
& Allen, 2006). If this is the case, then the effort to reliably identify the correlates of 
belief and experience of the paranormal in general may, to a certain extent, be 
misguided. This is not to say that the entirety of the existing literature suffers from this 
shortcoming. Studies into correlates of paranormal belief and experiences conducted by 
parapsychologists tend to distinguish between individual facets of the paranormal more 
than those in mainstream psychological literature. The assessment of the individual 
paranormal phenomena is, however, seldom guided by hypotheses and is often done in 
an ad hoc fashion (e.g., Agorastos et al., 2012; Davies & Kirkby, 1985; Hergovich et al., 
2005). Also, surveys of beliefs and experiences (e.g., Castro et al., 2014; Haraldsson, 
1985) often provide a detailed break-down of individual phenomena and their 
relationship with demographic variables. Moreover, studies often provide a similar 
break-down in their descriptive analysis sections (e.g., Williams & Irwin, 1991), however 
they typically do not proceed to explore the differences between individual types of 
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beliefs and experiences. Finally, there are a small number of studies that focus on a 
specific facet of the paranormal (e.g., Brugger, Landis, & Regard, 1990) and those that 
take a genuinely multidimensional, hypothesis-driven approach to studying the belief in 
the paranormal (e.g., Perkins & Allen, 2006; Tobacyk, Nagot, & Miller, 1988). However, 
there appears to be no systematic effort to identify mechanisms underpinning belief in 
and experience of individual types of these phenomena. We would argue that this state 
reflects the methodological developments undergone by the Paranormal Belief Scale 
discussed in section 1.3.3.1. Exploring individual facets of paranormal belief appears to 
have been more common since the 1980s, when Tobacyk’s orthogonal 7-factor solution 
was proposed. Nowadays, since the 2-factor solution has become widely accepted 
(Wiseman & Watt, 2006), the trend is to treat paranormal beliefs – in the narrow sense, 
as captured by the New Age Philosophy factor – as a single concept. Arguably, there is a 
reason to do so; the individual facets of paranormal belief are positively correlated and 
thus it is plausible that there indeed exists a general factor of paranormal belief 
(Lindeman & Aarnio, 2006). However, this general tendency might merely represent a 
predisposition to this kind of belief while the particular manifestation may be 
determined by unique psychological mechanisms. This would explain the lack of 
conclusive findings in paranormal belief research. 
The second issue affecting the research in this field is the insufficient delineation of 
paranormal belief and experiences. It is commonplace in studies on the psychology of 
these phenomena not to draw a clear conceptual distinction between a belief in a given 
phenomenon and an experience of it (Rattet & Bursik, 2001), although there are notable 
exceptions (e.g., Blagrove, French, & Jones, 2005; Rattet & Bursik, 2001). To the best of 
our knowledge, only a few studies have explored the relationship between the two 
(Glicksohn, 1990; Lawrence, Edwards, Barraclough, Church, & Hetherington, 1995; 
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Rattet & Bursik, 2001). These studies found that paranormal belief and experience share 
about 25-40% of variance which, albeit a significant proportion, suggests the two 
constructs are not interchangeable and should not be treated as such. 
In order to emphasise the relevance of these issues, we illustrate how they impact 
the main hypotheses proposed to account for paranormal belief and experience. As we 
will show, these hypotheses do not sufficiently distinguish between individual 
paranormal phenomena in question on the one hand and between belief in and 
experience of the paranormal on the other. 
Firstly, as mentioned above, the overarching theme of research into the psychology 
of the paranormal is that of a misattribution of paranormal causation to normal albeit 
peculiar experiences (e.g., Alcock, 1981; Blackmore, 1992). This hypothesis has been 
important in the study of paranormal beliefs and has prompted much research (see 
above). However, we would argue, that it serves primarily to explain paranormal 
experience, and only secondarily belief; there needs to be an experience in order for it to 
be misconstrued as something paranormal. While it is true that it may be difficult to 
imagine someone who does not believe in the existence of, say, telepathy attributing 
some unusual experience to direct exchange of information between two minds, the 
idea that there are people who endorse paranormal belief without ever having had a 
subjectively paranormal experience is undoubtedly less controversial. Indeed, the 
aforementioned variance overlap between paranormal experience and belief of 25-40% 
provides, in our view, sufficient grounds for the need to treat these two concepts as 
related but distinct. 
Secondly, paranormal beliefs have been linked to a need for control (Irwin, 2000). 
The rationale behind the link with belief in general is, however, rather weak. There is no 
good reason to assume that a belief in the existence of any paranormal phenomenon 
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would fulfil one's need for control (see e.g., Whitson & Galinksy, 2008; Greenaway, 
Louis, & Hornsey, 2013). If, on the other hand, the hypothesis is reformulated in terms 
of belief that one can gain information or influence the present or the future, for 
instance, by using precognition, lucky charms, or horoscopes, the connection to a need 
for control appears better justified. Thus, more than the belief in the existence of the 
paranormal, the hypothesis deals with the belief in one’s ability (or one’s access to those 
who possess such an ability) to influence reality through paranormal means. Perkins & 
Allen (2006) argue along similar lines and in their study, categorise different types of 
paranormal belief into “control” and “noncontrol” beliefs. Although their rationale for 
which beliefs fall within which category can be argued with, their approach, along with 
that of a few others (e.g., Davies and Kirkby, 1985; Tobacyk and Wilkinson, 1991), 
presents a welcome, if rare, occurrence. 
Finally, the view of paranormal beliefs as a coping mechanism (Callaghan & Irwin, 
2003; Rogers, Qualter, Phelps, & Gardner, 2006) suffers from a similar 
overgeneralisation. It is, again, difficult to imagine how a belief in UFO or the 
experience of distressing poltergeist or precognitive dreams, for instance, can help one 
cope with one’s circumstances. However, a belief in things such as deities, fate, soul, 
survival of consciousness after death, or psychic mediums may well help people come to 
terms with loss of a beloved person, a lack of meaning, or a feeling of randomness in 
life. 
Based on this critique, we second the call made by others before us (e.g., Glicksohn, 
1990; Lindeman & Aarnio, 2006) and propose that research in the area should more 
clearly differentiate between paranormal belief and experience as well as address specific 
phenomena, rather than focusing on the heterogeneous overarching category of “the 
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paranormal”. For this reason, the research reported in this dissertation focuses on a 
particular paranormal phenomenon, namely precognitive dreams. 
1.4. Precognitive dreams 
The notion that dreams can serve as an arcane source of knowledge of things to 
come has been persistent throughout human history and across cultures. It figures, for 
instance, as a major plot element in the story of Joseph in the Jewish and Christian 
religious scriptures. This tradition of ascribing mystical if not outright magical 
significance to dreams echoes, to a certain extent, even in relatively recent 
psychotherapeutic methods, such as Freudian or Jungian dream analysis. 
Even in modern times, surveys have shown that a large proportion of the general 
population believes that dreams can literally provide information about future events 
that could not have been obtained by any known means (e.g., rational inference, 
intuition, or coincidence). The belief in the reality of these, so-called precognitive 
dreams, was espoused by around 55-70% of participants in three representative samples 
of Britons, Icelanders, and Swedes, with about half as many reporting having had such a 
dream (Haraldsson, 1985). Similarly, it has been found that out of all spontaneous 
precognitive experiences 60 % occurred during sleep with a further 10 % taking place in 
near-sleep states (Green, 1960; Van de Castle, 1977).  Based on these findings, it is 
apparent that precognitive dreams are one of the most frequent of all paranormal beliefs 
and experiences. For that reason, we chose it as the object of study of this dissertation. 
The topic of dream precognition has, over the years, attracted substantial interest 
from parapsychologists. On several occasions, accounts of purportedly precognitive 
dreams related to high-profile disasters, such as the sinking of the Titanic (Stevenson, 
1960) and the Aberfan tragedy (Barker, 1967) have been gathered. These were, however, 
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exclusively post hoc reports, which makes their validity impossible to verify. Following 
Aberfan, the British Premonitions Bureau was set up in London and a few years later in 
the USA the Central Premonitions Registry was established (Nelson, 1970). Not much is 
known about the operation of these registries, but they both faltered apparently because 
of limited funds and insufficiently specific predictions (MacKenzie, 1974). 
There have also been attempts to test precognition through postal dream diary 
studies. Participants in Besterman’s (1933) study recorded their dreams upon awakening 
and sent a copy of the records by mail to the SPR. They were also asked to notify the 
experimenter if they experienced any events that corresponded to their dreams. Forty-
five such events were reported. However, out of the total 430 submitted dreams, only 
two were judged as providing sufficient support of a paranormal interpretation. Similar, 
not hugely encouraging results were obtained by a more recent postal study (Hearne, 
1984). 
An important milestone in parapsychological exploration of this topic are the so-
called Maimonides studies, a series of experiments conducted at the Maimonides 
Medical Center in Brooklyn, New York (Ullman & Krippner, 1970; Ullman, Krippner, 
& Vaughan, 1989) designed to test dream ESP (telepathy, clairvoyance, and 
precognition). The experiments took place in a sleep laboratory, with the participants 
connected to electroencephalogram (EEG) and electrooculogram (EOG). These would 
be used to identify the rapid eye movement (REM) phase in participants’ sleep cycles, a 
stage when dreaming is most likely to occur. Once the participants entered the REM 
phase, they were woken up and interviewed about the content of their dreams. The 
dreams were then matched with targets in various modifications of the general 
parapsychological procedure exemplified by the Ganzfeld described in section 1.3.1 
above. The two studies that focused on testing the existence of precognitive dreams 
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were conducted using a single participant, a self-proclaimed psychic Malcolm Bessent 
(Krippner, Ullman, & Honorton, 1971; Krippner, Honorton, & Ullman, 1972). The 
results of the studies were interpreted by the authors as evidence of dream precognition, 
with effect sizes of 0.73 and 0.65 respectively, although criticism has been levied against 
the methodology applied (e.g., Alcock, 1981). There have been several subsequent dream 
ESP studies aiming to conceptually replicate the findings of the Maimonides group. 
Sherwood and Roe (2003) reviewed this research and found an overall significant effect, 
although its size was considerably smaller (r = .14) than the original studies (r = .33). 
Sherwood and Roe speculated that the drop in effect size might be because the post-
Maimonides studies did not employ sleep laboratory and EEG/EOG methodology. 
However the only study post-Maimonides to test the dream precognition hypothesis in 
a sleep laboratory found no support for the hypothesis (Watt, Wiseman, & Vuillaume, in 
press). 
In contrast with the amount of parapsychological research on putative precognitive 
dreams, the other two approaches (see sections 1.3.2 and 1.3.3) have yielded 
considerably less output. Madey (1993) proposed that prophetic experiences, such as 
precognitive dreams, are a result of the inherent characteristics of vague, temporarily 
unbounded predictions. Such predictions are easy to forget if they are not confirmed 
but become very salient if they are. Although he found support for this biased 
processing of such predictions, there was no relationship with paranormal belief. 
Recently, this research was replicated with similar results (Watt, Ashley, Gillett, 
Halewood, & Hanson, 2014). However, Watt and colleagues also found that 
precognitive dream belief and experience were both related to a higher propensity to 
find correspondences between unrelated events. Interestingly, this was only the case in a 
precognitive dream context and not in a decontextualized neutral scenario. Applying the 
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probability-judgement approach of Blackmore and Trościanko (1985) and Brugger et al., 
1990) to precognitive dream belief and experience, Blagrove and colleagues (2006) 
found that a higher number of reported precognitive dream experiences was associated 
with a tendency to consider a lottery ticket filled by someone else as not equally likely to 
win than one filled by the participant. However, this relationship only held for non-
university-educated participants. Furthermore, when it came to judging the likeliness of 
sequences of dice rolls, there was no relationship between the performance on the task 
and precognitive dream experience. These results agreed with those for paranormal 
belief. Finally, precognitive dream experience and paranormal belief were both related to 
a tendency to answer yes to three personal questions (e.g., “Do you have a scar on your 
left knee?”). The authors suggest that this result may be seen as evidence that 
paranormal believers and precognitive dreamers adopt broader inclusion criteria. This is 
in line with the findings of Watt and colleagues (2014) regarding the propensity to find 
connections. Similarly, Houran and Lange (1998) suggest that precognitive dreams can 
be interpreted as purely coincidental, albeit personally significant, correspondences 
between mundane dreams and real-life events. Other interpretations have also been 
proposed. For instance, Fukuda (2002) proposes that the majority of such experiences 
are, in fact, instances of déjà vu. 
As for the demographics of precognitive dream experiences, Haraldsson (1985) 
found that women were more likely to both believe in the reality of precognitive dreams 
and report having experienced them. However, Aumann, Lahl, and Pietrowsky (2012) 
found that women tend to ascribe more personal significance to their dreams in general. 
This may be relevant for the issue of precognitive dream experiences which has also 
been linked to attitudes towards dreams in general (Schredl, 2009). On the one hand it is 
possible that these gender differences in the significance ascribed to one’s dreams are a 
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result of the tendency of women to believe in precognitive dreams as well as to 
experience such dreams. On the other hand, it is possible that the unequal rate of 
precognitive dream belief and experience with respect to gender is a result of these 
differences towards dreams in general. Beaulieu-Prévost and Zadra (2005) found that a 
tendency to ascribe importance to one’s dreams leads to overestimation of one’s dream 
recall frequency. By extension, it is plausible that women, who in general tend to 
consider their dreams as more important than men do, are likely to overestimate the 
frequency of their own subjective precognitive dream experience, thus leading to the 
gender differences found by Haraldsson (1985). It should be noted, however, that other 
studies did not find gender differences in precognitive dream frequency (Blagrove et al., 
2006; Rattet & Bursik, 2001; Schredl, 2009). 
There is also psychological research not primarily aimed at precognitive dream 
belief and experience that may nevertheless be relevant to the topic. We review this 
research in the subsequent chapters. 
For the purpose of this dissertation, we define precognitive dreams as dreams that 
provide information about future events that cannot be attributed to prior knowledge, 
rational inference, intuition, or coincidence. When communicating this definition to our 
participants, the following five criteria (Bender, 1966) are used: 
1. The dream must be recounted or recorded before its fulfilment (e.g., was 
it written down or described to another person before it ‘came true’?); 
2. The dream must include enough details to render chance coincidence 
unlikely; 
3. The possibility of inference from actual knowledge must be excluded (i.e., 
the dream must refer to an unexpected or unpredictable event); 
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4. Self-fulfilling prophecies must be excluded (i.e., you could not make the 
dream ‘come true’ through your own actions after the dream); 
5. Telepathic influences should not be able to explain the occurrence of the 
precognitive dream (i.e., no one else could know the information in the dream at 
the time that you had the dream). 
 
In addition, when discussing precognitive dream experiences, we refer to subjective 
assessment of a dream as precognitive by the experiencer. Whether or not these 
experiences meet the evidential criteria stated above is not relevant. 
1.5. Thesis outline 
As is apparent from the literature reviewed above, there has not been much 
research into the topic of precognitive dreams. For this reason, we believe, it would be 
beneficial to explore several lines of inquiry with the aim of identifying potentially 
promising avenues. This dissertation therefore presents research in line with each of the 
three approaches to the study of the paranormal outlined in section 1.3. Six studies are 
reported in this dissertation. 
In Chapter II we report on an online dream precognition study conducted in order 
to test the psi hypothesis (Study 1). Participants (N = 50) collected details of their 
dreams over four consecutive weekly periods. At the end of each such period, they 
submitted their dream reports. A group of four short video clips was then randomly 
selected from a target pool consisting of 17 such groups. The particular group of video 
clips was randomly selected for each participant in each trial. Independent judges 
subsequently rated the similarity of the dream reports with respect to each individual 
video clip in the selected group, providing both percent and rank ratings. Subsequently, 
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one target per participant per trial was randomly selected from the group of four video 
clips and sent to the participants. If the target allocation matched the highest judge 
rating, the trial was a hit. The testing of the psi hypothesis consisted of comparing the 
number of hits to a chance baseline of 50 hits out of 200 trials (4 trials per participant). 
Subsequent post-hoc analyses were conducted exploring patterns in the data relevant to 
the psi hypothesis. The findings are used to illustrate several conceptual and 
methodological issues that limit the value of this kind of research. 
In Chapter III we move away from the psi hypothesis and focus instead on 
alternative explanations of precognitive dreams in terms of unconscious cognition, 
which we believe may be a more fruitful line of research. We present two studies testing 
the hypothesis that precognitive dreams arise as a result of unconscious inferences 
about likely future events based on subtle cues from the environment perceived in the 
absence of awareness. Study 2 explores individual differences in implicit processing and 
their relationship to precognitive dream belief and experience. Participants (N = 50) 
completed the serial reaction time task, widely used in implicit learning research, as well 
as a series of questionnaire measures. We predicted that participants with prior 
precognitive dream experience will perform better at the implicit learning task. Study 3 
tests the hypothesis that it is the ability to notice subtle cues explicitly that relates to 
precognitive dream experience. In order to test this hypothesis, participants (N = 49) 
completed a modified flicker task used in change blindness research. Our modification 
allowed for assessing both explicit and implicit change detection separately. The 
performance on this task was then related to measures belief in and experience of 
precognitive dreams. 
Chapter IV forms a bridge between the alternative explanation approach and the 
approach focusing on psychological factors of precognitive dream belief and experience. 
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On a sample of participants recruited online (N = 672), Study 4 explores several 
demographic and sleep- and dream-related variables and their relationship with 
precognitive dream belief and experience. Extending the broad hypothesis tested by the 
research reported in Chapter III, in Study 4 we hypothesised that precognitive dream 
experience is associated with erratic patterns of sleep behaviour. We also explored the 
demographic factors of precognitive dream belief and experience, namely gender, age 
and education. Moreover, we ascertained the relationship between the measures related 
to precognitive dreams and attitudes towards dreams in general. Finally, in line with the 
argument presented in section 1.3.3.3, the study also looked at the mutual relationship 
between the belief in and the experience of precognitive dreams. 
In order to further develop our line of research, we identify a need for a new 
measurement tool addressing attitudes towards one’s precognitive dream experiences. 
Study 5, reported in Chapter V, concerns the development and validation of such a tool. 
A subset of the sample used in the previous study consisting exclusively of people who 
reported having had this kind of experience (N = 330) filled in an initial 49-item 
questionnaire. After removing items with unsatisfactory psychometric characteristics an 
exploratory factor analysis, coupled with an exploratory structural equation modelling, 
revealed a well-interpretable 5 factor structure with good internal consistency. 
Additional variables collected on the sample were subsequently used to test the validity 
of the derived subscales. 
The final empirical chapter, Chapter VI, explores the relationship between 
precognitive dream belief and experience, their personal significance and memory. Study 
6 draws on the findings reported in Chapter IV as well as on the new attitude 
questionnaire described in Chapter V in order to investigate the relationship between 
self-relevance of one’s supposed precognitive dreams, one’s memory of the earliest 
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experience of such dreams, and the frequency with which one has these experiences. 
Using the data collected on the sample described in Chapter IV, we tested three 
hypotheses. Firstly, we predicted that the earliest precognitive dream experiences tend to 
date to a period of identity formation in one’s life. Secondly, we predicted that the 
vividness of the memory of this earliest experience will be related to the frequency with 
which one reports experiencing precognitive dreams. Finally we predicted that this 
relationship will be accounted for by the personal significance ascribed to one’s 
precognitive dreams.  
Finally, Chapter VII summarises the findings of the seven studies conducted as a 
part of this dissertation. We discuss our results in the context of the existing literature 
and highlight the main theoretical, methodological, and empirical contributions of our 




Testing the psi hypothesis 
 
2.1. Study 1 Introduction 
Testing claims of the paranormal has a long tradition which has historically been 
rather intimately connected to that of mainstream psychology. Indeed, some of 
psychology’s most notable personalities have been involved in the development of the 
field of parapsychology. For instance, both William James and William McDougall have, 
in their time, presided over the Society for Psychical Research which, having been 
established in 1882, is the oldest extant professional organisation devoted to the study 
of the paranormal. Later in his career, even Hans Eysenck turned his attention towards 
the topics of astrology and other paranormal phenomena (e.g. Eysenck, 1975; Mayo, 
White, & Eysenck, 1978; see also Dean, Nias, & French, 1997). Most recently, the 
publication of Bem’s (2011a, see section 1.1) research on ‘retroactive priming’ in a top 
psychology journal has contributed to the stirring up of a lively debate about the state of 
research in psychology and shown that, despite often unfavourable views of 
psychological scientists on the topic of the paranormal, the two fields have still not 
entirely divorced. This recent development also illustrates how parapsychology has 
contributed to the methodological advancement of psychology as a science. It has been 
argued that experimental controls, such as blinding and randomisation, statistical 
methods, such as meta-analysis and Bayesian inference, and concepts, such as researcher 
degrees of freedom, have often been introduced into psychology as a result of its 
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interaction with parapsychology (see Watt, 2005; Wagenmakers et al., 2011; Simmons et 
al., 2011). 
We thus think that while the core of this dissertation concerns the psychology of 
precognitive dream experience and belief, it is appropriate to address the topic also from 
the point of view of parapsychology. The reason for this is twofold: firstly, albeit at odds 
with the current state of scientific understanding of the universe, the claim that people’s 
dreams literally predict the future by supernatural means is, in principle, a testable 
hypothesis and as such should be given a dispassionate scholarly treatment. A book-size 
dissertation on the topic of precognitive dreams should, arguably, include such 
treatment. Secondly, it is our opinion that researchers who deal with paranormal beliefs 
and experiences find themselves necessarily treading the borderline between psychology 
and parapsychology and thus need to have a good knowledge of both these disciplines. 
A first-hand experience of parapsychological research provides insight into the 
methodology applied in the field and its potential shortcomings and controversies that 
may be difficult to gain by a mere study of published parapsychological work. 
Therefore, in the first empirical chapter of this thesis, we focus on what is known within 
the field of parapsychology as ‘testing the psi hypothesis’, i.e., exploring whether 
people’s dreams contain anomalous information predictive of future events. 
When considering possible explanations for spontaneous paranormal experiences, 
parapsychologists tend to turn to controlled laboratory settings in order to test the psi 
hypothesis. However, only a minority of laboratory dream extrasensory perception 
(ESP) studies have investigated precognition, which is perhaps odd given the prevalence 
with which spontaneous dream precognition experiences are reported. Controlled 
laboratory studies of dream ESP took off from 1962, after psychiatrist Montague 
Ullman established a dream laboratory at the Maimonides Medical Center (Krippner, 
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1993; Ullman et al., 1970; 1989, see section 1.4). Thirteen formal dream ESP studies (11 
telepathy, 2 precognition) were conducted at the lab before it closed in 1978, the 
majority of which obtained medium to large positive effect sizes (Sherwood & Roe, 
2003). A review of the post-Maimonides dream ESP research identified that, for the 
majority of the studies, the research environment had moved from the relatively 
expensive and time-consuming sleep laboratory to participants’ own homes (Sherwood 
& Roe, 2003). The studies had a modest combined effect size (r = 0.14) – significantly 
less than for the Maimonides studies, but still regarded as successful by Sherwood and 
Roe, who expressed the hope that dream ESP research would be ‘re-awakened’.  
Nowadays, it is possible to present stimuli and collect data rapidly from participants 
online, something that is particularly practical when investigating dream precognition. 
Sleeping in their own homes, participants keep dream diaries and use a website to 
complete questionnaires and submit dream summaries and ratings at times that are 
convenient to them. Email is used to coordinate and communicate with participants; 
target feedback is rapidly given via video-streaming portals. The present study makes 
use of these advances in order to test the hypothesis that participants’ dreams will 
resemble a future randomly chosen target to an extent greater than chance expectation. 
Participants were asked to complete questionnaire measures concerning their 
precognitive dream experience and dream recall. Their task was then to dream about a 
target video clip that would subsequently be sent to them. They submitted a weekly 
dream summary that was rated for similarity with randomly-chosen target pools by 
independent hypothesis-blind judges. We used independent judges because if 
participants were to assess the similarity themselves, they would see all target 
possibilities therefore their dreams could in theory ‘precognise’ one of the decoy targets. 
Having participants only view their designated target video was, we felt, a way to ‘focus’ 
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any precognition on the target. After the judges had made their ratings, a target video 
clip was randomly selected and sent to participants, who were not informed of the 
judges’ ratings. After viewing the target clip, participants were asked to rate it for 
similarity with their dreams. If the psi hypothesis is true, we would expect to obtain 
significantly more hits than can be predicted by chance alone.  
2.2. Method 
2.2.1. Participants 
Participants were recruited through various means: via posts on Twitter; by email 
sent to former participants of an online parapsychology course led by CW (thesis 
supervisor); through the Koestler Parapsychology Unit website; from amongst 
acquaintances of the authors; and by word of mouth. Individuals were invited to 
volunteer if they were interested in their dreams (precognitive or otherwise) and able to 
recall their dreams. MV (thesis author) sent participants detailed information on the 
study prepared by CW. Volunteers received no financial reward for participating in the 
study. A total of 99 volunteers were sent the link to the initial questionnaire (see section 
2.2.3). Twenty-two of them did not return a completed questionnaire, and thus did not 
proceed with the study. Recruitment continued until 50 participants (20 males, 30 
females; Mage = 42.8, range 21–82, SD = 14.41) had completed four trials each. Twenty-
one others dropped out of the study before completing four trials; 6 completed four 
trials after the pre-planned N of 50 participants had been reached. Data for these 27 
participants is not included in this report. 
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2.2.2. Independent judges 
Two individuals who had an interest in parapsychology (a psychology PhD student 
and a psychology undergraduate student) acted as independent judges. They were each 
paid for their work as judges. Because they had no previous experience in judging, they 
were given guidelines on free-response ESP judging (Delanoy, Morris, & Watt, 2004). 
2.2.3. Materials 
Participants provided of the following information via online questionnaires: 
demographics and beliefs; dream summary and confidence ratings; and similarity ratings. 
Initial questionnaire 
A questionnaire inquiring into demographic characteristics as well as the following 
sections was presented (see Appendix A.1 for full wording of the used measures):  
Frequency of dream recall was measured using a single item (“How often have you 
recalled your dreams recently (in the past several months)?”) with the following 
response options: Never; Less than once a month; About once a month; Two or three times a 
month; About once a week; Several times a week; Almost every morning. This Dream Recall 
Frequency scale was developed by Schredl (2004), who reports a high test-retest 
reliability over approximately 70 days of r = 0.85, N = 198. 
Belief in precognitive dreaming was assessed using a single item (”Do you believe 
that some individuals have dreams that predict future events and that are not just 
coincidence?”) with response options Yes, No, and Unsure. Bender’s (1966, see section 
1.4) five criteria for judging a dream as precognitive were provided to participants, along 
with parenthetical explanations where appropriate, in order to ensure conceptual clarity. 
Another single-item measure assessed the subjective frequency of precognitive 
dream experience (“Based on the five criteria above, please indicate approximately how 
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often you have had a precognitive dream over the last few years.”). Response options 
were Never; Less than once a year; About once a year; About once in six months; About once a 
month; and About once a week. 
Dream summary form 
Participants provided a concise (maximum 300 words) written account of their 
dreams over each of four 5-day periods (one preceding each tiral) and assessed how 
confident they were that any of the dreams therein would relate to the target stimulus 
with which they were about to be presented. Response options were Not at all confident; 
Not very confident; Somewhat confident; Very confident; and Completely confident. Participants 
were also asked to explain why they chose their particular confidence rating (see 
Appendix A.2 for more detail). 
Similarity rating form 
After participants were sent a link to their target video, they were asked to indicate 
how much similarity, they felt, there was between their submitted dream summary for 
the given trial and the target with which they had been presented. They were also asked 
to bear in mind not just the dream content, but also potential associated themes and 
emotions. Participants typed in a number between 1 (No similarity) and 100 (Complete 
similarity). The form can be found in Appendix A.3) 
Target pool 
The stimulus pool consisted of 68 short (around one minute) video clips divided 
into 17 target pools of four videos each uploaded to YouTube as private videos 
accessible only through an unindexed URL (for a sample video clip see 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5_GLuUlt8u4). The target clips were digitized 
from a pool used in KPU ganzfeld-ESP research that had obtained positive psi results 
(e.g., Dalton, 1997; Morris, Dalton, Delanoy & Watt, 1995), and included scenes from 
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films, nature documentaries and music videos. There were originally 18 target pools (i.e., 
72 video clips), but one was withdrawn prior to the commencement of the study after a 
copyright query was raised by YouTube.  
Random number generator 
For random selection of the target pools and targets we used a RNG function of 
the website RANDOM.ORG (https://www.random.org/integers/), which generates 
numbers based on atmospheric noise and is therefore a true random source. This is 
more appropriate for a precognition study than a pseudo-random source, because it 
rules out the possibility of clairvoyance. 
2.2.4. Procedure 
The study consisted of 200 trials (pre-planned as four trials each from 50 
participants). For security reasons, the target for any one trial was randomly selected and 
sent to participants only after the independent blind judge had submitted his rating of 
the four randomly-chosen target pool videos against the dream summary for that trial. 
Therefore, there could be no leakage of target information, either from the randomiser 
to the judges or from the participants to the judges. Participants were not informed of 
the outcome of their judge’s ratings while the study was underway, but they were sent a 
summary of the overall study results once concluded. For the independent judging, no 
tied ratings were permitted, and a ‘hit’ was defined as a Rank 1 corresponding to the 
designated target. 
The initial questionnaire, as well as the two forms, was published online using 
Google Forms service. Participants could therefore complete the online questionnaire 
and forms after being sent the appropriate URL. 
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Each participant was assigned by MV to one of two judges and was sent a hyperlink 
to the initial questionnaire (participants had no contact with the judges, nor were they 
aware of the judges’ identities; likewise, judges were unaware of the participants’ 
identities). After completing and submitting the initial questionnaire, the participants 
were informed that their five-day dream collection period had commenced. They were 
reminded that, once their dream summary had been received by the researchers, they 
would be sent a “target” video clip to view. They were asked to take a few moments 
every night, before going to sleep to gently remind themselves that their dreams during 
the night would be linked to the target clip they were going to watch in due course. 
On the fifth night, they were sent an email informing them that the dream 
collection period was about to end and that their first dream summary was due the next 
morning. They were also sent a hyperlink to the dream summary form. Upon receiving 
the dream summary from a participant, MV randomly selected a target pool for that 
participant (one of the 17) and sent the anonymised dream report along with the URLs 
of the target pool videos to the judge. Within each target pool, the number of the clip 
determined the position in which its URL would be presented to the independent 
judges. So, for target pool 1, clip 1_1 would be first in the list of four URLs, clip 1_2 
would be second, 1_3 third, and 1_4 fourth. Judges could (and did) review the four clips 
in whatever order they chose and could (and did) view the clips more than once during 
the judging process for any particular trial.  
The judges were instructed to provide a percentage rating of the similarity between 
each of the four videos in a given target pool and the contents of the dream summary, 
as well as ranking of the videos based on these ratings (rank 1 = greatest similarity, rank 
4 = lowest similarity). No tied ratings were permitted. They subsequently emailed their 
judgements to MV in an attached file. MV then, without viewing the judgements, 
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randomly selected a target video from the given pool and sent its URL to the particular 
participant via email. The participants were also instructed to follow a hyperlink to the 
dream similarity rating form upon viewing the target videos.  
Two to three days after receiving the participants’ similarity rating, MV informed 
the participants by email that the second dream collection period was commencing and 
the procedure repeated itself. Altogether, for each participant four trials were conducted 
over approximately a four-week period. Throughout the study, the participants were 
thanked for their involvement and indirectly encouraged to continue. If a participant 
failed to submit either of the forms, they were sent a gentle reminder to do so. 
At the conclusion of the study, participants were sent a short summary of the 
overall study results. 
2.2.5. Hypothesis 
We predicted that there would be significantly more hits than mean chance 
expectation, based on the independent judges’ ranks of the target and three decoy clips 
(assessed by an exact binomial test1).  
                                                 
1 This analysis was planned (rather than, for instance, sum-of-ranks, binary hits where rankings or ratings 
in the top half = binary hit and in the bottom half = binary miss, or z-score based on judges’ ratings), 
firstly because Child's (1985) meta-analysis of Maimonides dream-ESP studies used direct-hits outcome 
measure to allow comparison between studies, and secondly because participants only viewed the target 
videos so we predicted that any precognitive dream content would focus on these videos. As it turns out, 
the decision to base analyses on hits rather than ratings did not disadvantage the psi hypothesis: judges’ 
ratings of the targets and decoys did not show elevated ratings for the target video clips relative to decoy 
clips, Mann-Whitney U = 56073.5, p = .162.  
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2.3. Results 
2.3.1. Descriptive statistics 
Table 2.1 shows the mean, SD, N, and range of scores on the questionnaire 
measures. 
Dream recall 
A large proportion of participants (50%) reported that they recalled their dreams 
several times a week, followed by almost every morning (28%), about once a week 
(10%), two or three times a month (8%), once a month (2%) and less than once a 
month (2%). As participants needed to be able to remember their dreams in order to 
successfully participate in the study, it was reassuring that the majority (88%) 
remembered their dreams at least once per week. 
 
Table 2.1 
Summary of descriptive statistics of measured variables 
Variable M SD Range 
Age 42.82 14.41 21–82 
Dream Recall Frequency (0-6) 4.88 1.10 1–6 
PD Belief (0-2) 1.58 0.64 0–2 
Prior PD Experience (0-5) 1.70 1.53 0–5 
Mean Confidence Rating (1-5) 2.04 0.74 1–3.75 
Mean Similarity Rating (1-100) 15.15 15.95 0.25–60 
Note. N = 50 in all cases. 
 
Precognitive dream belief 
Having been asked to use Bender’s (1966) criteria for evidentiality, most 
participants (66%) expressed a belief that individuals could have precognitive dreams; 
26% were ‘unsure’; and 8% did not believe in precognitive dreams. Thus, the sample 
was skewed towards individuals believing in precognitive dreams. Because there were so 
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few disbelievers in the sample (4 out of 50), no attempt was made to compare 
disbelievers and believers on the other study measures. 
Precognitive dream experience 
Twenty-eight percent of participants indicated that they had never had a prior 
precognitive dream experience (again, as defined by Bender’s criteria); 26% less than 
once a year; 14% about once a year; 16% about once in six months; 12% about once per 
month; 4% about once a week. Thus the majority of participants (72%) reported having 
had at least one prior precognitive dream experience that would be considered 
evidential.  
Confidence ratings 
Participants were not particularly confident that their dream summaries would 
relate to the future target video (mean rating = 2.04 on a scale from 1-5). Participants 
who gave low confidence ratings reported that they did so either because they did not 
believe in dream precognition, or because their own precognitive dreams were more 
personal and they did not think their dream would relate to a randomly selected target 
video.  
Similarity ratings 
After they were given feedback about the target video identity, participants’ 
similarity ratings suggested that they saw little similarity between their dream summary 
and the target video (mean rating 15.15 on a 1–100 scale). 
2.3.2. Hypothesis testing 
Sixty-four hits were obtained out of 200 trials, giving a 32% hit rate. Using an exact 
binomial test, this result is significant at p = .015 (1-t, Z = 2.21, ES (Z/√𝑁) = 0.16.) 
Thus, the hypothesis was supported. 
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2.3.3. Exploratory Analyses 
Independent judges 
There was little difference between the hit rate obtained by each judge (Judge 1, 26 
hits out of 84 trials, 31.0%; Judge 2, 38 hits out of 116 trials, 32.8%). A test for 
comparison of two independent proportions showed that this difference was not 
significant, z = −0.27, p = .787. 
Prior dream recall, precognitive experience, confidence and similarity 
ratings 
Older participants tended to report having had greater frequency of precognitive 
experiences than younger participants, rs = .287, p = .043, N = 50. Also, as one might 
expect, there was a significant tendency for participants reporting greater numbers of 
prior precognitive experiences to give higher ratings of confidence that their dream 
reports would contain material relating to the future target video, rs = .322, p = .023, N 
= 50. However, as these two relationships were not predicted, and as several 
correlations were calculated for the psychological variables (see Table 2.2), it would be 
wise to regard them as only tentative relationships, in need of replication. 
 
Table 2.2 
Matrix of Spearman correlations between the measured variables 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Age −     
Dream Recall −.186     
PD Experience .287* .158    
Total Hits −.123 .158 −.005   
Mean Confidence .059 −.060 .322* −.139  
Mean Similarity .012 −.068 .066 .026 .409** 
Note. N = 50 in all cases. * = p <.05, ** = p < .01. 
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After receiving feedback of the target video identity and giving it ratings for 
similarity to their previously-submitted dream report, participants who had previously 
given higher confidence ratings tended also to give higher similarity ratings, rs = .409, p 
= .003, N = 50. However, there was little relationship between these ratings and actual 
psi performance: the correlation between confidence ratings and hit rate was slightly 
negative but not significant, rs = −.139, p = .335, N = 50, and there was no correlation 
between hit rate and similarity ratings rs = .026, p = .860, N = 50. 
Self-reported prior dream recall did not significantly correlate with precognitive 
dream experience, confidence ratings, similarity ratings, or hit rate. Table 2.2 gives the 
full matrix of correlations between the variables reported here. 
We also explored whether the participants may have given higher similarity ratings 
to the target clips than the judges, for instance perhaps the participants were better able 
to recognise their own dream content in targets than the judges were. While 
participants’ mean ratings were slightly higher than those of the judges, this was 
primarily attributable to a small number of outlier similarity ratings above the mid-point 
of the scale. The distributions of ratings by judges and participants were strongly skewed 
towards the bottom end of the 100-point scale (judges’ median rating 4.5, SD = 12.35; 
participants’ median rating = 5.0, SD = 21.67); we also found a small but significant 
correlation between judges’ and participants’ similarity ratings (rs = .144, p = .04, N = 
200). 
2.4. Discussion 
The present study represents a controlled test of the hypothesis that individuals’ 
dreams can contain information about unpredictable future events; in other words that 
some form of anomalous cognition can occur. The majority of individuals who took 
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part in this study reported that they believed in precognitive dreaming, had experienced 
an evidential (according to Bender’s criteria) precognitive dream personally at least once 
in their lifetime, and were able to recall their dreams at least once per week. So, on the 
face of it, this sample would seem to be appropriate for a dream precognition study. 
Independent judges rated each participant’s dream summary for similarity to the 
contents of a randomly-selected pool of four video-clips, and then one of these clips 
was randomly selected as target and sent to the participant for feedback. Judges gave the 
highest similarity ratings to the future target clip significantly more often than would be 
expected by chance, thus supporting the hypothesis. Because of the negative definition 
of paranormal phenomena (see section 1.2), an above-chance hit rate provides evidence 
for a psi process only if all possible non-paranormal alternative explanations can be 
ruled out. Before focusing on several such alternative accounts, we turn to the 
discussion of the exploratory results of the study.  
We found indications of the operation of psychological mechanisms that can lead 
to increased subjective experience of precognitive dreams. Participants who had higher 
confidence tended to report greater levels of similarity between their dreams and the 
target video, though perceived similarity was not associated with greater hit rate or 
actual similarity ratings. So, prior confidence appeared to be associated with perceived 
correspondences between dreams and subsequent events. Some previous research has 
suggested that frequency of dream recall is a factor likely to create more opportunities 
for correspondences between dreams and subsequent events to be noticed (e.g., Lange, 
Schredl, & Houran, 2000). Contrary to this suggestion, our study found only a weak 
positive correlation between reported dream recall and prior precognitive experience, 
which did not reach statistical significance. It could be argued that there may be 
difficulties in interpreting participants’ responses to the dream recall measure due to the 
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nature of the question, which required retrospective reflection and self-report from 
participants (rather than, for instance, having them keep a diary and then count how 
often they remembered their dreams). However, this kind of self-report measure is 
common in psychological research despite response bias that can accompany any such 
measure. Furthermore, Schredl (2004) reports high test-retest reliability, which indicates 
consistency in responses.  
2.4.1. Alternative explanations for significant hit rate 
The following alternative explanation may be proposed to account for the above-
chance hit rate. We address them one at a time:  
1. Judges were deliberately or unconsciously biased by the experimenter’s knowledge of the selected 
target. This explanation does not apply because the experimenter did not select the target 
until after the judges’ ratings were made. 
2. The experimenter’s target selection was biased by his knowledge of the judges’ ratings. The 
experimenter did not view the judges’ ratings prior to target selection. Furthermore, 
target selection was done using an online random number generator, which would not 
under normal circumstances be influenced by the experimenter. 
3. Participants leaked information about the target identity to the judges, for example using online 
social networking sites. The judges did not know the identity of the participants and, even if 
they had, the judging was completed before participants were given feedback about the 
target identity. 
4. Participants’ dream summaries contained cues as to previous weeks’ targets that may have 
leaked information to the judges about the target identity. The judges rated each trial on the day 
that the dream summary was received, so the judging was done in real time. This means 
that dream summaries could only contain information about previous targets that had 
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already been judged. This information would not be useful for the present trial being 
judged. 
5. The coordinating experimenter cheated. The records for each trial were independently 
checked and verified after the study was concluded. For cheating to apply, one therefore 
has to adopt an unfalsifiable conspiracy theory, including fraud by the judges and the 
principal investigator. 
6. A coincidence between judges’ preferences and bias in target selection inflated the hit rate. A 
similar issue was encountered by Bem and Honorton (1994) for PRL study 302. In that 
study only one target pool was used and it was observed that one particular clip from 
that pool was more often designated as target than the others (though the statistical 
significance of this trend is not reported), thus raising the question of whether the hit 
rate might be inflated if that clip was generally preferred by participants. As Bem and 
Honorton put it: “If a video clip containing popular imagery (such as water) happens to 
appear as a target more frequently than a clip containing unpopular imagery (such as 
sex), a high hit rate might simply reflect the coincidence of those frequencies of 
occurrence with participants’ response biases” (p. 12). We will explore this line of 
argument in more detail because there is some evidence in its support. 
Distribution of judges’ ranks 
A first step to investigate the question of possible judging bias is to look at 
distribution of the judges’ allocation of ranks (1-4) to the clips numbered 1-4 in each 
pool. As Figure 2.1 shows, judges preferred to assign the second clip in each pool to 4th 
rank (47.5% of 4th ranks awarded to number 2 clips) and, to a lesser extent, tended to 
give 1st ranks to the fourth clip in each pool (33.5% of 1st ranks awarded to number 4 
clips). This variability in judges’ assignment of rankings is statistically significant: 2(3) = 




Figure 2.1. The number of Ranks (1-4) assigned to each target clip (1-4), for all 17 
target pools combined. Dashed line represents MCE = 50 for each rank. 
 
Hit rate for clips 1–4 
Figure 2.2 shows the hit rate obtained by target clips numbered 1–4. Naturally, this 
hit rate to some extent reflects judges’ rating preferences, with a dip in scoring for 
number 2 clips and a peak for number 4 clips. Specifically, hit rate was near to chance 
(25%) for clip 1 (28%), 2 (20.5%), and 3 (28.3%), but was considerably higher for 
number 4 (46.5%). The frequency of hits and misses per target number deviates 
significantly from chance: 2(3) = 8.71, p = .033. It is therefore appropriate to 




Figure 2.2. Hit rate obtained for clips 1-4 in each target pool. Dashed line represents 
MCE. 
 
Judges’ rankings for number 4 clips 
The greater hit rate seen for number 4 clips may in part arise out of a bias, whereby 
judges tend to give higher similarity ratings for these clips irrespective of whether the 
clip was assigned as a target or a decoy. In order to test this hypothesis a comparison 
can be made of the ratio of 1st ranks given to the number 4 clips when target, with the 
ratio of 1st ranks for the same clip when assigned as a decoy. This comparison controls for 
any inherent differences in individual target clip ‘attractiveness’ to the judges, and is 
similar to the analysis conducted by Bem and Honorton (1994) when faced with a 
potential coincidence of biases in PRL study 302. Subtracting the decoy ratios from the 
target ratios gives a single ‘difference’ figure for each clip. If each clip is only preferred 
when it is the target, the difference figure would be consistently positive. This would 
provide evidence in support of a communication anomaly whereby the participants’ 
dream summaries were judged to be more similar to the target than to decoys. If there is 
little difference between judges’ preference for the number 4 clips when decoy and the 
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number 4 clips when target, the difference figure would vary around zero. A one-sample 
t-test showed that the difference figures (see Table 2.3) did not significantly differ from 
zero, Mdiff = 0.125, 90% CI [0.018, 0.26], SD = 0.373, t(16) = 1.38, p = .093 (1-t). This 
analysis demonstrates that judges have a preference for the number 4 clips irrespective 
of whether or not they are designated as target.  
 
Table 2.3 
Ratio of Rank 1 given by judges when number 4 clips are assigned as target and decoy 
Target Rank 1 / target Rank 1 / decoy Difference 
1_4 0 (0/3) .25 (1/4) −.25 
2_4 .50 (1/2) .29 (2/7) .21 
3_4 0 (0/2) .25 (2/10) −.25 
4_4 .50 (2/4) .70 (7/10) −.2 
5_4 .60 (3/5) 0 (0/13) .6 
7_4 .50 (2/4) .13 (1/8) .37 
8_4 .43 (3/7) 0 (0/5) .43 
9_4 .50 (2/4) 0 (0/4) .5 
10_4 0 (0/3) .29 (4/14) −.29 
11_4 0 (0/1) .50 (4/8) −.5 
12_4 .75 (3/4) .50 (4/8) .25 
13_4 0 (0/1) .67 (4/6) −.67 
14_4 .80 (4/5) .18 (3/17) .62 
15_4 .50 (1/2) 0 (0/3) .5 
16_4 .36 (4/11) .57 (4/7) −.21 
17_4 .67 (2/3) .40 (4/10) .27 
18_4 .25 (1/4) .30 (3/10) −.05 
 
RNG performance 
If the RNG assigned number 4 clips as target considerably more often than the 
other clips, then this might contribute to the higher hit rate for number 4 targets. Figure 
2.3 shows the percentage of times that the RNG selected the number 1 clip as target, 
number 2 as target, etc. Although there was a trend for the number 4 clip to be 
designated as target more often and for the number 2 clip to be designated as target 
least often (clip 1, 25%; clip 2, 19.5%; clip 3, 26.5%; clip 4, 29%), this distribution was 
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not significantly different from the 25% per position expected by chance, 2(3) = 3.88, p 
= .275. Using the RNG, we generated a further five arrays of 200 numbers each in order 
to observe whether there was any systematic bias in the RNG output when assigning the 
target (number 1-4) for each session. This was not the case, 2(3) = 1.45, p = .695. 
Therefore, the RNG behaviour does not account for the larger proportion of hits when 
number 4 clips are designated as targets. 
These investigations raise the question of whether the hit rate in the present study 
might be inflated by a “matching bias” of random target selection and rank pattern. 
Although this question cannot be definitively answered based on a pattern that was 
observed post hoc, the apparent coincidence in the rating and target patterns suggest this 
might indeed have been the case. 
 
 
Figure 2.3. Percentage of times that clips numbered 1-4 were selected as target by 





Analysis of judges’ ratings 
In footnote 1 we provide a justification for our decision to analyse ranks rather 
than rating scores (1–100). We also showed that there was no difference between the 
ratings of targets and decoys. However, it could be argued in line with the psi hypothesis 
that this result could be expected. Even if there was indeed a communication anomaly, 
there is no reason to expect all targets to be rated as more similar than decoys; only hits 
should be particularly salient to judges, due to there being a noticeable similarity 
between the participant’s dream report and the target content. This reasoning, however, 
is problematic because, by definition, targets have the highest ratings in hit trials. 
Instead, we can explore the difference between the rating of 1st rank videos for hit trials 
and miss trials. If the saliency hypothesis is true, there should be a difference. However, 
in the present study, there was no such difference, U = 4127.5, p = .555. To take this 
one step further, it could also be argued that it is not the ratings per se that should 
differ. After all, it is quite possible that the salience matters only in the context of other 
videos in the pool. If all of them are equally similar to the dream, then there is no 
particular salience for the target, and hence any hits are due to chance. On the other 
hand, the argument goes, hits obtained due to psi should be characterised by the target 
standing out from amongst the other video clips in the pool. If this is true, a 
comparison of the ratio of the rating for 1st ranked video to the mean rating of rank 2–
4 videos (Rank 1 / Mrank 2–4) between hit and miss trials should reveal a difference. But 
again, the analysis did not yield significant results, U = 4318.5, p = .471. The series of 
analyses reported above suggests that there was nothing qualitatively special about the 





The analysis reported above does not address a remaining question, namely why the 
judges preferred the number 4 clips and avoided the number 2 clips. Perhaps there is 
something about the content of the number 4 clips that makes them more attractive to 
raters, while the content of the number 2 clips may be unattractive. For instance, 
number 4 clips might contain content that also occurs relatively often in dreams, such as 
imagery relating to being chased, or number 2 clips might contain imagery that tends 
not to occur in dreams. To explore this idea, we conducted a post hoc content analysis 
which revealed that clips in group 2 include a preponderance of animal themes with 12 
out of 17 featuring animals only, accounting for 63% of all animal-themed videos. For 
comparison, groups 1, 3 and 4 contained 0, 4 and 3 animal-themed videos respectively, 
with 2 out of 3 videos in group 4 featuring also humans and one depicting unicorns. 
This distribution departed significantly from the expected uniform, 2(3) = 16.58, p < 
.001. If there is a tendency for animal themes not to figure in participants’ dream 
reports, this non-randomness in the pool could account for the low number of first 
ranks in group 2. To explore this possibility, we conducted a word frequency analysis of 
a representative sample of the dream reports from half of the participants using the 
TagCrowd word cloud generator (http://www.tagcrowd.com). The overall length of the 
analysed dream reports was 22,468 words but only nouns, verbs, adjectives and adverbs 
were analysed. After excluding words day, dream, night and recall, which were often used 
by participants to provide meta-information (e.g. dream 1, night 1 or no recall on day 1) and 
grouping similar words together (e.g. learned, learns, learning −> learning), the generator 
displayed 2,709 different words with frequency ranging from 1 (1,421 words) to 76 for 
the word ‘friend’. The results of the analysis, along with the top 5 nouns for 
comparison, can be found in Table 2.4. 
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There were 21 different nouns in the ‘animal’ category. The total frequency of 
animal nouns was 82, with the words ‘cat’ and ‘dog’ accounting for 34% of this number. 
Animal-related nouns made up 0.36% of the total word count of analysed dream 
reports. Compared to the top 5 most frequently used nouns that accounted for 1.26% 
of the total word count, the frequency of occurrence of animal-related words is rather 
low. Thus, in context of the preponderance of animal-themed imagery in group 2 
videos, the low number of first ranks awarded to group 2 videos is not surprising. 
 
Table 2.4 
Word frequency content analysis of half of the dream reports 
Noun Instances (%) Noun Instances (%) 
Animal 5 (0.18) Fur 4 (0.15) 
Bear 4 (0.15) Horse 7 (0.26) 
Bird 7 (0.26) Hound 1 (0.04) 
Cat 15 (0.55) Insect 3 (0.11) 
Creature 3 (0.11) Leeches 1 (0.04) 
Dinosaur-like 1 (0.04) Lion 4 (0.15) 
Dog 13 (0.48) Pig 2 (0.08) 
Dolphin 3 (0.11) Puppy 1 (0.04) 
Ferret 2 (0.08) Snake 2 (0.08) 
Fish 2 (0.08) Wildlife 1 (0.04) 
Flea 1 (0.04)   
Total animal-related nouns 82 (3.03) 
Most often used nouns Instances 
Man 42 (1.55) 
Woman/women 46 (1.70) 
House 50 (1.85) 
People 69 (2.55) 
Friend 76 (2.81) 
 
Although it is arguably impossible to assess post hoc the effect of video content on 
the hit rate, some indirect information about the hypothesis that the video imagery 
might have elevated the observed hit rate can be obtained by the examination of judges’ 
ratings of hits with respect to the video groups. Using the Kruskal-Wallis one-way 
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analysis of variance, we discovered a significant difference of rating for hits between the 
groups of videos, H(3df) = 20.38, p < .001. A subsequent series of Mann-Whitney U 
tests revealed that the source of the significant difference were the videos in group 2, 
which differed from all the other groups at p < .001 (comparisons of group 2 with 
group 1, 3, and 4 yielded Mann-Whitney U values of 14,236, 14,838, and 17,949.5 
respectively). Group 2 hits thus had significantly lower ratings than the rest of the hits. 
There was no difference between any other pair of groups. These results suggest that 
not only were the hits rare in group 2 videos, but their ratings were also particularly low, 
indicating low similarity between the dream reports and group 2 targets. 
Summary of alternative interpretations of significant hit rate 
This study found a significantly higher hit rate than would be expected by chance 
alone. The question is whether this outcome reflects a similarity between the 
participants’ dream reports and the target they subsequently viewed, in line with the 
dream precognition hypothesis, or whether some other unexplained process may be at 
work. Below we summarise the outcome of the additional analyses that we have 
undertaken in an attempt to interpret the observed hit rate.  
1. For the target group that obtained the highest hit rate (46.5%), judges tended to 
assign these clips first rank regardless of whether they were target or decoy clips. 
2. Looking at all targets, there was no significant difference between the judges’ 
ratings of targets and decoys. 
3. The analysis of the judges’ ratings shows that targets that scored a hit were on 
average no more similar to the dream reports than those that did not, whichever way we 
look.  
4. The content analysis of the video clips used revealed a preponderance of animal 
motifs in group 2 of the target pool. At the same time participants dream reports were 
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found to contain little animal imagery. These findings provide a tentative yet plausible 
explanation of the low hit rate and judges’ ratings on videos in group 2. 
We acknowledge that no one definitive argument can be made based on these 
exploratory analyses. However, we believe that, taken together, the above mentioned 
four points strongly suggest that the hit rate in this study is not due to the judges 
detecting a similarity between the participants’ dream reports and the randomly chosen 
target. Thus, our data do not support the hypothesis of dream precognition as usually 
operationalized in parapsychology, for instance in the Maimonides dream ESP studies 
(Krippner, 1993). Due to the lack of an accepted theory of psi, which in turn leads to a 
negative definition of psi (see section 1.2), we cannot rule out the possibility that our 
significant hit rate is due to the operation of a non-psi process. 
The above discussion serves to illustrate the crucial importance of randomisation in 
studies with similar methodology to the present one (Ganzfeld, remote viewing, dream 
ESP, etc.) that employ a theoretical control such as MCE instead of an empirical control 
group or condition. As is the case with every statistical analysis, when using theoretical 
models it is necessary to examine whether the underlying assumptions have been met. 
With respect to MCE, as applied to methods similar to the one used in this study, there 
are three principal underlying assumptions. 
Firstly, it is assumed that every clip in the target pool has an equal probability of 
being designated as a target. As discussed previously, unless the number of trials is very 
large, there will be random fluctuations in the randomly generated strings which, albeit 
not significantly different from uniform distribution, may give rise to potentially 
problematic distributions due to knock-on effects. For illustration, in the present study 
the RNG-produced distribution of targets across clips did not depart significantly from 
chance (p = .275) and yet clips number 2 were designated as target 19.5% of the time, 
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while the frequency for clips number 4 was 29%. Bem and Honorton (1994) had to 
grapple with a similar issue. In co-occurrence with other contextual factors, this could 
obscure or inflate evidence of anomalous cognition. 
The second assumption of MCE is that all stimuli in the target pool are equally 
likely to feature in the imagery produced by participants. Given that the target pools are 
often constructed with the aim of creating – at least to some extent – thematically 
orthogonal groups (i.e., the individual video clips within a group are selected so that 
there is little overlap in content among the video clips), it is very difficult to ensure the 
equality of likelihoods. When using a single target pool, as was the case for Bem and 
Honorton's (1994) PRL study 302, a differential likelihood with which the target 
imagery appears in participant’s mentation is potentially problematic since it can 
coincide with fluctuations in the random target assignment, thereby inflating the 
probability of a direct hit. When employing multiple target pools the threat of such 
matching bias can be somewhat attenuated by randomising the position of a stimulus 
within individual pools. However, given the relatively modest knowledge of the 
prevalence of individual topics in people’s mentation, it is very difficult to ensure an 
unbiased arrangement of the target pools. 
It is important to emphasise that no one of the above mentioned issues can lead to 
distorted findings per se. However, we argue that random fluctuations and non-
uniformities such as the ones discussed occur rather habitually and even though non-
significant on their own, in combination they can contribute to a matching bias, yielding 
spurious results in either direction. Although these spurious results may be the 
consequence of short-run biases and random fluctuations that would cancel out in the 
long-run, results in the positive direction may become over-represented in the literature 
due to the pervasive publication bias in favour of significant results. For this reason, we 
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would like to encourage the use of multiple randomisation precautions and thorough 
examination of potential matching biases in similar studies employing theoretical 
controls such as MCE. As with many other areas of psychology, researchers could 
alternatively implement empirical control conditions, something that is arguably more 
labour-intensive, but that may allow more confidence that any obtained effect is valid. 
The study presented in this chapter explored the topic of precognitive dreams from 
the point of view of parapsychology. We applied methodology considered standard in 
the field and discussed potential pitfalls of this kind of research. We would agree that 
the extent and ad hoc nature of the exploratory analysis conducted in order to test the 
alternative explanations for the observed significant result are not usual in theory-driven 
research and may invite accusations of ‘explaining away’ the result. However, given the 
lack of theory in parapsychological research, we believe that this approach is 
appropriate. Moreover, since psi is defined as a category of anomalous effects that 
cannot be attributed to normal factors, attempts to ‘explain away’ any significant results 
are implicitly required in the process of testing the psi hypothesis. 
Given the philosophical and methodological issues in testing the psi hypothesis 
discussed above as well as the main topic of focus of this dissertation, in the following 
chapters, we abandon parapsychology and focus on somewhat more mundane processes 





Precognitive dreams and implicit processing 
 
Beside the hypothesis that precognitive dreams are a genuine paranormal 
phenomenon amenable to scientific testing explored in the previous chapter, there have 
also been proposed several alternative hypotheses to explain how this and similar 
experiences could occur by purely natural means yet have the appearance of the 
paranormal. One such, as of yet unexplored, hypothesis proposes that precognitive 
dreams might be a result of inferences during sleep based on subtle cues from the 
environment perceived outside of awareness. This hypothesis was first proposed by 
Aristotle over 2,000 years ago in his treatise On Prophesying by Dreams, and was more 
recently voiced by Alcock (1981). To illustrate, a fulfilled nightmare about the death of 
an elderly relative might be caused by perceiving, without awareness, a slight change in 
their appearance, behaviour or physiology (e.g., heavier breathing, paler complexion) 
during a previous encounter. These subtle, yet disconcerting indications of ill health 
might create a seemingly precognitive dream about the death of the person in question. 
If this person then passes away, the dream is recalled and the attribution of precognition 
is made. 
The plausibility of the implicit processing hypothesis (IPH) of precognitive dream 
experiences rests on the notions that dream imagery can reflect waking life events and 
that sleep and dreams can facilitate learning and memory consolidation and inspire 
insight. If there is no relationship between a person’s waking life experiences and the 
content of their dreams, it is uncertain how precognitive dreams such as the ones 
described in the example above could originate from previously acquired information. 
92 
Similarly, even if people are able to detect subtle cues from their environment without 
being aware of it, the hypothesis under consideration still requires a certain amount of 
associative processing and insight to take place in order for the inference from the 
detected cues to the conclusion to be made. 
The claim about the relationship between waking life and dream content appears to 
be intuitively true. People often report dreaming about something that happened 
previously or having their dreams influenced by their mental states; many of us still 
occasionally pass or fail our final school exams in dreams and re-live the anxiety they 
once induced. The support for this so-called continuity hypothesis is, however, not 
merely anecdotal. There exists extensive literature supporting the notion that dreams 
reflect, to some extent, waking life experiences (e.g. Schredl & Hofmann, 2003; Fosse, 
Fosse, Hobson, Stickgold. 2003; Pesant & Zadra, 2006; Hobson, & Schredl, 2011, for 
discussion). In light of this research, there appears to be no reason why information 
acquired in waking like could not, in principle, manifest itself in dream imagery. 
With regards to the issue of memory, learning, and insight, the prevailing expert 
opinion again appears to agree with the claim that these processes take place, or at the 
least are facilitated by sleep (see Walker & Stickgold, 2006 for review), although there 
are also opposing views on the matter (Vertes, Eastman, 2000; Frank & Benington, 
2006). Previous research in this area has found support for the role of REM sleep in 
consolidation of memory and learning (Ellenbogen, Payne, & Stickgold, 2006; Stickgold 
& Walker, 2007; Wamsley, Tucker, Payne, Benavides, & Stickgold, 2010), including 
probabilistic and procedural learning (Walker, Brakefield, Morgan, Hobson, & Stickgold, 
2002; Djonlagic et al., 2009). There is also some evidence that sleep causes improved 
performance on tasks requiring insight into hidden rules (Wagner, Gais, Haider, 
Verleger, & Born, 2004) and primes associative networks (Cai, Mednick, Harrison, 
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Kanady, & Mednick, 2009). Thus, even though there is an ongoing debate about the 
role of sleep in learning and memory (Frank & Benington, 2006), there is at the very 
least circumstantial support for the plausibility of the IPH of precognitive dream 
experiences. 
In this chapter, we present two studies testing this hypothesis. Study 2 explores the 
relationship between implicit learning and precognitive dream experiences while Study 3 
focuses on perception without awareness and its relationship to these experiences. 
3.1. Study 2 
One prediction of the IPH is that people who tend to have precognitive 
experiences are better able to pick up on subtle cues and process them without being 
aware of it. This can be tested in the framework of the implicit learning paradigm. 
Implicit learning occurs when people acquire new information without intending it or 
being consciously aware of having done so (Cleeremans, Destrebecqz, & Boyer, 1998; 
Kaufman et al., 2010). Several methods for exploring implicit learning have been 
developed but one in particular, the Serial Reaction Time task, seems to be the most 
appropriate and most widely used (Jiménez & Vázquez, 2005). Moreover, this method 
has recently been used in individual differences research, where implicit learning 
significantly correlated with the personality factors of intuition, openness to experience, 
and impulsivity, as well as with cognitive variables including verbal analogical reasoning, 
processing speed, and academic performance (Kaufman et al., 2010). This individual 
differences approach regards implicit learning as an ability and is in line with our 
hypothesis. 
Of potential interest in exploring the relationship between implicit processing and 
precognitive dream experience is the concept of transliminality, developed by 
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Thalbourne and Delin (1999) and defined as “a largely involuntary susceptibility to, and 
awareness of, large volumes of inwardly generated psychological phenomena of an 
ideational and affective kind” (Thalbourne & Delin, 1999, p25). Crawley and colleagues 
(2002) found a link between transliminality and susceptibility to subliminal priming. 
Participants in this study were led to believe they were taking part in an extra-sensory 
perception card-guessing task. Unbeknownst to them, half of the trials were preceded 
by a subliminal prime showing the correct response. The results showed that 
transliminality was positively related to number of correct responses only on the primed 
trials. Furthermore, in a subsequent task, high transliminality subjects were more 
successful at detecting which trials had been primed, even though they reported no 
conscious awareness of the priming in the card-guessing task. These findings suggest 
that transliminality might play a role in the kind of implicit processing required by the 
IPH. If high levels of transliminality are conducive to the ablility to detect subtle 
environmental cues (e.g., subliminal primes used in the above-mentioned study) without 
being aware of them, then people who experience precognitive dreams should, under 
the IPH, score high on transliminality. Similarly people who possess higher levels of this 
trait should show superior implicit learning ability compared to low transliminality 
individuals. Study 2 therefore predicts that precognitive dream experience will positively 
correlate with transliminality and implicit learning. 
3.1.1. Method 
3.1.1.1. Participants 
A planned number of participants (N = 50, 31 females), mostly undergraduate 
students, were recruited and paid for their participation. Data from one participant were 
excluded due to incompleteness and another participant was recruited in order to 
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preserve the planned number of participants. Participants’ ages ranged from 17 to 53 
years (M = 21.98, SD = 17.49). 
3.1.1.2. Materials and apparatus 
Serial Reaction Time task 
To assess the individual differences in implicit learning, we used a modified version 
of the widely-used Serial Reaction Time task (SRT; Nissen & Bullemer, 1987) used by 
Kaufman et al. (2010). This particular version of the SRT task draws on multiple 
sources. 
The basis of the task is the SRT paradigm (Nissen & Bullemer, 1987), which 
consists of presenting stimuli, each of which appears in one of several different 
positions. The participant’s task is to indicate the position of the stimulus as quickly and 
accurately as possible by pressing a button corresponding to the given position, while 
reaction time is measured. Unbeknownst to the participants, the positions of the stimuli 
follow a predetermined sequence. As participants learn the sequence, their reaction time 
shortens. 
This task has been modified by Cohen, Ivry, and Keele (1990) and further 
developed by Reed and Johnson (1994) and Destrebecqz and Cleeremans (2001). The 
modification consists of employing sequences of positions based on co-called second 
order conditionals (SOC). Here, every position in the sequence is unambiguously 
determined by a combination of two previous positions, while a single preceding 
position provides no information about the following position (Reed & Johnson, 1994). 
The use of SOC makes the sequence difficult to detect explicitly. 
Yet another modification of the classic SRT task was introduced by Schvaneveldt 
and Gomez (1998). In addition to the previous modification, the positions of the stimuli 
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in their second experiment were controlled by two independent SOC sequences, with 
one occurring 90% of the time (probable sequence) and the other occurring 10% of the 
time (improbable sequence). Assuming that the improbable sequence is not learnt, it 
provides a baseline against which the learning of the probable sequence can be 
compared. The probabilistic version of the SRT task based on SOC has been praised as 
an excellent means of assessing implicit learning (Jiménez & Vázquez, 2005). The 
version used in the present study, which is closely modelled on the one reported by 
Kaufman and colleagues (2010), combines the above-mentioned modifications as 
follows. During a trial, an ‘X’ appeared in one of four possible locations represented by 
underscores and arranged horizontally in the centre of the screen. The keys ‘z’, ‘x’, ‘n’, 
and ‘m’ were assigned one to each location (‘z’ to the leftmost, ‘m’ to the rightmost). 
The task was to press the appropriate key as quickly and accurately as possible. The next 
trial followed 500 ms after a key was pressed. Reaction time was measured from the 
onset of the stimulus. If no response was recorded, the next stimulus appeared after five 
seconds. The sequence of locations was governed by two SOC sequences; the Probable 
sequence (1–2–1–4–3–2–4–1–3–4–2–3) occurred on 85% of the trials, and the 
Improbable sequence (3–2–3–4–1–2–4–3–1–4–2–1) occurred on 15%. Note that none 
of the transitions appear in both sequences. In order to achieve this, the rules governing 
the sequences must prohibit the occurrence of the same location twice in a row. Thus, 
each position is followed equally often by each other location. For example, the 
likelihood of locations 2, 3, or 4 given location 1 on the immediately preceding trial, is 
equally divided between these three locations. Furthermore, not allowing for repetitions 
also excludes extremely salient trials that might provide memorable cues. The task 
consisted of seven blocks of trials with 102 trials per block. Because SOC requires two 
pre-existing trials, the first two trials were selected at random. Whatever these first two 
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trials may be, they conform to both sequences and thus it is not possible to assign them 
to either one. For this reason, these trials were not analysed. The first block served as a 
practice block and was not included in the analysis either. The occurrence of Probable 
and Improbable trials was randomised. The task was designed using E-prime version 2.0 
software (Psychology Software Tools, Pittsburgh, PA) in white on black background. 
The design of the SRT task is summarised in Fig. 3.1. 
Precognitive Dream Belief and Experience 
Belief in precognitive dreams was assessed using a 6-item scale (see Appendix B.4). 
Response options on the 5-point Likert scale ranged from 1 (Completely disagree) to 5 
(Completely agree). The overall reliability2 of this scale reached the acceptable level (ωt = 
.75; 95% CI [.58, .86]) but the analysis revealed one very weakly and one negatively 
correlated item, which we omitted from further analysis, raising the reliability index of 
the scale to ωt = .88; 95% CI [.79, .93]. 
One further question that related to precognitive dream frequency (“Approximately 
how often you have had a precognitive dream over the last few years?”) was included in 
the battery with response options: Never; Less than once a year; About once a year; About once 
in six months; About once a month; and About once a week. This item was used to divide 
participants into those with and without experience of precognitive dreams. 
 
                                                 
2 We chose McDonald's  ωt over the traditionally used Cronbach’s α as an index of psychometric reliability 
because of the many problems associated with the latter (see e.g., Dunn, Baguley, & Brundsen, 2013). 
McDonald's  ωt provides a superior measure of reliability and, unlike α, does not rely on the often broken 
assumption of essential tau-equivalence (Dunn et al., 2013; Zinbarg, Revelle, Yovel, & Li, 2005). 
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Figure 3.1. Structure of the SRT task. a) Participants are instructed to press the key 
corresponding to the position of the stimulus as quickly and accurately as possible. b) 
The position in which the stimulus is presented is governed by two exclusive second-
order conditional sequences. A transition between the sequences is possible at every 
step (three such transitions are illustrated). c) The probabilistic nature of the task is 
characterised by one sequence appearing on 85% of the trials (Probable Sequence) and 
the other (Improbable Sequence) appearing on 15% of the trials. Adapted from 
Kaufman et al. (2010), with permission from Elsevier. 
 
Transliminality 
In order to measure participants’ transliminality, we used the Revised 
Transliminality Scale (RTS; Lange, Thalbourne, Houran, & Storm, 2000), a 17-item 
forced choice scale. The scale is presented in an earlier 29-item form (Thalbourne, 1998) 
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in order to preserve the context but only the 17 items of interest are scored. Houran, 
Thalbourne, and Lange (2003) report the scale’s high internal consistency (KR-20 r = 
.85) and test-retest reliability over an average of 50 days, r = .82, p < .001, N = 51. In 
the present sample, the reliability of the full scale was comparably high (ωt = .85; 95% 
CI [.75, .9]), while the reliability of the 17 items was moderate to high (ωt = .77; 95% CI 
[.64, .85]). This, however, is not necessarily a problem given that the RTS was validated 
using Rasch model and therefore its reliability should be independent of the sample 
(Hambleton, 1991).  
3.1.1.3. Procedure 
Participants were shown individually into an experimental cubicle where they were 
seated in front of a computer with standard 16 in CRT monitor with 75 Hz refresh rate. 
They were given an information sheet and a consent form. Next, demographic data 
were collected and participants were asked to complete the SRT task which was 
described as a reaction time task without a mention of implicit learning or the 
probabilistic SOC nature of the stimuli. Participants were encouraged to get comfortable 
pressing the assigned keys and then asked to proceed when they were ready by pressing 
the space bar. Once participants completed 102 trials, the block ended and they were 
asked to take a break. After a minute they were asked to continue, when ready, by 
pressing the space bar again and the next block of trials ensued in the same fashion. 
Once the SRT task was over, subjects were asked to complete the questionnaire part of 
the study. The battery of items was presented in electronic form using the Google forms 
service. Upon completion, subjects were thanked for their participation, debriefed about 
the actual nature of the SRT task, paid, and dismissed. 
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3.1.1.4. Hypotheses and analysis 
Based on the implicit processing hypothesis of precognitive dream experience, we 
predicted the following: 
H1: There is a positive relationship between the performance on the SRT task and 
precognitive dream belief. 
H2: Performance on the SRT task is positively related to transliminality score. 
H3: Transliminality is positively related to precognitive dream belief. 
H4: Participants with prior precognitive dream experience will perform better at the 
SRT task than those who have not had such experience. 
H5: Participants with prior precognitive dream experience will score higher on 
transliminality than participants without such experience. 
To assess the individual differences in implicit learning, the SRT task was analysed 
using a mean difference score. To arrive at this score, we first deleted all error responses 
(5.08% of all trials). Next, we calculated a 20% trimmed mean reaction time (RT) for 
each block (2-7) per participant, separately for Probable and Improbable trials. 
Subsequently, we calculated the difference between the trimmed mean RT of 
Improbable trials and the trimmed mean RT of Probable trials in each block for each 
participant. The mean of the resulting six numbers was the participant’s mean difference 




















where i is any given participant and j represents block. We chose the 20% trimmed 
mean over mean because it provides a more reliable estimator of location for non-
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normally distributed data (Wilcox, 2010). Higher MDS represents greater implicit 
learning on the SRT task. 
The Revised Transliminality Scale was analysed using the Rasch score derived 
according to Lange and colleagues (2000). 
3.1.2. Results 
3.1.2.1. SRT task validation 
First, we analysed the overall data from the SRT task in order to validate the implicit 
learning effect. Fig. 3.2 shows the pooled performance by trial type across blocks. 
A repeated measures factorial analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted with 
block (6 levels) and sequence (2 levels; probable v improbable) as within-subjects factors 
and 20% trimmed mean RT calculated per block per trial type for each participant as 
dependent variable. The results showed a significant effect of type of trial, F(1,49) = 
37.95, p < .001, 
𝑃
2  = .45, and block, F(3.51,172.1)3 = 2.54, p  = .049, 
𝑃
2  = .05. There 
was also a significant interaction between trial type and block, F(5,245) = 3.78, p = .003, 

𝑃
2  = .07. These results, combined with examination of Fig. 3.2, indicate that learning 
did indeed take place and that the greatest differences appeared later in the task. 
 
3.1.2.2. Hypothesis testing 
Table 3.1 summarises the descriptive statistics for the analysed variables for the 
overall data as well as separately for the two compared groups. 
                                                 
3 Greenhouse-Geisser ( ̂ = .702) corrected degrees of freedom due to significant Mauchly’s test of 




Figure 3.2. Overall performance on the SRT task across individual blocks. Points 
represent 20% trimmed means, error bars represent 95% confidence intervals based on 
a bootstrap sample of N = 599. 
 
Table 3.1 
Descriptive statistics for variables analysed in Study 2 for all data and for the compared groups 
   Group 1 Group 2 
Variable M SD M SD M SD 
Precognitive dream belief 9.20 4.28 7.18 2.70 13.12 4.01 
MDS 14.87 17.07 16.82 16.51 11.10 18.01 
Transliminality 23.11 3.65 22.03 3.14 25.22 3.74 
Note. MDS = Mean Difference Score on the SRT task; Total N = 50; Group 1 = participants without 
precognitive dream experience (N = 33); Group 2 = participants with previous precognitive dream 
experience (N = 17). 
 
In order to assess the relationships predicted by H1 and H2, we conducted a series 
of simple regression analyses with MDS as outcome variable and precognitive dream 
belief and transliminality respectively as predictors. Precognitive dream belief was not a 
significant predictor of performance on the SRT task (β = 0.14, t(48) = 1.00, p = .322, 
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R2 = .02, F(1,48) = 1.00, p = .322). Transliminality scores also did not significantly 
predict participants’ performance on the implicit learning task (β = −0.21, t(48) = 
−1.48, p = .146, R2 = .04, F(1,48) = 2.18, p = .146). These results did not support 
hypothesis H1 about a positive relationship between performance on the SRT task and 
precognitive dream belief, or hypothesis H2 about the relationship between SRT 
performance and transliminality. 
We also conducted a simple regression to explore the role of transliminality in 
precognitive dream belief (H3). Transliminality was a significant predictor of 
precognitive dream belief, b = 0.51, 95% CI* [0.15, 0.83], p = .002. Transliminality 
accounted for a significant portion of variance in precognitive dream belief, R2 = .19, 
F(1,48) = 10.95, p = .002, thus supporting the hypothesis H3 of a positive relationship 
between transliminality and precognitive dream belief. 
Given this relationship between precognitive dream belief and transliminality, we 
investigated the unique contribution of transliminality to SRT performance. In order to 
do this, we conducted a simultaneous multiple regression analysis with MDS as outcome 
variable and precognitive dream belief and transliminality as predictors, thus controlling 
for precognitive dream belief. As shown in Table 3.2, transliminality was a significant 
predictor of performance on the SRT task, p = .035. However, the direction of the 
relationship was opposite to the one predicted by H2. In addition, we included an 
interaction term in the model which was also not significant (b = 0.24, 95% CI* [−0.03, 
0.51], p = .080). This hypothesis therefore remains unsupported by the data. 
Finally, we compared the participants with and without a reported precognitive 
dream experience. This binary variable was derived from the precognitive dream 
frequency item. Those who selected the option ‘Never’ (N=33) were designated as ‘non-
precognitive dreamers’ while the rest were considered ‘precognitive dreamers’ (N=17). 
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An independent t-test revealed no significant difference in the performance on the SRT 
task between non-precognitive dreamers and precognitive dreamers, t(48) = 1.13, p = 
.265, r2 = .03. Hence, the hypothesis H4 about differences in SRT task performance was 
not supported. There was, however a significant difference between these groups in 
transliminality scores (mean difference = −3.19, 95% CI* [−5.20, −1.18], t(48) = −3.19, 
p = .003, r2 = .17. This finding lends support to the hypothesis H5 about differences in 
transliminality between people with and without precognitive dream experience. 
 
Table 3.2 
Results of multiple regression analysis of SRT performance on precognitive dream belief and 
transliminality 
Variable b SE β [95% CI] p 
Precognitive dream belief 1.14 0.6 0.29 [−0.07, 2.469] .067 
Transliminality −1.56 0.72 −0.33 [−2.61, −0.116] .035 
 
3.1.3. Study 2 Discussion 
Study 2 tested the hypothesis that people with precognitive dream belief and 
experience exhibit superior implicit learning ability compared to those without these 
beliefs and experiences. This hypothesis was not supported by the data. There was no 
statistically significant relationship between the performance on the SRT task and belief 
in precognitive dreams, nor a significant difference in the SRT task performance 
between participants who have had this kind of experience and those who have not. 
Moreover, this difference was in the opposite direction from the one predicted by the 
hypothesis. Our findings specifically concerning precognitive dream belief and 
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experience and implicit learning are in line with an earlier study that found no 
relationship between general paranormal belief and performance on a different implicit 
sequence learning task (Palmer, Mohr, Krummenacher, & Brugger, 2007). 
Potential criticism of our findings could concern whether the learning exhibited by 
participants was really implicit. Previous research employing modifications of the SRT 
task in combination with the process dissociation procedure has shown that under some 
circumstances participants are able to discriminate between the test sequence used and 
random sequences at an above-chance level, although there was nevertheless evidence 
of implicit learning (Destrebecqz & Cleeremans, 2001; Fu, Bin, Dienes, Fu, & Gao, 
2011). Therefore, there is a possibility of explicit learning contamination in the study. 
However, we echo Kaufman and colleagues’ (2010) argument that the probabilistic 
second order conditional version of the task employed in the present study makes 
explicit learning difficult, thus lowering this probability. 
It could also be argued in defence of the IPH that, although not better at implicit 
learning per se, precognitive dreamers are more sensitive to implicit pattern violation 
than those people who have not had precognitive dream experience. While we agree 
that this is indeed a possibility, we would posit that the analysis reported above already 
tests this hypothesis by using the mean difference score as a measure of implicit 
learning. This index takes into account the difference between RT on improbable and 
probable trials and therefore the response latency on improbable trials compared to 
probable ones.4 
                                                 
4 This argument is supported by the corroborative nature of the result obtained from an additional 
analysis of covariance that explored the differences in mean RT on improbable trial between the two 
groups while controlling for the mean RT on probable trials, F(1,47) = 1.27, p = .265. 
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Finally, it is important to emphasise that this study tested merely one possible 
prediction of the IPH. It may be the case that the difference between precognitive and 
non-precognitive dreamers lies in the better ability of the latter group to notice subtle 
cues consciously. This would imply that although their implicit processing ability is not 
better, precognitive dreamers’ failure to notice these subtle cues explicitly might leave 
more opportunities for them to process them outside of awareness. To explore this, a 
measure of implicit processing is required that would provide a means to clearly 
differentiate processing accompanied by awareness from processing in its absence. 
Study 2 also investigated the role of transliminality in implicit learning and 
precognitive dream belief and experience. Transliminality was positively related to both 
precognitive dream belief and experience. However, the significant relationship between 
transliminality and measure of implicit learning after controlling for precognitive dream 
belief was in the opposite direction to the one predicted. We find this result difficult to 
reconcile with that of Crawley and colleagues (2001) who found that high transliminality 
individuals performed better on a subliminal priming task than those low on 
transliminality as well as with our prediction which follows from the concept of 
transliminality itself. We can only speculate about the reasons for this contradiction. 
Perhaps the transliminality measure partly taps into some other variable that mediates 
the relationship between transliminality and susceptibility to subliminal priming. If 
believers in precognitive dreams happened to score higher on this unknown variable, it 
would explain the findings reported by Crawley and colleagues (2001), who did not 
control for precognitive dream/paranormal belief. If true, this would call into question 
the validity of transliminality as a unitary construct. Alternatively, the inconsistent nature 
of the findings obtained using transliminality scales could be caused by suboptimal 
psychometric characteristics of these measures. Although Lange and colleagues (2000) 
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claim that the revised transliminality scale is a unidimensional measure, an additional 
principal component analysis of the data from the present sample revealed that the first 
principal component accounted merely for 26% of the total variance in the scores. 
Bartlett scores based on this principal component correlated with precognitive dream 
belief even more strongly than the Rasch scores used in the primary analysis (r = .498, 
95% CI* [.195, .745], p < .001). In order to account for over a half of the total variance 
of the RTS scores, a total of five components would need to be extracted. Furthermore, 
only four of the scale’s 17 items had communalities over .3 (items 3, 8, 16, and 18 with 
h2 = .53, .62, .56, and .53 respectively), while seven items had communalities below .1. It 
thus seems that, at least in the present sample, the Revised Transliminality Scale cannot 
be considered a valid measure. We encourage researchers working with this scale to pay 
closer attention to its psychometric characteristics in future studies. 
3.2. Study 3 
In the previous section, we outlined an alternative prediction of the implicit 
processing hypothesis of precognitive dream experience. We hypothesised that if these 
experiences really arise through the proposed mechanism, and if people without these 
experiences are better at noticing subtle cues explicitly, then non-precognitive dreamers 
are less likely to be influenced by this mechanism than precognitive dreamers, because 
precognitive dreamers are less able to consciously notice subtle cues. In other words, 
non-precognitive dreamers may have fewer precognitive dream experiences because 
they tend to notice potentially relevant subtle cues consciously more often than 
precognitive dreamers. 
In order to explore this prediction, Study 3 uses the flicker task, a well-established 
paradigm used in change blindness research. The term change blindness (Rensink, 
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O’Regan, & Clark, 1997) describes a phenomenon whereupon people fail to notice 
sometimes major changes in stimuli when the presentation of the stimuli is disrupted 
(for example by camera cuts) and the change occurs during this disruption. This 
phenomenon has been extensively studied and has proved to be highly robust and 
generalisable (Rensink, 2000; Simons, 2000; Simons & Rensink, 2005). The flicker task 
developed by Rensink and colleagues (1997) and used in Study 3 involves presenting 
participants with stimuli in quick succession interrupted by a mask, usually a 
monochrome empty screen. The stimuli are two photographs, sometimes identical, 
sometimes with a single change to one of the pair. This task is appropriate for the 
purposes of the present study for several reasons. Firstly, as stated above, it is a widely-
used research method in the field capable of creating a robust change blindness effect. 
Secondly, a modification of the flicker task described in the Methods section below 
offers means to distinguish conscious identification from implicit change detection and 
thus to assess them separately. It therefore appears appropriate for our purposes. 
Finally, the flicker task has previously been used in studies investigating implicit 
detection. In his study, Rensink (2004) asked participants to press a key when they feel a 
change has occurred and then again once they are able to identify the change explicitly. 
He found that some participants were able to ‘sense’ the change in the stimulus several 
seconds before they could consciously identify it. In light of this finding, it is possible 
that the individual differences in the ability to ‘sense’ and ‘see’ the change might be 
related to precognitive dream experience. This argument is in line with Rensink’s 
suggestion that this ability to sense, or mindsight, is related to the popular notion of a 
‘sixth sense’ (2004). In this study, we therefore test the discussed prediction in terms of 




As in Study 2, a planned number of mostly undergraduate student participants (N = 
50, 26 females) were recruited for the study and paid £6.20 each for their participation. 
Participants’ ages ranged from 15 to 53 years (M = 21.64, SD = 6.33). Data from one 
participant were omitted due to outlier values on the change detection measures. 
3.2.1.2. Material and apparatus 
Flicker task 
In order to assess both explicit and implicit change detection, we used a modified 
version5 of the flicker paradigm used in change blindness research (Rensink et al., 1997). 
In this task, participants are presented with two pictures that oscillate in quick 
succession and asked to identify which element in the pictures undergoes change. In the 
present study, participants completed a total of 43 trials each, three practice trials and 
forty test trials. The stimuli, arranged in pairs, were all colour images with a resolution of 
700 × 500 pixels, displayed full-screen. The images used depicted everyday scenes (e.g., a 
picture of a train station) and were downloaded from Ronald Rensink’s personal website 
(http://www2.psych.ubc.ca/~rensink/). The first image of the pair was shown for 240 
ms, followed by a 120 ms mask (grey screen), after which the second image of the pair 
appeared for another 240 ms again followed by the mask. Each trial consisted of six 
such cycles, thus lasting 4.32 seconds. Figure 3.3 shows a flowchart of a trial’s design. 
The pictures were identical (‘no-change trials’) in half of the test trials, while in the other 
half (‘change trials’), there was a single change, easily detectable under normal viewing 
                                                 
5 We are grateful to Professor Richard Wiseman for suggesting this modification. 
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conditions. The change to an object in the picture could be either in its presence (e.g., 
appearance and disappearance of a person) or in its location (e.g., horizon shifting up 
and down). The order of the trials was randomised.6 The task was designed using E-
prime version 2.0 software (Psychology Software Tools, Pittsburgh, PA). All 




Figure 3.3. Flowchart of the flicker task. First, a fixation target is presented for 3,000 ms. 
Next, the two versions of the stimulus (1 and 2) are presented for 240 ms with a grey 
mask in between presented for 120 ms. One trial consists of six such cycles with a total 
of 11 transitions between stimuli. Afterwards, a change detection prompt appears with 
two possible outcomes. 
 
 
                                                 
6 Due to an error in the design, one trial was presented twice, which did not influence the total number of 
trials but, as a result, only 39 different test stimuli were presented. Both the duplicated and the omitted 
stimuli were ‘no-change’ stimuli and therefore this error did not increase the likelihood of change 
detection. 
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Precognitive dream belief and experience 
Participants’ belief in precognitive dreams was assessed using the same scale as in 
Study 2. This time, the reliability of the scale was high for all six items, ωt = .86; 95% 
CI* [.76, .91]. The scale was again followed by an item inquiring into the frequency of 
participants’ precognitive dreams used to assess precognitive dream experience. 
3.2.1.3. Procedure 
As in Study 2, participants were seated in an experimental cubicle in front of a 
computer with standard 16 in CRT monitor with 75 Hz refresh rate. Participants were 
given an information sheet and a consent form, after which demographic data were 
collected. 
Next, participants completed the flicker task. They were asked to carefully read the 
instructions and were informed that the first three trials would serve as practice trials. 
Subjects then proceeded, when ready, by pressing the space bar. Subsequently, a fixation 
cue in the form of a plus sign appeared in the centre of the screen for three seconds, 
after which the task began. After each trial, participants were prompted to indicate 
whether or not they detected a change by pressing the ‘y’ key for yes and the ‘n’ key for 
no. If they answered yes, they were asked to report verbally to the experimenter what 
the change was. If they did not see a change, they were prompted to decide based on 
their ‘gut feeling’ whether or not there was a change. The task terminated after three 
practice and forty test trials. Responses to the first prompt were labelled ‘explicit trials’ 
and responses to the gut feeling prompt were labelled ‘implicit trials’. 
Finally, they completed the precognitive dream belief and experience questionnaire 
presented using the Google forms service. After that, participants were debriefed, 
thanked for taking part in the study, paid, and dismissed. 
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3.2.1.4. Hypotheses and analysis 
Study 3 explores the following hypotheses: 
H1: There is a negative relationship between explicit performance on the flicker task 
and precognitive belief. 
H2: Participants without precognitive dream experience will perform better on the 
explicit flicker trials than those participants who have had such experience.  
As an additional test of the hypothesis investigated in Study 2, we formulated two 
further hypotheses: 
H3: There is a positive relationship between implicit performance on the flicker task 
and precognitive dream belief. 
H4: Precognitive dreamers perform better on implicit trials than non-precognitive 
dreamers. 
The flicker task was analysed using the d' and c indices as described in Stanislaw and 
Todorov (1999), used in signal detection analysis. The d' (d prime) index provides an 
estimate of sensitivity to signal versus noise, which, in the present case, translates to 
participants’ ability to detect change. It can theoretically range from -∞ to ∞ with 0 
representing chance performance. The c index is a measure of bias, i.e. a tendency to 
indicate the presence (liberal bias, c < 0) or absence (conservative bias, c > 0) of signal in 
situations of uncertainty. These measures take into account the proportion of correct 
identifications of signal to the number of signal trials (hit rate) and the proportion of 
incorrect identifications in the absence of signal to the number of noise trials (false 
alarm rate). In our analysis, we calculated one set of indices for the explicit hits (exact 
identification of the element of change) and one for implicit identification, based on 
participants’ ‘gut feeling’. The reliance on z-scores makes the use of dꞌ problematic in 
situations of either a perfect HR or azero FA, for which the corresponding z-score is 
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±∞. Several corrections have been developed in order to assess this issue, the best of 
which seems to be the so-called loglinear correction (Stanislaw & Todorov, 1999). 
When using this correction, extreme values are adjusted by adding 0.5 to (if the extreme 
value is 0) or subtracting 0.5 from (if it is 1) both number of hits and number of false 
alarms and adding 1 to both the overall number of signal trials and the number of noise 
trials respectively before calculating the hit and false alarm rates. However, if the 
number of signal and noise trials is unequal, as was the case with implicit trials in the 
present study, this correction is biased. To give an example, with Nsignal = 5 and Nnoise = 
10, and both hit and false alarm rates of zero, applying the loglinear correction (HR = 
0.5 / (5 + 1) = 0.083; FA = 0.5 / (10 + 1) = 0.045) yields 
dꞌ = Φ−1(HR) − Φ−1(FA) = 0.3, 
 
where Φ−1 is a function that converts probabilities into z-scores. This means that 
while 0 is the logical value of dꞌ, the loglinear correction gives dꞌ ≠ 0. To overcome this 
bias, we corrected zero hit rates by adding (subtracting) 0.5 x R to the number of hits 
and adding 1 x R to the number of ‘true’ items, where R is the ratio of ‘true’ and ‘false’ 
items. False alarm rates and the number of ‘false’ items were adjusted by the original 
loglinear correction. Based on the example above, applying this correction (HR = (0.5 x 
0.5)/(5 + 0.5) = 0.045; FA = 0.5/(10 + 1) = 0.045) yields dꞌ = 0, thus removing the bias.  
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3.2.2. Results 
Table 3.3 summarises the descriptive statistics for the analysed variables. 
 
Table 3.3 
Descriptive statistics for variables analysed in Study 3 
   Group 1 Group 2 
Variable M SD M SD M SD 
Precognitive dream belief 13.20 5.84 10.10 4.00 18.56 4.50 
Explicit dꞌ 1.68 0.47 1.74 0.41 1.57 0.56 
Implicit dꞌ 0.35 0.61 0.40 0.54 0.25 0.72 
Explicit c 0.96 0.24 0.92 0.23 0.97 0.28 
Implicit c 1.11 0.58 1.19 0.54 0.98 0.63 
Note. Descriptives for all data (N = 49) and for the compared groups. Group 1 = participants without 
precognitive dream experience (N = 31); Group 2 = participants with previous precognitive dream 
experience (N = 18). 
 
3.2.1.5. Flicker task item analysis 
We verified explicit hits by comparing participants’ verbal identifications to the stimuli. 
If participants scored an explicit hit but were unable to identify the element of change, 
the trial was re-labelled a false alarm. 
Furthermore, we explored the flicker task at the item level (individual stimuli used in 
trials) to identify potential ceiling and floor effects. We analysed both explicit and 
implicit hit rate on change items and correct rejection rates on implicit trials only. The 
rationale for this being that, in case of no-change trials, explicit ‘correct rejections’ can 
be expected to be high. Two change items scored a 100% explicit hit rate and were 
excluded from further analyses of explicit detection due to ceiling effect. One item 
scored a 0% hit rate and was also excluded due to floor effect. One further change trial 
was eliminated from implicit detection analysis due to floor effect, having never been 
implicitly detected. 
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Finally, in order to assess possible effects of learning, we compared the hit rate on 
first half of the trials to that on the second half. If, during the course of the task, 
participants learnt what changes are most likely to occur, their explicit hit rates on the 
second half of the trials should be higher than their explicit hit rates on the first half. A 
paired sample t-test comparing these groups of hit rates was not significant (mean 
difference = −0.13, 95% CI* [−0.09, 0.06], t(49) = −0.335, p = .739). 
3.2.1.6. Hypothesis testing 
First, we explored the hypothesis H1 about a negative relationship between 
precognitive dream belief and explicit change detection. Two simple regression analyses 
conducted on measures of sensitivity and bias respectively, summarised in Table 3.4, did 
not reveal a significant relationship. 
Subsequently, in line with the hypothesis H2, we compared participants with (N = 
18) and without (N = 31) precognitive dream experience on the explicit dꞌ and c 
measures. Participants were divided into these groups by the same principle as in Study 
2. Again the difference was non-significant for both sensitivity, t(47) = 1.28, p = .256, r2 
= .03, and bias, t(47) = .11, p = .917, r2 = 2.57 x 10-4. The results of this analysis do not 
lend support to the tested hypotheses. 
In order to assess the hypothesised differences in implicit change detection, we first 
explored participants’ overall performance on implicit trials. The mean sensitivity on 
these trials was 0.35 (SD = 0.61) which indicates an above-chance performance. This 
value differed significantly from zero, t(48) = 4.00, p < .001, 95% CI* [0.17, 0.51], r2 = 
.25, suggesting that participants were able to detect a change even when they reported 
not having seen it. Another set of simple regression analyses was conducted in order to 
investigate the hypothesised relationship between precognitive dream belief and 
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measures of sensitivity and bias on implicit trials (H3), however no significant 
relationship was discovered. The findings are summarised in Table 3.5. Controlling for 
sensitivity on explicit trials did not change the null result; the effect of implicit d' was 
still not significant, b = −1.41, SE = 1.40, β = −0.15, p = .318, 95% CI* of b [−4.14, 
2.26]. Again, these findings are corroborated by comparing the implicit performance of 
precognitive dreamers and non-precognitive dreamers, as stated in the hypothesis H4. 
There was no significant difference between these groups on sensitivity, t(47) = 0.84, p 
= .452, r2 = .01, or bias, t(47) = 1.24, p = .237 r2 = .03. Thus, the hypotheses about a 
relationship between implicit change detection and precognitive dream belief and 
experience were not supported by the data. 
  
Table 3.4 
Results of two simple regression analyses of precognitive dream belief performance on measure of 
sensitivity and bias on explicit trials 
Variable b SE β [95% CI] p 
Explicit dꞌ −0.83 1.82 -0.07 [−4.39, 3.70] .645 
Explicit c 0.16 3.48 0.01 [−6.73, 6.23] .963 
 
Table 3.5 
Results of two simple regression analyses of precognitive dream belief performance on measure of 
sensitivity and bias on implicit trials 
Variable b SE β [95% CI] p 
Explicit dꞌ −1.36 1.39 −0.14 [−4.81, 1.73] .332 
Implicit c −0.76 1.47 −0.08 [−3.44, 2.15] .606 
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3.2.3. Study 3 Discussion 
Study 3 focused on the role of explicit and implicit change detection in precognitive 
dream belief as well as differences in these variables between people with and without 
precognitive dream experience. We hypothesised a negative relationship between 
explicit change detection and precognitive dream belief and a positive one between 
implicit detection and this belief. Furthermore we predicted differences in explicit and 
implicit change detection between precognitive and non-precognitive dreamers. None 
of the hypotheses were supported by the data. In contrast to a previous study 
investigating paranormal belief using signal detection methods (Krummenacher, Mohr, 
Haker, & Brugger, 2010), we did not find that paranormal believers exhibited a lower 
response criterion (i.e., favoured false alarms over misses). 
It could be argued that the employed task did not in fact measure implicit detection. 
Indeed, this line of argumentation has been raised in a critique of Rensink’s (2004) study 
by Simons, Nevarez, and Boot (2005). They argued, in terms of signal detection theory, 
that when participants indicate they sensed a change, they are merely expressing that 
they have evidence of change but that this evidence has not yet reached the decision 
criterion. In other words, the ‘sensing’ detections represented merely liberal responses 
waiting to be confirmed. If this criticism applies to the present study, one would expect 
to find the participants exhibiting liberal bias in their performance on implicit trials. 
However, in the present study, participants tended to adopt a somewhat conservative 
bias for both explicit and implicit trials. Furthermore, Simons and colleagues (2005) 
showed that participants in the ‘can-sense’ category (those who ‘sensed’ the change 
substantially sooner than they ‘saw’ it) made more false alarms than ‘only-see’ 
participants. In our study, however, the mean sensitivity to change on implicit trials was 
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significantly higher than chance-level, which would not occur had false alarms been 
proportional to hits. 
Granted the argument above, one could nevertheless suggest that the hits and 
correct rejections on implicit trials represented situations when the phenomenon of 
change was detected consciously but the particular element that changed was not. This 
argument would imply that participants first use some kind of global perception to 
assess the overall state of the stimuli and only then use a more analytical approach to 
identify the changing element. While this idea seems plausible at least at face value, we 
would suggest that a potential proponent of this explanation needs to provide an 
explanation of what it means to notice something without knowing what it is, as well as 
account for why participants indicated that they had not noticed a change. 
3.3. General discussion and conclusion 
In this chapter, we investigated the hypothesis that putative precognitive dream 
experiences are caused by implicit processing of subtle environmental cues. Study 2 
explored the hypothesis of a positive relationship between transliminality, implicit 
learning ability, and precognitive dream belief and experience. None of the predictions 
were confirmed by the data analysis. Furthermore, contrary to prediction, we found a 
negative relationship between transliminality scores and performance on the SRT task. 
Study 3 focused on the relationship between implicit and explicit change detection 
ability on one hand and precognitive dream belief and experience on the other. We 
hypothesised that belief in and experience of precognitive dreams would be negatively 
related to explicit change detection. Neither of these hypotheses was supported by the 
data. In light of these two studies, we conclude that although individual differences in 
explicit and implicit processing abilities, such as the ones assessed by the reported 
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studies, may play a role in precognitive dream experiences, they are most likely not a 
major factor. 
Some remarks on the limitations of the reported studies are in order. Firstly, there 
is an ongoing discussion in the scientific community about whether or not the methods 
employed in these studies have demonstrated the existence of true implicit processing in 
the absence of awareness (c.f. Mitroff, Simons, & Franconeri, 2002; Destrebecqz & 
Cleeremans, 2001). If we adopt the negative stance on this debate, there are two 
possible implications; either this kind of higher processing cannot take place without 
being accompanied by awareness or it can take place but there are currently no good 
methods of assessing it. In case of the latter, further development in this field is needed 
before the IPH can be reliably tested. However, if there is indeed no such thing as 
implicit processing, the hypothesis in question becomes false by definition. 
Secondly, it could be argued that more emotionally impactful stimuli than those 
used in the present studies are needed in order for the implicit mechanisms leading to 
precognitive dreams to take effect. Returning to the hypothetical example in the 
introduction, anxiety resulting from unrealised concern for one’s relative’s health 
certainly bears more personal relevance than a sequence of characters on a computer 
screen, however, the aim of this chapter was to examine the variability of general 
implicit processing ability, not of implicit processing of emotionally upsetting stimuli. 
The point is nevertheless valid and we would encourage future research on this topic. 
Furthermore, the sample sizes used in our studies might not have been large 
enough to detect the true effects. There were only 17 precognitive dreamers (34%) in 
Study 2 and 18 (37%) in Study 3, which might not have been sufficient numbers for the 
conducted comparisons. We might have obtained a higher proportion of precognitive 
dreamers had we used a sample with a cultural background that particularly endorsed 
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such experiences. Our sample consisted mostly of white, UK-domiciled undergraduate 
psychology students, however the proportion of precognitive dreamers that we obtained 
with this sample is in line with that found in most representative surveys of paranormal 
beliefs. 
Finally, there are at least two possible predictions of the IPH that were not 
explored by our studies. Firstly, it may be that precognitive dream experiences are not 
explained by individual differences in waking life implicit processing, but by differences 
in the extent to which this processed information manifests itself in the individual’s 
dream imagery. A study exploring this hypothesis could, for instance, assess the 
relationship of precognitive dream experience and sleep-inspired insight. Secondly, it 
could be argued that most people have dreams that, to some extent, reflect unconscious 
inferences about implicitly processed information and that whether or not these are 
deemed precognitive depends largely on external circumstances and subjective 
assessment. Some people might be more inclined to attribute precognitive character to 
such dreams, others might look for other, less extraordinary explanations. Thus, while 
acknowledging the need for replication of our findings as well as finding alternative 
means of testing the implicit processing hypothesis, we believe that research into 
potential psychological factors behind the differences in precognitive dream attribution 
may be more valuable. It is the exploration of these factors on which we focus in the 





Demographic and sleep-related correlates of precognitive 
dream belief and experience 
 
4.1. Study 4 Introduction 
In Chapter III we conclude that rather than exploring implicit processes that might 
lead to dream imagery that actually provides information about likely future events, it 
might be fruitful to focus on potential individual differences in characteristics that may 
contribute to people’s tendency to attribute paranormal explanations to their 
experiences. In this chapter, we provide a transition between these two areas by 
exploring individual differences in demographic and sleep-related characteristics and 
their relationship to precognitive dream experience. 
Expanding on the idea behind the implicit processing hypothesis of precognitive 
dream experience tested in Studies 2 and 3, it could be argued that these experiences 
come about as the result of processing of external stimuli during sleep or borderline 
sleep states. For example, if a person falls asleep in front of the television, a news item 
may get incorporated into the narrative of their dreams. When, once awake, this person 
learns the news, they can be under the impression that their dream foretold the event in 
question (Alcock, 1981). Both early and late sleep stages have been shown to be 
permeable to external stimuli (Hoelscher, Klinger, & Barta, 1981), so it is plausible that 
the more often one finds oneself in borderline sleep states, the higher the likelihood of 
putatively precognitive dream experiences will be. Examining the relationship between 
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precognitive dream experience and various sleep-related behaviours, such as the 
frequency of nocturnal awakenings or diurnal naps, thus seems worthwhile. 
Closely related to the issue of sleep behaviour and its relationship to precognitive 
dream experience is the topic of sleep medication use. Use of medication alters sleep 
patterns and certain drugs have been shown to interfere with REM sleep, a stage where 
most dreams occur (Pagel & Parnes, 2001), as well as induce nightmares (Pagel & 
Helfter, 2003). Thus, even in the absence of a straightforward mechanism for how sleep 
medication might induce a precognitive dream experience, we consider it worthwhile to 
examine the potential relationship between the two. 
It could also be argued, and indeed has been argued (Houran & Lange, 1998), that 
certain individual characteristics raise the likelihood that a seemingly extraordinary 
coincidence between one’s dreams and subsequent events will be ascribed a paranormal 
attribution. One such characteristic, often mentioned by the proponents of the cognitive 
deficit hypothesis (Alcock, 1981) discussed in the introductory chapter, is erroneous or 
biased reasoning. This view has led to studies exploring the role of such factors as 
general cognitive ability (see Wiseman & Watt, 2006, for review), critical reasoning skills 
(Pennycook et al., 2012; Roe, 1999; Royalty, 1995), and various cognitive biases (e.g., 
Blackmore & Trościanko, 1985; Blagrove et al., 2006; Brugger & Taylor, 2003; French & 
Wilson, 2006). However, as French and Wilson (2007) point out, the findings of these 
studies are often inconclusive. For example, Musch and Ehrenberg (2002) found that 
paranormal belief is negatively related to general cognitive ability, as assessed using a 
measure of scholastic proficiency. On the other hand, Stuart-Hamilton and colleagues 
(2006) failed to find a significant relationship between intelligence and paranormal 
belief. A potential weakness of this research may lie in the fact that the studies 
addressing this issue have mainly explored the relationship between cognitive abilities 
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and paranormal belief in general (see Wiseman & Watt, 2006). However, as pointed out 
in section 1.3.3.3, belief in and experience of the paranormal are distinct constructs and 
thus this approach may be conflating the two. Furthermore, it has been suggested that 
individual paranormal experiences and beliefs may differ in the psychological 
mechanisms that underlie them (Irwin, 1993, see also section 1.3.3). We therefore 
believe that this research will be advanced by focusing separately on the belief in and 
experience of particular paranormal phenomena. For that reason Study 4 will, in 
addition to sleep characteristics, look at the relationship between precognitive dream 
belief and experience on the one hand and education on the other. Although 
educational achievement is by no means a perfect measure of cognitive ability, we would 
argue that, given the exploratory nature of the link between precognitive dream belief 
and experience and cognitive ability, using an easily measurable proxy characteristic, 
such as years of completed formal education, is justifiable with appropriate caveats. 
Another factor contributing to the misattribution of paranormal causality to 
seemingly extraordinary dream-related experiences may be attitude towards dreams in 
general. Beaulieu-Prévost and Zadra (2005) found that a tendency to ascribe importance 
to one’s dreams leads to overestimation of one’s dream recall frequency and Schredl 
(2009) found a relationship between the former and precognitive dream experience. 
Furthermore Haraldsson (1985) found that women were more likely to both believe in 
the reality of precognitive dreams and report having experienced them, while Aumann 
and colleagues (2012) found that women tend to ascribe more personal significance to 
their dreams in general. On the one hand it is possible that these gender differences in 
the significance ascribed to one’s dreams are a result of the tendency of women to 
believe in precognitive dreams as well as to experience such dreams. On the other hand, 
consistent with the findings of Beaulieu-Prévost and Zadra (2005), it is plausible that 
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women, who in general tend to consider their dreams as more important than men do, 
are likely to overestimate the frequency of their own subjective precognitive dream 
experience, thus leading to the gender differences found by Haraldsson (1985). It should 
be noted, however, that other studies did not find gender differences in precognitive 
dream frequency (Rattet & Bursik, 2001; Schredl, 2009). In order to explore this issue 
further, the present study will look at the relationship between demographic variables 
(gender and age), attitudes toward dreams in general, and precognitive dream belief and 
experience. 
To summarise, Study 4 sets out to explore several questions. Firstly, it will look at 
the relationship between precognitive dream belief and experience, thus adding to the 
scant available literature on the demarcation between paranormal belief and experiences. 
Secondly, given the mixed results of previous studies regarding the relationship between 
cognitive ability and paranormal belief, the study will investigate the role of education, 
among other demographic variables, in the belief in and experience of precognitive 
dreams. Thirdly, it will also explore the relationship between precognitive dream belief 
and experience and attitudes towards dreams in general. Fourthly, based on the 
argument outlined above, the research presented here will also focus on individuals’ 
sleep-related characteristics and their relationship with subjective precognitive dream 
experience. And finally, the study will explore the relationship between sleep medication 




Participants were recruited via social networks (Facebook, Twitter, Reddit), blogs, 
and online discussion forums and interest groups dedicated to various topics 
(psychology, dreams, scepticism, the paranormal), as well as through word of mouth. A 
total of 693 participants completed the study. Despite stating in the introductory section 
of the study that data from minors cannot be used, 10 participants were less than 18 
years old and their data were excluded from further analysis due to ethical 
considerations. Of the remaining participants, 279 were male (41.52%) and 393 
(58.48%) female. Eleven participants (1.6%) did not identify as either male or female, 
and their exclusion resulted in the final sample of 672 participants. Mean age of the 
sample was 31.47 years (range = 18-75, SD = 11.74). There was no age difference 
between males and females in the sample (Mmale = 31.45, SD = 12.67, Mfemale = 31.48, 
SD = 11.05, t(546.21) = 0.032, p = .974). The majority of participants found out about 
the study on social networks (70.8%), from a family member (2.2%), or through word 
of mouth (2.7%), while the rest of the sample (24.3%) came across the research through 
their interest in above-mentioned related topics. Participants came from 55 countries, 
mostly from the United Kingdom (32.7%), the United States of America (24.9%), and 
Slovakia (13.6%). None of the other countries had frequency over 5%. This distribution 




Figure 4.1. Distribution of participants by country. 
 
4.2.2. Materials 
A battery of questionnaires was administered in the following order. The wording 
of the items can be found in Appendix B. We also used other measures not analysed in 
the present study. Their description is provided in the following chapters. 
Demographic data 
Standard demographic items including gender (including an additional non-binary 
response option), country of origin, age, and years of formal education completed were 
taken. Furthermore, participants were asked to indicate how they found out about the 
study, whether through social networks (Facebook, Twitter, etc.), interest group, 
website, or community, from a family member, or through word of mouth. Participants 
who selected the ‘interest group/website/community’ option were asked to specify the 
area of interest (see Appendix B.1). 
Attitudes towards dreams 
A 21-item questionnaire was used to assess attitudes towards dreams. Nineteen 
items originated from the ‘Dream significance’, ‘Dream positivity’, and ‘Dream 
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guidance’ subscales of the 50-item Inventory of Dream Experiences and Attitudes 
(IDEA, Beaulieu-Prévost, Charneau Simard, & Zadra, 2009). Items were rated on a 7-
point Likert scale (1 = Completely disagree, 7 = Completely agree). Although we used items 
from three subscales in the study, when factor analysed, all but two of them loaded 
primarily on one of two factors, namely ‘Dream significance’ (the importance ascribed 
to dreams in general) and ‘Dream positivity’ (positive affect towards one’s dreams). 
Furthermore, the ‘Dream guidance’ and ‘Dream significance’ factors were strongly 
correlated (r =.58). For these reasons, we collapsed these two factors into a single factor 
(referred to henceforth as ‘Dream significance’. A subsequent confirmatory factor 
analysis (CFA) of the two-factor model using weighted least square mean and variance 
adjusted estimation (WLSMV) showed an acceptable fit (CFI = .966, TLI = .962, 
RMSEA = .076, 90% CI [.070; .080]). The two resulting subscales exhibited high 
reliability (α = .92, 95% CI* [.90, .94] for ‘Dream significance’ and α = .84, 95% CI* 
[.80, .87] for ‘Dream positivity’). For the wording of the items, see Appendix B.3. 
Sleep characteristics 
Seven items related to sleep quality addressing usual sleep duration, frequency of 
day-time naps and night-time wake-ups, use of sleep medication, history of sleep 
disorders, usual dream recall, and overall subjective sleep quality were used. A ‘Prefer not 
to say’ response option was provided for the item related to diagnosed sleep disorders. 
The items were adapted from the Pittsburg Sleep Quality Index (Buysse, Reynolds, 
Monk, Berman, & Kupfer, 1989). The items can be found in Appendix B.2. 
Precognitive dream belief and experiences 
Belief in precognitive dreams was assessed using a 4-item Likert scale with response 
options ranging from 1 (Completely disagree) to 7 (Completely agree). This was a modified 
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version of the scale used in studies 2 and 3. Internal consistency of this scale was high, α 
= .92. 
An additional item inquired into the source of information underlying participants’ 
belief into the existence, or otherwise, of precognitive dreams. Five response options 
were provided: Scientific evidence, Popular print or broadcast media, Knowledge of another person’s 
experience, Direct personal experience, and Other (please specify). 
Precognitive dream experience was measured using two further items. The first 
was, just like the items in the belief section, a 7-point Likert item worded “I have had at 
least one dream that came true and which (I believe) was precognitive.” The second 
item related to precognitive dream frequency and was identical to that described in the 
previous chapter. Again, precognitive dreams were defined as “dreams that foretell the 
future” and Bender’s (1966) criteria for what constitutes a precognitive dream were 
included before the precognitive dream section of the questionnaire battery. The 
questionnaire can be found in Appendix B.4. 
4.2.3. Procedure 
The battery of questionnaires was administered online and hosted on Google 
Drive. Participants read a description of the study and gave consent by proceeding with 
filling in the questionnaire.  Upon completion, participants who reported having 
experienced a precognitive dream were asked to complete a separate questionnaire 
whose development is described in Chapter V and is not included in the present 
analysis. Participants were then thanked for completing the study and debriefed. 
4.2.4. Hypotheses 
H1. Precognitive dream belief and experience are related to demographic 
variables (gender, age, and education). 
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H2. Precognitive dream belief and experience are related to significance ascribed 
to one’s dreams as well as emotional appraisal of them. 
H3. Precognitive dream experience is related to sleep characteristics (sleep quality 
and nocturnal awakening and diurnal nap frequency). 
H4. Precognitive dream experience is related to sleep medication use. 
4.3. Results 
4.3.1. Descriptive analysis 
The mean number of completed years of formal education in the sample was 16.45 
(Mdn = 17, SD = 3.35) ranging from 8 to 25. Table 4.1 provides a summary of 
descriptive statistics of the dream attitude subscales. 
 
Table 4.1 
Descriptive statistics for attitudes towards dreams variables 
Variable M Mdn SD Min Max 
Dream Significance 4.15 4.23 1.42 1.08 7 
Dream Positivity 4.19 4.29 1.15 1 7 
 
The majority of participants reported sleeping on average 7-8 hours a day (62.7%) 
with only 4.5% of participants sleeping fewer than 5 or more than 10 hours a day. The 
mean overall sleep quality rated on a 7-point Likert scale (1 = Very bad, 7 = Very good) 
was 5.1 (Mdn = 5, MAD = 1.48). Forty-two participants (6.9%) reported having been 
diagnosed with a sleep disorder. Items related to frequencies of daytime naps, night time 
waking up, use of sleep medication and dream recall are summarised in Table 4.2. Due 
to extremely skewed distribution of responses to the sleep medication item (80.1% 
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reported never taking sleep medication) we decided to dichotomise the variable for 
further analysis. 
The mean score on the precognitive dream belief index, derived from the four 
items measuring belief in the reality of precognitive dreams, was 3.5 (Mdn = 3.5, SD = 
2.01). The median response to the item addressing precognitive dream experience was 2, 
with 39.2% of the sample having scored above the mid-point. Furthermore, 56.2% of 
participants reported never having remembered a precognitive dream, 17.8% 
remembered them less often than once a year, 6.2% about once a year, 12.1% about 
once in six months, 5.2% reported having precognitive dreams about once a month, and 
2.5% about once a week. 
 
Table 4.2 
Descriptive statistics for sleep variables 
Variable Mdn Min Max 
Daytime nap frequency 2 0 6 
Night time wake-up frequency 3 0 6 
Sleep medication use frequency 0 0 6 
Dream recall frequency 4 0 7 
 
4.3.2. Relationship between precognitive dream belief and experience 
Belief in precognitive dreams was strongly related to both precognitive dream 
experience (rs = .812, 95% CI* [.780, .841], p < 2 × 10
−16) and frequency of precognitive 
dreams (rs = .730, 95% CI* [.692, .764], p < 2 × 10
−16). Figure 4.2 shows the distribution 
of precognitive dream belief scores with respect to precognitive dream recall frequency. 
As is apparent from the plot, the bulk of participants who never have precognitive 
dreams do not hold belief in the existence of such dreams (M = 2.25, Mdn = 1.75, SD = 
1.43, N = 343), those who report having precognitive dreams infrequently (once a year 
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or less often) belief in the reality of these phenomena with moderate conviction (M = 
4.87, Mdn = 5.00, SD = 1.31, N = 166), and those who have these dreams frequently 
believe in their reality more strongly (M = 5.64, Mdn = 6.00, SD = 1.13, N = 162). 
These differences were statistically significant, F(2, 668) = 437.7, p = 2 × 10−16 with 
difference between first two groups of 2.61, 95% CI [2.32, 2.92] and the difference 
between the latter two groups being 0.77,  95% CI [2.32, 2.92] (both p’s < 10−6 for 
Tukey’s HSD test). Conversely, out of the participants who scored above the median on 
the precognitive dream belief measure, only 13.7% reported never having had a 
precognitive dream experience, as opposed to 82.5% of those below the median value. 
Figure 4.2. Area plot showing relative proportions of precognitive dream experience 
categories with respect to precognitive dream belief. 
 
4.3.3. Hypothesis testing 
Demographic variables and precognitive dream belief and 
experience 
First, we explored the role of demographic variables in precognitive dream belief 
and experience (H1). A sequence of linear regression models predicting PD belief was 
built with gender, age, and years of formal education completed added, one at a time in 
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order to assess the individual contributions of the predictor variables. Education was 
added to the model last in order to account for potential relationship with age and 
gender. The final model including these three variables accounted for 22.5% of the 
variance in precognitive dream experience, with all variables having a significant effect 
on PD belief (see Table 4.3 and 4.4). This result was supportive of H1. Men exhibited 
lower PD belief, while age was positively related to the outcome variable. Furthermore, 
PD belief diminished with increasing number of years of formal education completed. 
Comparable results were obtained from a multiple ordinal regression of PD experience 
on the same predictor variables (see Table S1 in Appendix C). 
 
Table 4.3 
Summary of hierarchical regression models of PD belief 
Model R ΔR2 ΔF df p 
1 .095 .009 2.017 1, 670 .014 
2 .415 .164 132.22 1, 669 < 2 × 10−16 
3 .475 .053 45.493 1, 668 3 × 10−11 
Note. Predictors for model: 1) gender; 2) model 1 + age; 3) model 2 + education. 
 
Table 4.4 
Details of the final regression model predicting PD belief 
Predictor b β [95% CI*] t p 
Gender −0.449 −0.109 [−0.174, −0.039] −3.203 .001 
Age 0.072 0.416 [0.350, 0.475] 12.169 < 2 × 10−16 






Precognitive dream experience and attitudes towards dreams 
Next, we tested the hypothesis that precognitive dream variables are related to 
individuals’ attitudes towards dreams (H2). Table 4.5 shows zero-order correlation 
between each of the PD variables on the one hand and dream significance and dream 
positivity on the other. There were strong positive relationships between Dream 
significance and each PD variable. As for Dream positivity, however, the correlations 
were much weaker, albeit still statistically significant. 
 
Table 4.5 
Zero-order Spearman’s rank correlations between PD and dream attitude variables 
 Dream significance  Dream positivity 
PD variable rs [95% CI*] p  rs [95% CI*] p 
Belief .683 [.642,.719] < 2 × 10−16  .154 [.072, .227] 6 × 10−5 
Experience .615 [.587, .678] < 2 × 10−16  .148 [.064, .221] 10−4 
Frequency .634 [.567, .662] < 2 × 10−16  .145 [.072, .222] 2 × 10−4 
 
 
Because of the strong correlations between PD variables, we used partial 
correlations to explore the unique contributions to the variance shared between PD and 
dream attitude variables. Controlling for both PD experience and PD frequency, the 
correlation between PD belief and Dream significance dropped to a moderate size, rs = 
.355, 95% CI* [.289, .421], p < 2 × 10−16. 
However, partialling out PD belief reduced the sizes of the correlations of PD 
experience and PD frequency with Dream significance to small, rs = .189, 95% CI* [.107, 
.266], p = 10−6 and rs = .233, 95% CI* [.158, .308], p = 10
−9, respectively. Thus, H2 was 
partially supported by the data. 
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Precognitive dream experience and sleep characteristics 
In order to ascertain the relationship between precognitive dream experience and 
sleep characteristics (H3), a hierarchical cluster analysis using Ward’s minimum variance 
method (Ward, 1963) was first conducted on the five standardised sleep variables (sleep 
duration, frequency of nocturnal awakenings and diurnal naps, dream recall frequency, 
and subjective overall sleep quality). Due to extremely small variance of the sleep 
medication variable as well as the binary nature of the sleep disorder variable, these were 
excluded from the cluster-analysed set, in order to avoid homogenisation of the sample. 
Based on visual inspection of the resulting dendrogram (Fig. S1 in Appendix C), three 
clusters of similar sizes were identified. The individual ‘sleep profiles’ of these clusters is 
depicted in Fig. 4.3. As can be seen in the figure, Cluster 1 was characterised by a rather 
erratic sleep pattern with high frequency of both nocturnal awakenings and diurnal naps, 
high dream recall, and a low subjective overall sleep quality. Cluster 2 differed from 
Cluster 3 mainly in terms of sleep duration and dream recall. Thus, these two clusters 
were interpreted as representing high and low dream recallers respectively. Table 4.6 
shows the descriptive statistics for the measured variables with respect to the three sleep 
clusters as well as tests of differences between the clusters.  
There were no significant differences between the sizes of the clusters, 2 (2) = 
3.723, p = .155, however, there was a preponderance of men in Cluster 3 compared to 
Cluster 2, 2 (2) = 7.790, p = .020. The mean age of Cluster 1 was furthermore 
significantly higher in comparison to the other two clusters, Mean diff2−1 = −3.29, 95% 
CI* [−5.90, −0.69], p = 0.009; Mean diff3−1 = −4.37, 95% CI* [−7.00, −1.74], p = 3 × 
10−4. Importantly, the three clusters also differed significantly from one another in the 
proportion of participants who have used sleep medication, with Cluster 1 having the 
highest and Cluster 3 the lowest proportion, 2 (2) = 28.396, p = 7 × 10−7. To see if this 
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relationship remained significant after controlling for age, the variables were entered 
into a logistic regression with age and sleep clusters as predictors and sleep medication 
use as a binary outcome. As shown in Table 4.7, participants in Cluster 2 were 58% less 
likely to have used sleep medication than Cluster 1 participants. Those in Cluster 3 were 
67% less likely to report sleep medication use compared to Cluster 1. However, when 
the model was refitted with sleep cluster as ordinal variable in order to compare Clusters 
2 and 3, there was no longer a significant difference between them (see Table S2 in 
Appendix C). 
 
Figure 4.3. Sleep variable profiles of three identified sleep clusters. Error bars represent 
± 1 SD. 
 
Next, we investigated the relationship between sleep patterns and reported PD 
frequency. As reported in Table 4.6, there was a significant difference in PD frequency 
between each pair of sleep clusters. Table 4.8 shows a more detailed breakdown of 
proportion of responses on the PD frequency item within individual clusters. Within 
Cluster 1, 36.32% of participants reported having precognitive dreams more often than 
once a year, compared to 27.62% of Cluster 2 and 9.96% of Cluster 3 participants. 
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Furthermore, the proportion of participants without a precognitive dream experience 
rose from 36.82% in Cluster 1 to 62.77% in Cluster 3. 
 
Table 4.6 
Descriptive statistics and test of between group differences for measured variables with respect to sleep 
clusters 
Variable Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 2 (2) 
N (%) 201 (29.9) 240 (35.7) 231 (34.4) 3.723 
Gender (% male) 42.3 35.03 47.62 7.790* 
Sleep meds (% use) 32.32,3 16.31,3 13.01,2 28.396*** 
Sleep disorder (%) 11.002,3 4.61 4.31 9.910** 
 
M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) F (2,669) 
Age 34.14 (13.22)2,3 30.85 (11.02)
1 29.77 (10.7)1 8.125*** 
Years of education 16.31 (3.39) 16.39 (3.47) 16.64 (3.20) 0.564 
Dream significance 4.61 (1.36)2,3 4.31 (1.37)1,3 3.57 (1.32)1,2 34.390*** 
Dream positivity 4.01 (1.21)2 4.37 (1.17)1 4.16 (1.07) 5.501** 
PD belief 4.17 (2.02)3 3.76 (2.05)3 3.27 (1.90)1,2 10.990*** 
 
Mdn (MAD) Mdn (MAD) Mdn (MAD) H (2)† 
Sleep duration 3 (0.00)2 3 (0.00)3 3 (0.00)1,2 65.313*** 
Nap frequency 5 (1.48)2,3 2 (1.48)1 2 (1.48)1 168.269*** 
Wakeup frequency 6 (1.48)2,3 4 (2.97)1,3 4 (2.97)1,2 114.984*** 
Dream recall 6 (1.48)3 6 (1.48)3 4 (1.48)1,2 333.306*** 
Sleep quality 4 (1.48)2,3 6 (1.48)1,3 5 (1.48)1,2 139.745*** 
PD experience 5 (2.97)2,3 3 (2.97)1 2 (1.48)1 25.631*** 
PD frequency 2 (1.48)2,3 1 (0.00)1,3 1 (0.00)1,2 40.407*** 
Note. MAD = median absolute deviation. 
Superscripts in individual cells indicate a significant difference from given cluster according to Tukey 
HSD-corrected t-test for continuous variables and Bonferroni corrected Mann-Whitney U-test for ordinal 
variables. 
† Kruskal-Wallis ANOVA due to ordinal variable. 
* < .05; ** < .01; *** < .001 
 
In order to control for demographic variables, a multiple ordinal regression model 
was fit with PD frequency as outcome and demographic variables and sleep cluster as 
predictors. The results are summarised in Table 4.9. Sleep cluster remained a significant 
predictor even after accounting for the significant effects of age and education. 
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However, as was the case with the model predicting sleep medication use, when Sleep 
cluster was treated as an ordinal variable, the odds ratio for Cluster 3 was not 
significantly different from Cluster 2, b = −0.076, SE= 0.13, p = .557, OR = 0.93, 95% 
CI [.74, 1.23]. 
 
Table 4.7 
Summary of logistic regression predicting sleep medication use 
Predictor b SE p OR [95% CI] 
Age 0.012 0.01 .118 1.01 [1.00, 1.03] 
Cluster 2 −0.862 0.23 2 × 10−4 0.42 [0.27, 0.66] 
Cluster 3 −1.112 0.25 8 × 10−6 0.33 [0.20, 0.53] 
 
Table 4.8 
Proportion of PD frequency levels by sleep clusters and sleep medication use categories 
 PD frequency (%) 
Sleep cluster 0 1 2 3 4 5 
1 36.82 19.40 7.46 20.90 9.45 5.97 
2 51.88 16.74 3.77 14.23 8.79 4.60 
3 62.77 18.61 8.66 7.36 1.73 0.87 
Sleep medication use      
No 54.56 17.69 6.7 12.1 5.77 3.17 
Yes 37.31 20.15 5.97 20.9 9.7 5.97 
Note. Cells within rows add up to 100%. 
 
The relationship between the presence of a sleep disorder diagnosis and PD 
frequency was investigated using another multiple ordinal regression with a categorised 
PD frequency as outcome variable. The categories were the same as the ones depicted in 
Fig. 4. 1. The reason for this treatment of the variable was the small number of 
participants who reported having been diagnosed with a sleep disorder. Reducing the 
number of outcome variable categories thus increases the number of cases per cell. 
Sleep disorder was a significant predictor of PD frequency category, even after 
accounting for the effects of demographic variables and sleep cluster, b = 0.752, SE= 
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0.33, p = .021, OR = 2.12, 95% CI [1.12, 4.04]. This result provides further support for 
H3 that sleep characteristics are related to experience of precognitive dreams7. 
Precognitive dream experience and sleep medication 
Finally, we investigated the role of sleep medication in precognitive dream 
experience (H4). In order to do this, we first compared the distributions of responses on 
the PD frequency variable between those who reported having used sleep medication 
and those who did not. The distributions differed significantly, 2 (5) = 17.454, p = .003. 
Table 4.8 shows the proportions of responses within the individual sleep medication use 
groups. 
Secondly, we controlled for the effects of demographic variables and sleep cluster 
by including them, along with the binary sleep medication variable into a multiple 
ordinal regression with PD frequency included in the model as outcome. As shown in 
Table 4.9, the effect of sleep medication, as well as sleep cluster, on PD frequency 
remained significant. This result was consistent with H4. 
 
Table 4.9 
Summary of ordinal regression of demographic variables, sleep cluster and sleep medication use on PD 
frequency 
Predictor b SE p OR [95% CI] 
Gender −0.169 0.16 .279 0.84 [0.62, 1.15] 
Age 0.041 0.01 2 × 10−11 1.04 [1.03, 1.06] 
Education −0.163 0.02 10−12 0.85 [0.81, 0.89] 
Cluster 2 −0.393 0.18 .033 0.68 [0.47, 0.97] 
Cluster 3 −0.973 0.19 4 × 10−7 0.38 [0.26, 0.55] 
Sleep meds 0.446 0.19 .016 1.56 [1.08, 2.24] 
                                                 
7 We acknowledge that the reported analysis does not address the question of how much of the 




The present study investigated the relationships between the belief in, and 
experience of, putatively precognitive dreams and various demographic as well as sleep 
and dream related variables. As expected, precognitive dream belief and experience were 
strongly positively related to each other. The magnitudes of detected correlations were 
somewhat larger than those reported by previous studies exploring paranormal belief 
and experience (Glicksohn, 1990; Lawrence et al., 1995), in the .7 – .8 range as opposed 
to .5 – .6. This discrepancy may be attributed to the differences in samples used. The 
present sample consisted of members of the general population rather than mostly 
undergraduate students and school children. Furthermore, some participants were 
recruited from interest groups. This could have led to distributions of the precognitive 
dream variables that exaggerated the relationships between belief and experience. The 
causal nature of the relationship between PD belief and experience is difficult to tease 
apart. It seems natural that if a person encounters an event they perceive as fulfilling a 
dream they previously had, such experience can lead to espousing of belief in the 
precognitive power of dreams. On the other hand, it could be argued that at least a 
certain propensity to paranormal belief is necessary for attributing such experience to 
precognition rather than dismissing it as a mere quirk of probability or explaining it 
away in less extraordinary terms. Furthermore, the fact that there exist individuals who 
believe in PD without a prior experience suggests that even if belief may be, in cases, 
sufficiently caused by an experience, such experience is not a necessary condition of 
belief. This issue of causality would be best addressed by a longitudinal study. Such a 
study could, for example, track participants’ beliefs and experiences and assess the 
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temporal order of their first instance. It might be also feasible to induce a higher level of 
belief in participants and then see whether their reported frequency of PD changes. 
However, this approach might be ethically problematic. Until an appropriately designed 
study has been conducted, we believe it is prudent to embrace a middle ground position 
of a likely bidirectional relationship between PD belief and experience with potential 
positive feedback mechanisms. 
Besides the mutual relationship of precognitive dream belief and experience, the 
study explored several hypotheses. Firstly, we hypothesised that there would be a 
relationship between PD belief and experience on the one hand and demographic 
variables on the other. Consistent with previous literature (Haraldsson, 1985), women 
were more likely to embrace belief in the reality of dream precognition as well as to 
report a first-hand experience of it than men. Furthermore, both PD belief and 
experience were positively related to age, running contrary to some previous findings 
(Schredl, 2009, Blagrove et al., 2006). It could be argued that this is not surprising 
because a longer life means a greater chance of subjectively experiencing an ostensibly 
precognitive dream and, by extension, a greater likelihood of espousing PD belief. 
However, this interpretation does not account for the significant positive relationship 
between age and reported PD frequency (see Table 4.9), unless one is prepared to admit 
that this kind of self-report is at least partly driven by belief. Since attitudes have been 
shown to inflate self-reported dream recall frequency (Beaulieu-Prévost, & Zadra, 2005), 
this is certainly a possibility and further research should address this issue. Interestingly, 
we also found that the number of completed years of education was negatively related 
to both PD belief and experience, even after controlling for age. This result is consistent 
with those of Musch and Ehrenberg, (2002), who found that paranormal belief is 
negatively related to cognitive ability, as well as those of Blagrove and colleagues (2006), 
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who found a negative relationship between belief in PD and education. Viewed through 
the lens of the cognitive deficit hypothesis of paranormal belief (Alcock, 1981), this 
result may be taken to suggest that more educated people are more likely to scrutinise 
their experiences. This interpretation is certainly plausible; cognitive ability has been 
shown to be positively related to critical thinking and negatively to biases in probability 
judgement (Liberali, Reyna, Furlan, Stein, & Pardo, 2012; West, Toplak, & Stanovich, 
2008; but see Stanovich & West, 2008) and education has been shown to correlate with 
general cognitive ability (Ritchie, Bates, Der, Starr, & Deary 2013). On the other hand, 
using a measure of formal education as a proxy for cognitive/critical thinking ability is 
potentially problematic (Deary & Johnson, 2010). Therefore, even though interesting, 
this result should be treated with caution when used as support for the cognitive deficit 
hypothesis. However, we would argue, it provides a good basis and rationale for future 
research using more direct measures of cognitive ability and critical thinking skills. 
Future investigation of the relationship between these variables and specific paranormal 
experiences may help to disentangle the inconsistent results obtained from studying a 
conceptually ill-differentiated composite of general paranormal belief and experience 
(French & Wilson, 2007). 
Secondly, we hypothesised that PD belief and experience would be related to 
attitudes towards dreams, namely perceived personal significance of dreams in general 
and positive affect towards one’s dreams. There was a strong positive relationship 
between PD variables and dream significance. When the shared variance between PD 
belief and experience was partialled out, the size of the relationship dropped to 
moderate for belief but only small for experience and frequency. For the above-
mentioned reasons, it is difficult to determine what the shared variance between the PD 
variables represents, whether it is closer to ontological (e.g. belief in the existence of 
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precognitive dreams) or ‘experiential’ belief (conviction that one has experienced such 
dreams). However the relatively small unique contribution of PD experience and 
frequency compared to belief points at the primacy of the latter when it comes to the 
relationship with personal significance ascribed to one’s dreams. As was the case before, 
the causality of this relationship cannot be unambiguously interpreted based on the 
present result. It is possible that belief in precognitive dreams (and experience thereof) 
causes an individual to ascribe a greater personal significance to their dreams. However, 
it is equally plausible that an a priori tendency to consider dreams as personally 
significant creates a propensity to belief in, and experience of, precognitive dreams. 
As for positive affect towards one’s dreams, we found a small positive relationship 
with the PD variables. The unique contribution of neither of them reached statistical 
significance. This finding will become relevant further in the discussion. 
Thirdly, we hypothesised a relationship between the frequency of precognitive 
dream experience and an individual’s sleep pattern. We identified three clusters of 
participants based on their responses on sleep-related variables. One of the clusters 
exhibited a rather erratic sleep pattern with a relatively high frequency of nocturnal 
awakenings and diurnal naps and a lower subjective overall sleep quality. Consistent 
with a high frequency of awakenings, this cluster also reported a high dream recall 
frequency. Dream recall was also a main characteristic that distinguished the other two 
clusters, although there were smaller yet statistically significant differences in most of 
the measured sleep variables. The results showed that, controlling for demographic 
variables, participants in the ‘erratic’ cluster reported the highest PD frequency and 
those in the low dream recall cluster reported having these kinds of dreams least often. 
This was further supported by the finding that the presence of a sleep disorder diagnosis 
was a significant predictor of PD frequency. 
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Finally, we hypothesised a relationship between PD experience and sleep 
medication use. We found that participants who reported having used sleep medication 
in the past were more likely to report a higher frequency of precognitive dream 
experiences than those who have not used sleep medication. Furthermore those in the 
‘erratic’ sleep cluster were more likely to have used sleep medication than participants in 
the other two clusters. This finding validates the interpretation of the extracted clusters 
since it can be expected that people with disturbed sleep are more likely to use sleep 
medication. However, our findings suggest that sleep medication use has an additive 
effect beyond that of the sleep clusters. 
These results are consistent with the hypothesis that precognitive dream experience 
may arise as a result of an individual’s processing external stimuli, such as news reports 
on the television or radio, during hypnagogic and hypnopompic states (Alcock, 1981). 
An erratic sleep pattern and associated increased likelihood of sleep medication use 
means more frequent hypnagogic and hypnopompic states and thereby a heightened 
likelihood of external stimuli being processed. Such stimuli can then figure in the 
narrative of one’s dreams. If one is then confronted again with the same stimuli after 
awakening, this can lead to the impression that one dreamt about the future. 
Alternatively, given that the present study relies on self-report measures, it is also 
possible that these results reflect a tendency of certain people to exaggerate their sleep 
difficulties as well as to over-report extraordinary experience. If this is the case, one 
would expect to find a relationship between precognitive dream experience and 
variables such as anxiety, depression, and narcissism. To the best of our knowledge, 
there has been only one study that explored the role of neuroticism in precognitive 
dream frequency and it did not find a significant result (Schredl, 2009). As for the other 
traits, there appears to be no research linking them to precognitive dream experience. 
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There are, however studies looking at more general paranormal belief/experience. For 
instance, Agorastos and colleagues (2012) found no differences in belief in precognition 
or other paranormal phenomena between groups of participants with obsessive-
compulsive disorder or anxiety disorder compared to healthy controls. However, 
Sharps, Matthews, and Asten (2006) found that depression, among other variables was a 
significant predictor of paranormal belief and Dudley (2000) found an association 
between paranormal belief and negative affect. Research into the relationship between 
paranormal belief and narcissism has also yielded somewhat mixed findings. Tobacyk 
and Mitchell (1987) found a positive relationship between the two, however, Auton, 
Pope, and Seeger (2003) did not find a relationship between narcissistic personality 
characteristics and paranormal belief. Moreover, the findings of Roe and Morgan (2002) 
were mixed; they found a positive relationship between narcissism and the Extrasensory 
perception and Psychokinesis subscales of the Australian Sheep-Goat Scale but no 
relationship between the former and paranormal belief in general as assessed by the 
Paranormal Belief Scale. More research is therefore needed. Including the above-
mentioned variables in future studies could help to adjudicate between the two 
alternative interpretations of the link between precognitive dream experience and sleep 
characteristics. Different still, it may be the case that, by virtue of sheer probability, the 
more one recalls one’s dreams, the higher the likelihood that a real-life event will, at least 
to some extent, thematically overlap with the content of any of the dreams. This 
interpretation, even though plausible, is probably not amenable to objective testing. 
It could be also argued that the above-mentioned interpretations misidentify the 
causal direction of the relationship between sleep patterns and PD experience and that, 
in fact, it is the subjective experience of upsetting precognitive dreams that disturbs 
one’s sleep. However, as pointed out, the present results show that tendency to PD 
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experiences is associated with a small increase in positive affect towards one’s dreams. 
This would not be the case if precognitive dreams were responsible for disturbed sleep 
and a lower sleep quality. 
Finally, it is also possible that both PD experiences and a disturbed sleep pattern 
share a common cause without the one causing the other. Since many psychological 
disorders are associated with sleep disturbances and some also list various 
“extraordinary” experiences among their symptoms, future research should also explore 
psychopathology as a factor in the experience of precognitive dreams. This would, at the 
same time, contribute to the clarification of the inconclusive results of research focusing 
on the link between paranormal beliefs and experiences on the one hand and 
depression, anxiety, and narcissism on the other, as discussed above. 
There are some limitations to our findings that should be discussed. Firstly, the 
sample used in the study may not be representative of the general population and was 
not obtained using random sampling. However, an effort was made to recruit a broad 
range of participants of differing backgrounds and beliefs. Despite this effort, possible 
biases in the sample may have occurred. There was, for instance, a preponderance of 
males in one of the sleep clusters, even though males were slightly underrepresented in 
the sample as a whole. Since the cluster in question included the most disbelievers in 
precognitive dreams, this gender distribution may be reflecting the fact that some of the 
strong disbelievers were recruited via online forums dedicated to scepticism. These 
kinds of forums tend in general to be rather male-dominated. Moreover, using online 
forums and interest groups dedicated to the paranormal may have led to 
overrepresentation of PD believers/experiencers in comparison to the general 
population. Thus, the frequency of PD belief and experience obtained in the present 
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study should not be viewed as informative of the distribution of these beliefs and 
experiences in the general population. 
In addition to already mentioned difficulties related to the interpretation of 
causality, it is also difficult to disentangle the complex network of relationships between 
the individual measured variables. Since no hypotheses were made about potential 
relationships between, e.g., sleep characteristics and dream attitudes, the present study 
did not attempt to ascertain them. Should such relationships be hypothesised, advanced 
multivariate methods such as structural equation modeling might be of use in testing 
more complex models. We believe that the present findings provide a useful empirical 
basis for their specification. 
In conclusion, the present study identified several correlates of precognitive dream 
belief and experiences, some of which had, to the best of our knowledge, not been 
previously explored. The most notable findings are that precognitive dream belief and 
experience are negatively related to education and that a more frequent PD experience is 
associated with somewhat erratic sleep patterns and a heightened likelihood of sleep 
medication use. We also found evidence of the link between attitudes towards dreams in 
general and precognitive dream belief and, to a lesser extent the frequency of PD 
experience. This finding suggests that people’s attitudes towards their precognitive 
dreams may be a relevant psychological factor contributing to these beliefs and 
experiences. The next chapter will therefore focus on exploring the structure of attitudes 





Attitudes towards precognitive dreams 
 
5.1. Study 5 Introduction 
Considering the prevalence of precognitive dream belief and experience in the 
general population (Blackmore, 1997; Moore, 2005), there has been little rigorous 
investigation into their phenomenological nature. Research in the topic of paranormal 
belief and experience, whether from a clinical or cognitive psychological perspective, 
tends not to focus on how the experiencers of paranormal phenomena perceive and 
construe their experiences. As we will argue in this chapter, addressing this dearth of 
research interest by focusing on attitudes towards precognitive dreams in particular can 
provide useful new insights into the psychology of these beliefs and experiences. 
There are a number of scales addressing paranormal (sometimes labelled 
supernatural, superstitious, or magical) beliefs. These come mainly from two research 
traditions. Firstly, paranormal beliefs and experiences have long been a focus of clinical 
psychology and psychiatry, since this kind of belief and experience has been linked to 
psychosis and sub-clinical levels of psychotic-like perception and behaviour. From this 
tradition comes the concept of schizotypy, a trait whose high levels have been 
associated with elevated risk of schizophrenia (Kwapil et al., 2014). The Magical Ideation 
scale of the Wisconsin-Madison scales (Chapman, Chapman, & Kwapil, 1995), which is 
frequently used as a measure of schizotypy, contains items inquiring into what can be 
described as paranormal experience. The second tradition is embodied within the fields 
of parapsychology and anomalistic psychology. There have been several measures of 
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paranormal belief and experience developed within these fields, the Revised Paranormal 
Belief Scale (R-PBS, Tobacyk, 2004) and the Australian Sheep-Goat Scale (ASGS, 
Thalbourne & Delin, 1993) being the most widely used ones (Goulding & Parker, 2001). 
The development of these scales has prompted numerous studies in both of the above-
mentioned traditions. 
Given the above, we believe there is a gap in the scientific literature investigating 
various paranormal experiences in the general non-clinical population. Moreover, as 
discussed in section 1.3.3.3, there is also a dearth of literature focusing on teasing apart 
of the various paranormal phenomena and their psychological correlates. These gaps 
can be filled with measurement instruments that would focus on specific types of 
paranormal experiences.  While it is true that the individual levels of endorsement of 
different paranormal beliefs tend to correlate (Lange, Irwin, & Houran, 2000), it is 
nonetheless plausible, as we argue, that individual forms of paranormal experiences have 
different underlying psychological mechanics (Irwin, 1993). Measures that are able to 
provide a more fine-grain access to the individual paranormal experiences could help to 
uncover these potential differences.  
Further reasons why we feel such a measure would be helpful stem from a different 
aspect of the current state of scientific exploration of paranormal belief and experience. 
As mentioned above, the currently available measures, such as the R-PBS, mostly focus 
on the assessment of ontological beliefs, i.e. beliefs about the existence of paranormal 
phenomena, while precious little attention is paid to more experiential aspects, such as 
phenomenology or attitudes. 
The aim of this chapter is therefore the development of a scale that would assess 
attitudes towards precognitive dreams. As discussed in the introductory chapter, this 
topic has previously received substantial academic attention. However, when it comes to 
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experiential aspects of precognitive dreams, the scientific literature on the topic is rather 
sparse. Stowell (1997a; 1997b) provides a qualitative analysis of interviews with five self-
proclaimed precognitive dreamers, in which she explores, among other things, the 
phenomenological characteristics that, according to the interviewees, set precognitive 
dreams apart from the mundane ones. These characteristics included exceptional 
vividness, clarity, and emotional intensity of the dream imagery, feeling of impact and 
significance upon awaking from the dream, and a sense of lack of completeness while 
awaiting the fulfilment of the dream coupled with feeling of distress when the 
confirmatory event does not come to pass. Although qualitative research, such as 
Stowell’s, can undoubtedly provide potentially interesting information, we believe that a 
quantifiable measure exploring similar aspects of precognitive dream experience (e.g., 
attitudes) that could be administered to a larger number of people could prove useful, 
for instance for identifying the psychological correlates of different attitudes. 
Yet another reason for this kind of measure is the possibility that precognitive 
dream experience might be a multi-faceted phenomenon. There might exist different 
profiles of precognitive dreamers, each with its own underlying psychological 
mechanics, which are unlikely to be teased apart using the available measures. Exploring 
individual differences in attitudes towards precognitive dream experiences can help shed 
light on these processes. For instance, it is conceivable that people with experience of 
precognitive dreams differ on how central or important this experience is to their self-
image and world-view. Some may regard it as a minor event in their lives while for 
others this kind of experience may play a significant role in the way they think of 
themselves and act towards their environment. Given the existing evidence of the 
interplay between the strength and importance of convictions and desirability of 
outcome on the one hand and various cognitive biases on the other (Sanitioso, Kunda, 
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& Fong, 1990; Bastardi, Uhlmann, & Ross, 2011), it is feasible that self-relevance of 
these kinds of experiences could facilitate potential motivational and cognitive factors, 
leading to higher subjective incidence of precognitive dreams (see Chapter VI). A 
measure assessing various components of people’s attitudes towards their precognitive 
dream experiences would allow for the exploration of relationships such as the one 
suggested. 
Finally, a measure of attitudes towards precognitive dream experience will also 
make it possible to investigate individual differences in experiencers in terms of well-
established psychological constructs, such as the 5-factor model of personality and IQ. 
That is especially interesting given the current situation of inconclusive findings from 
research into the relationship of cognitive ability and paranormal belief (see Wiseman 
and Watt, 2006 for a review). This situation might be a result of treating belief in diverse 
paranormal phenomena as a unitary construct as well as of the potential multi-faceted 
nature of paranormal belief and experience. To illustrate this point within the context of 
precognitive dreams, there is a possibility that precognitive dreamers with positive 
emotions towards their dreams are less neurotic than those with negative emotions. 
Failing to assess these differences and looking for a relationship between subjective 
precognitive dream experience and neuroticism could lead to inconclusive results. 
For these reasons we believe that there is a need for a measure of attitudes towards 
specific paranormal experiences. This chapter reports on the development and 




Participants (N = 330) were selected from the sample described in Chapter IV on 
the basis of their reported prior precognitive dream experience. There were 124 
(37.58%) males and 203 (61.52%) females. Three participants (0.91%) did not identify as 
either male or female. Mean age of the sample was 35.17 years (Mdn = 31.5, range = 18-
69, SD = 13.13). There was no age difference between males and females in the sample 
(Mmale = 35.55, SD = 14.18, Mfemale = 35.09, SD = 12.49, t(235.158) = −0.297, 95% CI 
[−3.505, 2.585], p = .766). The majority of participants found out about the study on 
social networks such as Facebook, Twitter, or Reddit (55.5%), from a family member 
(2.1%), or through word of mouth (3.0%), while the rest of the sample (39.4%) came 
across the research through their interest in topics of psychology, dreams, scepticism, 
and the paranormal. 
5.2.2. Materials 
For the purposes of this study, we used participants’ data on the demographic 
questionnaire, attitudes towards dreams questionnaire, and precognitive dream belief 
and experience questionnaire described in Chapter IV. 
Attitude towards Paranormal Experience Scale 
In addition to the above-mentioned measures, a 63-item Attitude towards 
Paranormal Experience Scale – Precognitive Dreams version (APES-PD) was devised in 
order to assess attitudes towards precognitive dreams. A 7-point Likert scale (1 = 
Completely disagree, 7 = Completely agree) was used in order for the participant to express 
their endorsement of the individual statements. The items were designed to address 9 a 
priori factors with 7 items (3-4 reverse-scored) per factor. The factors along with sample 
152 
items are listed in Table 5.1 and the full list of items can be found in Appendix B.5. The 
a priori factors were not assumed to be orthogonal and the number of items per factor 
was selected to allow for potential dropping of variables with unsatisfactory metric 
characteristics. Prior to the administration of the scale, face and content validity of the 
items were assessed in a group discussion with researchers in parapsychology, 
personality psychology, and psychometrics at the University of Edinburgh. 
 
Table 5.1 




My precognitive dreams, for better or worse, are a part of who I am. 
2. Privacy 
My precognitive dreams are a private matter. 
3. Credit seeking 
Society would greatly benefit from exploring the potential of precognitive dreamers. 
4. Exclusivity 
To have precognitive dreams is a rare thing. 
5. Emotion towards precognitive dream 
If I could I would give up my precognitive dream ability. 
6. Conative component 
My actions are often informed by my precognitive dreams. 
7. Alienation 
Society mocks people who have precognitive dreams because it fears what it doesn't understand. 
8. Internal/external source 
Precognitive dreams are an ability which can be cultivated. 
9. Reliability/clarity 
Sometimes it takes a bit of hindsight to realise the dream had been precognitive.  
 
5.2.3. Procedure 
The study followed the procedure described in Chapter IV. 
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5.2.4. Analysis 
Model fit was assessed using the Comparative Fit Index (CFI), Tucker-Lewis Index 
(TLI) and the Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA). As criteria of good 
fit, we chose CFI and TLI > .9 and RMSEA < .08.  
5.3. Results 
5.3.1. Factor analysis of APES-PD 
First, we fit a confirmatory factor analytic (CFA) model to the data with 9 factors 
based on the hypothesized structure. Due to the polytomous nature and distributions of 
the variables, we used the weighted least squares means and variance adjusted (WLSMV) 
estimation, since it provides more accurate and reliable estimates when the variables are 
ordinal and skewed, as is the case with the present data (Flora & Curran, 2004). The 
model, however, did not converge. 
In order to arrive at the latent variable structure, we conducted an exploratory 
factor analysis (EFA). Parallel analysis on a matrix of polychoric correlations suggested a 
9 factor solution (see Fig 5.1 for scree plot). We then employed the following algorithm. 
First, we dropped all items with communalities below .3. Next we ran an EFA using the 
weighted least squares (WLS) estimation and Geomin rotation and explored the factor 
structure. We dropped any additional items with factor loadings on all factors below .3. 
This process was then iterated until there remained no items that did not meet the 
communality and loading criteria. Finally, we inspected the resulting factor structure and 
assessed its interpretability. The 9 factor solution was not interpretable, with only one 
item loading primarily on the 9th factor. We therefore repeated the above-mentioned 
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algorithm with 8, 7, and 6 factor solutions. The resulting factor structures, however, 
suffered from the same issues as the first solution.  
 
Figure 5.1. A scree plot of the unrotated factor solution of the original 63 APES-PD 
items. 
 
Finally, after retention of 5 factors and applying the item-dropping algorithm, and 
excluding complex items (with equivalent cross-loadings on multiple factors), a 
satisfactory factor structure with sufficient interpretability emerged from the resulting 
set of 31 items (see Table 5.2 for a list of loadings). We labelled the factors ‘Benefit’ 
(perceived benefit derived from one’s precognitive dream experience), ‘Importance’ 
(personal significance and reliability one ascribes to this experience), ‘Negative emotion’ 
(towards one’s precognitive dreams), ‘Credit’ (desire for acknowledgement for one’s 
precognitive dream ability), and ‘Privacy’ (tendency to keep one’s precognitive dreams to 
oneself). The eigenvalues of the extracted factors prior to rotation were 9.65, 3.38, 2.12, 
1.73, and 1.55 respectively and the five factors accounted for 52% of the total variance 
in the data. As shown in Table 5.3 the factors were intercorrelated, as a result of using 





Factor loadings for the 5-factor solution based on WLS estimation 
Item Benefit Importance Neg Emo Credit Privacy 
01   −0.562 0.393  
02   −0.329  −0.394 
03  0.397    
05   −0.546 0.505  
06 0.738     
10 0.368     
11  −0.5597    
16     −0.753 
17  −0.555    
21  −0.584    
22 0.734     
24     0.748 
30     0.588 
33  0.478    
36  0.409 0.531 0.321  
37 0.511  0.488   
40    −0.638  
41  0.423 0.550   
42 0.408 0.469    
44 0.751     
45 0.852     
46  0.493    
47 0.434    −0.545 
48    0.588 −0.304 
50   0.705   
52 0.339     
54    0.582  
56   −0.416 0.613  
59  −0.595    
61 0.449     
62 −0.318 −0.581    






Matrix of inter-factor correlations for the WLS and WLSMV solutions 
Factor 1 2 3 4 5 
1  Benefit − .645 −.286 .416 −.328 
2  Importance .467 − −.336 .423 −.135 
3  Negative emotion −.040 −.168 − −.291 .173 
4  Credit .514 .398 .001 − −.268 
5  Privacy −.148 −.130 .228 −.205 − 
Note. Bottom half – WLS, Top half – WLSMV. 
 
As previously stated, the most appropriate method of estimation for skewed ordinal 
data is the WLSMV estimation. To date, however, this method has not been 
implemented into any EFA R package. For that reason we fit a 5-factor EFA model in 
the CFA framework (also known as an exploratory structural equation model, eSEM) 
using the lavaan package (Rosseel, 2012) – which does provide the WLSMV estimation 
– to the reduced dataset arrived at by the process described above. This was achieved by 
fixing the variance of a single indicator per factor and allowing the other variables to 
estimate. The choice of the fixed indicator for each factor was informed by the EFA 
reported above; items 45, 59, 50, 40, and 16 were fixed, respectively, for factors one to 
five. The resulting model showed a good fit to the data, 2(320) = 705.166, p < .001, 
CFI = .952, TLI = .931, RMSEA = 0.06, 90% CI [0.054, 0.067]. The factor structures 
obtained by the two estimation methods were comparable although there were a few 
items whose loadings were substantially different across the two solutions (see Table S3 
in Appendix D). 
The amount of agreement between the two factor solutions was ascertained by 
comparing of two scoring methods across the models. Firstly, we derived individual 
participant scores on five scales corresponding to the five extracted factors separately 
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for either solution. These scores were calculated as average response value on salient 
items (see Table 5.2). Secondly we extracted ten Berge scores (ten Berge et al., 1999) for 
each factor. These scores are appropriate for non-orthogonal solutions, as they preserve 
the factor correlations. A set of individual ten Berge scores for each participant was 
obtained for both the WLS and the WLSMV solutions. Subsequently, we examined the 
correlations between: 1. the two sets of scale scores; 2. the two sets of ten Berge scores; 
3. the scale and ten Berge score from the WLS-derived solution, and 4. the scale and ten 
Berge score from the WLSMV-derived solution. The correlations were satisfactorily 
high, Mr = .948 (.868 - .976), SD = .029. The correlation matrices can be found in Table 
S4 (Appendix D). 
5.3.2. Reliability 
In order to assess the reliability of the questionnaire, we calculated the Cronbach’s 
α coefficient of each scale separately for the WLS and WLSMV models. The reliability 
of the scales ranged from acceptable (Negative emotion, α = .65, 95% CI [.55, .72]) to 
high (Benefit, α = .84, 95% CI [.80, .89]) and the two models yielded similar results. The 
only exception to this was the Credit scale, whose reliability dropped from α = .74 to α 
= .68, as a result of a reduction of the number of items in the scale. The complete list of 
scale reliability indices along with item-level analysis of the WLS model can be found in 
Table 5.4. For comparison, the data for the WLSMV solution are included in Table S5 
in Appendix D. 
5.3.3. Convergent and divergent validity 
For the purpose of testing the convergent and divergent validity of the APES-PD, 
we made use of several variables collected on the sample. These were the two subscales 
of the IDEA questionnaire, namely Dream significance and Dream positivity. 
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Furthermore, the participants completed a 4-item Precognitive Dream (PD) Belief 
Table 5.4 
Item-level analysis of WLS-based scales 
  Benefit M = 3.44, SD = 1.35, α = .84, 95% CI [.80, .89] 
Item α if deleted SE of α Item-total r MItem SD 
06 .82 .03 .75 4.40 2.11 
10 .84 .02 .59 3.44 2.14 
22 .83 .03 .69 3.40 2.05 
37 .84 .03 .61 2.55 1.82 
44 .81 .03 .81 3.29 1.83 
45 .80 .03 .82 3.43 1.92 
52 .84 .03 .61 3.71 1.90 
61 .83 .03 .66 4.00 1.84 
  
Importance M = 4.73, SD = 1.19, α = .83, 95% CI [.79, .88] 
Item α if deleted SE of α Item-total r MItem SD 
03 .81 .03 .64 2.8 1.82 
11 .82 .02 .57 3.66 1.90 
17 .82 .02 .58 2.73 1.63 
21 .81 .03 .64 3.06 1.65 
33 .82 .02 .60 2.88 1.75 
42 .80 .03 .72 3.37 2.04 
46 .81 .03 .70 2.67 1.76 
59 .81 .03 .66 3.59 1.82 
62 .80 .03 .74 4.05 2.01 
  
Negative emotion M = 3.19, SD = 1.08, α = .65, 95% CI [.58, .73] 
Item α if deleted SE of α Item-total r MItem SD 
01 .62 .04 .56 3.67 1.92 
02 .64 .04 .53 2.95 1.81 
05 .61 .04 .59 3.46 1.74 
36 .62 .04 .57 3.48 2.00 
37 .65 .04 .49 2.55 1.82 
41 .61 .04 .59 3.83 2.18 
50 .58 .05 .67 2.37 1.71 
  Credit M = 3.61, SD = 1.26, α = .74, 95% CI [.66, .82] 
Item α if deleted SE of α Item-total r MItem SD 
05 .68 .05 .72 4.54 1.74 
40 .70 .05 .68 3.75 1.92 
48 .69 .05 .71 3.80 1.82 
54 .72 .05 .65 2.30 1.75 
56 .68 .05 .73 4.40 1.79 
  
Privacy M = 4.35, SD = 1.31, α = .75, 95% CI [.68, .82] 
Item α if deleted SE of α Item-total r MItem SD 
02 .76 .04 .60 5.50 1.81 
16 .67 .05 .78 3.67 2.09 
24 .67 .05 .78 3.70 1.85 
30 .71 .05 .70 3.39 1.73 
47 .72 .05 .67 2.45 1.75 
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questionnaire and a single item measure of previous precognitive dream experience. 
Descriptive statistics for the variables are summarized in Table 5.5. Firstly, we expected 
a positive relationship between dream significance and the Importance scale, as well as 
between dream positivity and Benefit. Secondly, Importance was expected to relate to 
the strength of one’s belief that one has previously experienced PD. Moreover, we 
predicted a negative relationship between dream positivity and the Negative emotion 
scale. Finally, the Importance and Credit scale were assumed to correlate significantly 
with PD belief. 
We also identified relationships that should not be present amongst the variables. 
Dream positivity was expected to be independent of Importance, Credit, and Privacy 




Descriptive statistics and gender comparisons 
 
M SD SEmean Mdn Range Skew Kurtosis 
Dream significance 5.00  1.06 0.06 5.15 2 – 7 −0.447 −0.398 
Dream positivity 4.33  1.09 0.06 4.43 1 – 7 −0.290 −0.072 
PD belief 5.25  1.28 0.07 5.50 1 – 7 −0.787    0.471 
PD experiencea 
   
7 1 – 7 
  
  Gender    
 
 
 Male   Female   tmale−female (df)  p 
 
 
M SD  M SD  
  
Dream significance 4.76 1.13 5.15 0.98  −3.13 (232.093) .002 
Dream positivity 4.49 1.06 4.23 1.10  2.01 (267.323) .037 
PD belief 5.26 1.37 5.24 1.23  0.17 (239.937) .865 
   Mdn   Mdn  Wmale−female     p 
PD experiencea  7  7 12690.500   .886 
Note. PD = precognitive dream. a = variable is ordinal, hence only the median and range are reported and 
the Wilcoxon signed-rank test used for group comparison. 
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Table 5.6 shows the correlations between the ten Berge factor scores on the 
individual APES dimensions and the above-mentioned variables. Because of the 
moderate correlations between some of the APES factors, we examined the individual 
contributions of each of the factors in predicting the four outcome variables. This was 
done by entering all factors simultaneously into four multiple linear and ordinal (for PD 
experience) regression models. Because of the significant gender differences in Dream 
significance and Dream positivity scores, we also included gender in the two models 
predicting these variables. The results of the regression analyses are summarised in 
Table 5.7. All the predicted relationships were found to be highly statistically significant 
(p < .001), but, contrary to expectations, several predictions of no relationship were not 
supported by the data. In line with the predictions, Benefit was only related to Dream 
positivity. Importance was positively related to Dream significance and both PD belief 
and experience, and unrelated to Dream positivity. There was a negative relationship 
between Negative emotion and Dream positivity and no relationship between the factor 
and PD experience. There was also an unpredicted significant negative relationship 
between Negative emotion and PD belief, however, the effect size was small (ΔR2 = 
.023, compared to .13 for Importance). As predicted, Credit was related to PD belief but 
not to Dream positivity. Finally, in accordance with the prediction Privacy was not 
related to either Dream positivity or PD experience. Unexpectedly, there was a small but 
significant negative relationship between Privacy and PD belief (ΔR2 = .033). 
5.4. Discussion 
This chapter reported on the construction and validation of the Precognitive dream 
version of the Attitudes towards Paranormal Experiences Scale (APES-PD). This  
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measure fills a gap that currently exists in research focusing on paranormal experience as 
it allows for assessment of attitudes towards precognitive dreams in people who report 
having had them. Exploring these attitudes has the potential of providing insight into 
the psychological mechanisms underpinning paranormal experiences. Furthermore, by 
addressing a specific type of paranormal experience, the scale avoids the pitfall of 
conflating several qualitatively distinct, albeit correlated, kinds of experience that may 
each have its own underlying psychological causation. 
Originally, a 63-item questionnaire tapping into nine putative factors of attitudes 
towards precognitive dream experience was administered. After dropping items with 
unsatisfactory psychometric properties and conducting an EFA, five interpretable 
factors emerged from the reduced 31-item questionnaire. The model fit the data well 
(CFI = .952, TLI = .931, RMSEA = 0.06). Having inspected the primary loadings of the 
items, we labelled these factors Benefit, Importance, Negative emotion, Credit, and 
Privacy. Inter-factor correlations ranged from .001 to .645 which reflects the intended 
oblique nature of some of the dimensions.  
 
Table 5.6 








Benefit .425*** .279*** .374*** .412*** 
Importance .436*** .191*** .492 *** .604*** 
Neg. emotion −.224** −.367*** −.270 *** −.401*** 
Credit .416*** .122 .351 *** .508*** 
Privacy −.389*** −.032 −.179 ** −.317*** 
Note. Boldface indicates predicted significant relationships. * p < .05, ** p < .01, ***, p < .001. p-values 






Multiple regressions of additional values on APES factors 
 
b SE p Beta  95% CI  
    Low High 
Dream significance      
Gender −0.325 0.097 <.001 −0.150 −0.517 −0.133 
Benefit 0.090 0.066 .171 0.086 −0.039 0.220 
Importance* 0.258 0.065 <.001 0.245 0.130 0.386 
Neg. emotion −0.008 0.051 .877 −0.008 −0.108 0.093 
Credit 0.218 0.055 <.001 0.206 0.109 0.326 
Privacy −0.277 0.051 <.001 −0.263 −0.378 −0.176 
Dream positivity      
Gender 0.263 0.113 .021 0.117 0.040 0.485 
Benefit* 0.295 0.077 <.001 0.270 0.144 0.446 
Importance† −0.070 0.075 .352 −0.064 −0.219 0.078 
Neg. emotion* −0.368 0.059 <.001 −0.338 −0.485 −0.252 
Credit† −0.035 0.064 .584 −0.032 −0.161 0.091 
Privacy† 0.101 0.059 .091 0.093 −0.016 0.218 
PD belief       
Benefit −0.158 0.070 .024 −0.124 −0.296 −0.021 
Importance* 0.638 0.069 <.001 0.497 0.502 0.774 
Neg. emotion† −0.210 0.054 <.001 −0.163 −0.317 −0.103 
Credit* 0.319 0.058 <.001 0.249 0.205 0.434 
Privacy† −0.251 0.055 <.001 −0.196 −0.359 −0.144 
PD experience    Odds ratio   
Benefit 0.030 0.176 .866 1.030 0.727 1.453 
Importance* 1.041 0.184 <.001 2.832 1.994 4.105 
Neg. emotion† −0.182 0.135 .178 0.834 0.640 1.087 
Credit 0.116 0.139 .402 1.123 0.856 1.476 
Privacy† −0.259 0.139 .063 0.772 0.585 1.012 
Note. PD = precognitive dream. Ordinal regression parameters reported for PD experience. * = significant 
relationship predicted. † = absence of significant relationship predicted. 
 
The five scales, created by scoring of salient items, had reliabilities ranging from 
acceptable (α = .65 for the Negative emotion scale) to very good (α = .84 for the 
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Benefit scale). However, in order to best preserve the factor structure, we used ten 
Berge factor scores for further analysis. We would encourage potential users of the 
APES-PD questionnaire to do likewise (the factor weights can be found in Table S6 
(Appendix D). 
The questionnaire showed good convergent and discriminant validity. According to 
expectations, Importance scores were positively related to Dream significance but not to 
Dream positivity, as measured by IDEA, after controlling for the other APES factors. 
These results show that the factor does indeed measure how much importance 
experiencers of precognitive dreams attribute to their experiences, regardless of whether 
or not they find them pleasant. The reverse was true for the Negative emotion factor, 
which showed a negative correlation with Dream positivity but was not related to 
Dream significance. Although the latter result was not explicitly predicted, it serves to 
further support the validity of the factor. The Benefit factor also showed relationships 
that confirmed our predictions, correlating positively with Dream positivity. Since all the 
other factors were controlled for, this relationship represents an individual contribution 
of perceived benefit derived from subjective precognitive dreams to the general positive 
emotion towards dreams in general, independent of that of the Negative emotion factor. 
Scores on the Credit factor were, in line with the prediction, positively related to belief 
in the existence of precognitive dreams but independent of Dream positivity. Finally, we 
predicted that the Privacy factor would be orthogonal to Dream positivity as well as 
both belief in the possibility and the strength of conviction regarding the experience of 
precognitive dreams. Two of these predictions were supported by the data, however, we 
found Privacy to be weakly but significantly negatively related to belief in precognitive 
dreams, even after controlling for the other APES factors. It is currently not clear 
whether the result constitutes evidence against the divergent validity of the factor, or 
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whether it points to the existence of a genuine relationship between the strength of 
belief in precognitive dreams and the extent to which the experiencer is vocal about his 
or her dreams, or still whether it is a spurious finding. In the same vein, we are unable to 
provide a conclusive interpretation of the negative relationship between PD belief and 
the Negative emotion factor. 
Apart from the findings discussed above, the analysis also revealed some 
relationships we had not predicted (see Table 5.7). Since we made no prediction 
regarding these relationships, we can only offer post-hoc interpretations. Regarding the 
positive relationship between Dream significance and Credit, a plausible explanation 
seems to be that if a person feels deserving of credit for their ability to have 
precognitive dreams, they will have a vested interest in them. This will naturally lead to 
them ascribing greater significance to their dreams. Similarly, with respect to the 
negative relationship between Dream significance and Privacy, we would suggest that if 
someone perceives dreams as significant, they may be likely to talk about them with 
others. This tendency might apply to precognitive dreams as well as mundane ones. As 
for the negative relationship between Benefit and PD belief, we can provide no 
explanation whatsoever. It is not clear why greater perceived benefit derived from one’s 
precognitive dreams should be associated with lower belief in the existence of such 
dreams. Given the small effect size of this relationship as well as the fact that its 
direction is opposite that of the zero-order correlation between these two variables (see 
Table 6), we are inclined to consider it a statistical artefact. It is however crucial to stress 
that all these interpretations have been made post hoc and that these relationships need to 
be replicated before they should be given too much weight. However, we would like to 
offer the above-mentioned results as proof of concept of the heuristic potential of 
APES. 
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Some discussion of strengths and limitations of the present study is in order. 
Firstly, we believe that the APES questionnaire has a potential to further the knowledge 
in the field of psychology of paranormal belief and experience. It shows good 
psychometric qualities and has been developed on a sufficiently large sample. It also 
reveals a substantial variability of attitudes towards these experiences in people who 
report them which has been overlooked by previous research. Future research should 
focus on the relationship between the APES factors and well-established personality 
dimensions, such as the ones within the Five Factor Model of personality. Particularly, 
the relationships between Negative emotion and Benefit on one hand (APES) and 
Neuroticism (FFM) on the other and between Privacy (APES) and Extroversion (FFM) 
seem like a natural starting point. Other APES factors, such as Credit, appear, at face 
value, less directly related to basic personality traits. Exploring the link between this 
factor and measures of narcissism may be worthwhile but we would certainly encourage 
all effort to relate the APES factors to the FFM as well as other trait, such as general 
cognitive ability. 
Another interesting line of inquiry would be to examine the relationship between 
the APES dimensions and the frequency of paranormal experience. There have been 
several psychological mechanisms put forwards as explanation for this kind of 
experience (Alcock, 1981; Blagrove et al., 2006; Houran & Lange, 1998; Watt et al., 2014) 
but the causal factors are likely to vary based on the frequency with which a person 
experiences these phenomena. For instance, it may be the case that most people will 
have an experience that resembles a previous dream with startling accuracy just by 
coincidence. After all, there are countless events happening and dreams being had and 
some of them are bound to coincide. Assuming an independent 1 in 10,000 chance of a 
coincidence between a dream and a subsequent even, Paulos (1988) estimated that 3.6% 
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of all people who dream every night should experience such a coincidence within a one-
year period. A person’s belief in precognitive dreams and the underlying psychological 
mechanics of this belief based on such an impressive yet perhaps unique experience are 
however very different from those of another person who experiences precognitive 
dreams on a weekly basis. Understanding the differences in attitudes towards such 
experiences between people can elucidate potential motivational factors underpinning 
frequent paranormal experience. 
A further advantage of the APES questionnaire is both its specificity and flexibility. 
By focusing on a specific kind of phenomenon, APES avoids the potential pitfall of 
conflating qualitatively different experiences that can be caused by different 
psychological factors. On the other hand, the questionnaire can potentially be co-opted, 
with minor modifications in the wording of the items, to address other kinds of 
paranormal experiences. This makes it possible to compare the various forms of 
experiences and identify associated psychological factors that are common to a number 
of them as well as specific to each. 
One potential limitation of the present study is, as is the case with most studies, the 
sample. Although sufficiently large for the purpose of factor analysis, it needs to be 
pointed out that the sample was not recruited randomly. However, we took precautions 
to minimise self-selection by not stating explicitly that the study explores precognitive 
dream experiences when advertising; potential volunteers were only told the study 
focuses on “dreams (and more)”. There was also a preponderance of females in the 
sample (61.5%) which may reflect the differences in interest in dreams between the 
genders (e.g., Schredl & Piel, 2008; Wolcott & Strapp, 2002). Nevertheless, we would 
argue that a sample of more than three hundred participants, the use of robust analytical 
methods (WLMSV), and the good model fit obtained make the resulting factor structure 
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likely to be stable. Future studies should aim to replicate the present findings using 
independent samples. 
Another limitation concerns the range restriction of the precognitive dream 
experience variable. There was very little variability in the scores, with the majority of 
participants expressing the highest possible degree of endorsement of the item. 
Although this state follows naturally from the characteristics of the sample, it is likely to 
distort the results of analyses involving the variable in question. The findings related to 
PD experience should therefore be treated with caution. 
In conclusion, this chapter presents a new measure of attitudes towards 
precognitive dreams that has been missing from the arsenal of methods commonly 
employed in research in the area. The APES questionnaire has a well-interpretable 
factor structure and shows satisfactory validity and reliability. These characteristics, 
along with the potential modifiability of this questionnaire, give us a reason to believe 
that its future use will prove fruitful in gaining novel insights into the psychology of 
precognitive dream belief and experience. In the next chapter, we illustrate the utility of 
the APES-PD by applying it to the issue of attitudes and motivation and their role with 




Precognitive dreams and memory 
 
6.1. Study 6 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, we argued that some PD believers may overestimate the 
frequency of their experiences. We proposed that, in line with the findings of Beaulieu-
Prévost and Zadra (2005), this overestimation may be a result of personal significance 
attributed to precognitive dreams. Considering this line of argument leads to the 
question of what the mechanism behind this over-reporting of PD frequency is. Two 
alternatives are on offer: wilful deception and motivational bias. Regarding the former, it 
is certainly possible that people who ascribe great importance to the notion of 
themselves being precognitive dreamers should intentionally misreport the frequency 
with which they experience PDs. However, even if true in some cases, this explanation 
bears little appeal for further discussion. Firstly, embracing it naturally leads to the 
rather dismissive position that everyone who claims to experience, or have experienced 
precognitive dreams and, by extension, other paranormal and religious occurrences, is 
simply lying. Since there is a vast body of evidence showing that a mismatch between 
reality and people’s perception of and beliefs about it often arises and that people can 
sincerely believe they experienced things that did not, in reality, happen (e.g Loftus, 
2003a; 2003b; 2005), assuming that all reports of precognitive dreams are fraudulent is 
not only unhelpful but, most likely, also incorrect. Secondly, there simply is no way of 
testing this unfalsifiable hypothesis and, as such, it is not scientific. For these reasons, it 
will not be further discussed in this chapter. 
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If wilful deception is discarded as an explanation of the tendency of PD believers to 
overestimate the frequency of their experiences, the topic of motivational bias in recall 
moves into the spotlight. In order to further develop this argument, it is desirable to 
first discuss the state of relevant knowledge in the field of human episodic memory. 
Over the past eighty years, there has accumulated a vast body of scientific literature 
which is in accordance with the notion that episodic memories are not static recordings 
of past events but rather reconstructed narratives based around schematic knowledge-
like structures. Bartlett (1932) in his seminal work on memory accuracy found that 
people’s memories are likely to be reconfigured in a way that tends towards brevity, 
preservation of gist, and personal belief. Memory thus constitutes only a ‘skeleton’ to 
which elaborate details dependent upon personal belief, context (Sharps et al., 2006) and 
social interaction (McGregor & Holmes, 1999) can be attached.  
The malleability and potential unreliability of memory is perhaps best illustrated by 
research in eyewitness testimony employing the misinformation paradigm (Loftus, 
Miller, & Burns, 1978). This paradigm consists of three basic steps: presentation of a 
scene to participants; misinformation which can be achieved, e.g. by using leading 
questions or story transcript; and recollection, where participants report what they 
remember of the original scene. Loftus and her colleagues have, over the past forty 
years, found that it is relatively easy to use leading questions or misinformation to plant 
false memories into the minds of witnesses, so that they misremember important details, 
such as the colour of cars involved in an accident (Loftus, 1977). This paradigm 
succeeded in making people remember screwdrivers instead of hammers, give way signs 
instead of stop signs or a bar where there was none (Loftus, 2005). She and her 
associates even went as far as planting memories of getting lost in a supermarket as a 
child (Loftus & Pickrell, 1995), witnessing exorcism (Mazzoni, Loftus, & Kirsch, 2001), 
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or experiencing impossible scenarios, such as meeting Bugs Bunny, a Warner Bros. 
character, in Disneyland (Braun, Ellis, & Loftus, 2002). These studies provide 
overwhelming evidence of the capability of this paradigm to induce memories of things 
that never happened (for review, see Loftus, 2005). 
Studies into characteristics of false memories have also yielded some interesting 
findings. Laney and Loftus (2008) concluded that true and false memories are virtually 
indistinguishable in most assessed emotional characteristics. Furthermore, even though 
false memories are usually held with somewhat lower confidence and coherence and are 
less vivid than true memories (Loftus & Pickrell, 1995; Loftus, 2003; Laney & Loftus, 
2008), the reported levels of vividness and confidence can still be substantially high 
(Koriat, Goldsmith, & Pansky, 2000). The relationship between accuracy of a memory 
and its vividness is also rather interesting. It has been found that even in the so-called 
‘flashbulb memories’, i.e. extremely vivid memories of highly significant events, the 
relationship between vividness and confidence on the one hand and accuracy on the 
other (Koriat et al., 2000; Talarico & Rubin, 2003; Phelps & Sharot, 2008) is far from 
straightforward. 
There is a modest amount of research into individual differences in susceptibility to 
this kind of memory implantation. It has been shown that those participants with lower 
cognitive abilities are more prone to being susceptible to misinformation (Zhu et al., 
2010a). Furthermore, it has been found that some personality characteristics, such as 
certain coping strategies, self-directedness, depression, or fear of evaluation are also 
related to proneness to false memories (Zhu et al., 2010b). 
During the course of false memory research, other successful paradigms have been 
developed. In the “crashing memory paradigm” the participants are asked whether or 
not they recall seeing a non-existent record of a well-publicised event (plane crashes, 
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assassinations, bombings, etc.; Smeets, Telgen, Ost, Jelicic, & Merckelbach, 2009). In 
the Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) paradigm, participants are presented lists of 
words such as ‘crown’, ‘George’, ‘throne’, ‘palace’, and so on and then asked to recall as 
many as they can. During this recall task they tend to remember the critical semantically 
associated lure ‘king’, although it was not presented in the original study list (Roediger & 
McDermott, 1995). Both of these approaches display robust effects eliciting high levels 
of false recall. Gallo (2010) provides a summary of the findings over the past 15 years of 
the DRM paradigm while Koriat and colleagues (2000) and Smeets, Merckelbach, 
Horselenberg, and Jelicic (2005) review the concepts, methods and models developed in 
the study of recollection inaccuracies as well as the findings in false memory research. 
There also exists a substantial tradition of research into autobiographical memory 
dedicated to uncovering the mechanisms by which memories are constructed and 
factors that affect this construction. For instance, Conway and Pleydell-Pearce (2000) 
focused on the interaction between autobiographical memories and the self. According 
to their model, individual memories are constructed and accessed in a way that serves to 
maintain a coherent self, a system of goals, beliefs, and motivations. Others, such as 
Sanitioso and colleagues (1990) have conducted research into motivational influences on 
memory recollection and found, in accordance with Conway and colleagues’ broader 
notion of memory as a self-supporting constructive system, that the tendency to 
remember specific episodes from one’s life can be influenced by manipulating people’s 
goals and motives. Study 6 looks at the relationship between relevance of precognitive 
dreams to one’s self-concept and the features of the earliest PD experience. The 
rationale for this study stems from, and builds upon, research by Conway and his 
colleagues (Conway, 2005; Conway & Holmes, 2004; Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000) 
discussed to a greater extent below. In order to formulate hypotheses concerning the 
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relationship between importance of PDs and their reported frequency, some discussion 
of the literature on self-concept and autobiographical memory, as well as their mutual 
relationship is desirable. In the framework of social cognition, self-concept is a broad 
term encompassing several components whose treatment lies outside the scope of this 
chapter or, indeed, thesis. However, the definition relevant to the topic at hand is that of 
self-concept as a dynamic system of descriptive and evaluative beliefs about the self that 
informs and regulates behaviour, providing incentives and motivation (Markus & Wurf, 
1987). The relevance of the particular beliefs to the stability and integrity of the self-
concept varies: some of them, the core beliefs, are highly self-relevant and thus tend to 
be highly accessible, salient and stable, whereas others, the peripheral beliefs, are less 
crucial for maintaining of a coherent self-concept and can therefore be more fluent 
(Markus & Wurf, 1987). It would then follow that the more self-relevant a belief is, the 
stronger its effect in behaviour regulation and motivation is. Given the above-
mentioned constructive character of memories as well as evidence that memory can be 
influenced by motivation (Sanitioso et al., 1990), it is plausible that those whose belief in 
their ability to have precognitive dreams is self-relevant, tend to construct their memory 
of past PD experiences in a manner consistent with this belief. This line of argument is 
consistent with the findings reported in the previous chapter. 
Furthermore, there is ample evidence of an interactive relationship between the self 
and autobiographical memory, so much so that authors such as Conway and Pleydell-
Pearce (2000) refer to a fully-integrated Self-Memory System (SMS). The SMS consists 
of the working self, a currently active set of goals and self-relevant beliefs, and the 
autobiographical memory knowledge base, a set of statements about one’s 
autobiographical history held to be true. These two parts of the system interact in order 
to produce the recall of autobiographical memories. The function of this interaction is 
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twofold (Conway, 2005): to maintain self-coherence on the one hand and verisimilitude 
on the other. Conway argues that autobiographical memories of the distant past tend to 
prioritise self-coherence over correspondence with reality. If a memory is not coherent 
with self, its recall is inhibited, whereas the accessibility of a self-coherent memory will 
be strengthened. Exploring memories of early PD experience thus may provide 
interesting insights into the psychological mechanics of these experiences. 
Conway and Holmes (2004) expanded on the work of Erikson and Erikson (1998) 
on psychosocial development and showed that, in accordance with Erikson’s theory, 
themes pertaining to the developmental task relevant for a given stage are most likely to 
figure in autobiographical memories from times when a person was going through said 
developmental stage. In other words, when people recall autobiographical memories 
featuring themes of, for example, identity, they tend to date these memories to when 
they were adolescents, which is a period in an individual’s psychosocial development 
when, according to Erikson, forming a stable identity is the main developmental task 
one is faced with. Thus, if being a precognitive dreamer is a highly self-relevant belief 
which forms a part of the dreamer’s identity, it could be argued that earliest memories 
of PD experiences should date to the period of one’s identity formation, i.e., 
adolescence. 
Besides the age associated with the memory of the earliest PD experience, it may be 
interesting to look at the vividness of these memories. Although, as reviewed above, 
memory vividness has generally been shown to correlate positively with certainty that 
the event really took place, which has in turn been shown to predict memory accuracy 
(Loftus & Pickrell, 1995; Loftus, 2003; Laney & Loftus, 2008), other research has 
demonstrated that even false memories can be recalled with high levels of vividness 
(Koriat et al., 2000). Moreover, rehearsing stories can lead to imagination inflation (see 
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Sharman & Calacouris, 2010), where imagining a situation leads to it being believed to 
have happened. The tendency to this kind of imagination inflation has been linked with 
traits such as suggestibility and hypnotic suggestibility (Heaps & Nash, 1999; Paddock et 
al., 1998). These characteristics have also been found to relate to paranormal belief and 
experience (Hergovich, 2003; Wagner & Ratzeburg, 1987). French (2003) provides a 
review of research into false memories and its relevance for anomalistic psychology. 
Since, as mentioned above, memories coherent with highly self-relevant beliefs are 
rendered more accessible by the workings of the Self-Memory System, if belief in the 
reality of one’s PD experience is highly self-relevant, the identity-defining earliest 
memories are likely to be rehearsed in both intrapersonal and interpersonal contexts. 
This rehearsal would then lead to inflated levels of vividness of such memories. 
Beaulieu-Prévost and Zadra (2005) have shown that a higher tendency to attribute 
significance to one’s dreams in general leads to an inflated estimate of dream recall 
frequency. Following that argument, it is plausible that the more self-relevant PD 
experiences are, the higher the perceived frequency of PDs will be. This leads to two 
predictions: people who report a higher frequency of PD experiences will also have a 
more vivid recollection of their early PD experiences and that the reason for this is the 
self-relevance of PD belief, which leads to an inflated assessment of both PD frequency 
and early PD experience vividness. 
In summary, the present study tests three hypotheses: that the earliest memories of 
people’s PD experiences date to the times of their adolescence (roughly the middle of 
the second decade), that people who report having PDs more frequently will remember 
their earliest PD experience as more vivid, and that this relationship will be accounted 




The sample described in Chapter V was used in the present study. This was a PD 
dreamer-only subset of a larger sample (N=693, see section 5.2.1 for details). Out of the 
330 participants, there were 124 (37.58%) males and 203 (61.52%) females. Three 
participants (0.91%) did not identify as either male or female and their data were not 
used. Data from 36 further participants were excluded due to missing values on the 
earliest PD experience variables. Mean age of the resulting sample (N=291) was 35.55 
years (Mdn = 32, range = 18-69, SD = 13.10). There was no age difference between 
males and females in the sample (Mmale = 36.59, SD = 14.55, Mfemale = 34.95, SD = 
12.19, t(189.005) = −0.985, 95% CI [−4.950, 1.653], p = .326). Participants who recalled 
their earliest PD experience differed from those who did not (36 excluded participants) 
on only one of the measured variables; they scored slightly higher on PD experience 
(Mdn = 7 vs 6, W = 6268, p = .01).   
6.2.2. Materials 
The wording of the items used can be found in Appendix B. First, a demographic 
questionnaire was administered, followed by a measure of attitudes towards dreams as 
well as of PD belief and experiences. The details of the individual measures are given in 
Chapter 4.2.2. Participants who reported having had a PD experience then went on to 
complete two further measures. 
6.2.2.1. Earliest precognitive dream experiences 
Two items addressed the earliest remembered precognitive dream. The first one 
asked about the age at which the dream occurred and the second one asked participants 
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to rate the vividness of this dream on a 7-point Likert scale from 1 (Not at all vivid) to 7 
(As vivid as real life). 
In order to provide the age of the earliest PD experience a free-answer field was 
provided for participants. This led to a variation in the kinds of answers provided which 
necessitated a degree of post-collection editing. We applied the following rules: 
responses indicating the participant did not remember as well as any other statements 
(e.g., “like anyone is going to remember this”) were designated as missing values. ‘Early 
teens’ was substituted by the value of 14, ‘mid teens’ by 16, and ‘late teens’ by 18. If two 
adjacent ages were given, e.g. 15-16, the response was replaced with a value equal to the 
higher of the two numbers. If a wider range was given, e.g. 15-17, the integer in the 
middle of the range was inputted (16, in case of the given example). 
6.2.2.2. Attitude towards paranormal experience scale – Precognitive dreams 
The APES-PD measure whose development and validation are reported in Study 5 
was used. This is a 31-item scale addressing 5 aspects of attitudes towards one’s 
precognitive dreams: Benefit (α = .84), Importance (α = .82), Negative emotion (α = 
.65), Credit (α = .68), and Privacy (α = .76). Individual scores on these dimensions were 
standardised ten Berge scores based on WLSMV-derived factor structure. For more 
detail on the scale’s content and factor analysis, see Chapter V. 
6.2.3. Procedure 
The procedure is described in Chapter IV (see section 4.1.3). 
6.2.4. Hypotheses 
H1. The distribution of the age of the earliest PD has a mean of 15 with the 
bulk of the distribution falling within the 10-20 range. 
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H2. Vividness of the first PD dream is positively related to reported PD 
frequency. 
H3. The relationship predicted by H2 is fully accounted for by the 
Importance factor of APES-PD.  
6.3. Results 
6.3.1. Descriptive analysis 
Table 6.1 shows the descriptive statistics for the measured variables as well as the p-
values of differences in the variables between genders. Descriptive statistics for APES 
factor scores are not included as these are standardised scores and there were no gender 
differences in the scores. As shown in the table, the only variables exhibiting gender 
differences were Dream significance with females scoring higher than males (Mdiff = 
0.39, 95% CI [0.13, 0.65], t(197.98) = 2.93, p = .004) and Dream positivity with males 
scoring higher than females (Mdiff = 0.29, 95% CI [0.03, 0.55], t(223.29) = 2.19, p = 
.030). 
6.3.2. Hypothesis testing 
The distribution of the Age of 1st PD experience variable is depicted in Fig. 6.1 
(panel A). In order to make sure that the mean value of the variable is not artificially 
lowered by younger participants due to range restriction of possible values, we divided 
the sample into two subsamples with respect to an age cut-off point of 35 years. The 
means of the Age of 1st PD experience variable of the resulting groups were 
significantly different with the older group having a higher mean, Mdiff = 5.24, 95% CI 
[2.98, 7.51], t(173.41) = 4.55, p = 10−5. However, as can be seen on panels B and C of 
Fig. 6.1, there was a substantial overlap between the bulks of the distributions. 
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Furthermore, 20% trimmed means of the groups were 16.30 and 12.95 for the older and 
younger group respectively, compared to untrimmed means of 18.66 and 13.42. The 
relatively large difference between untrimmed and trimmed means of the older group 
suggests a greater influence of positive skew on the mean, compared to the other group. 
 
Table 6.1 
Summary of descriptive statistics  of the variables measured in Study 6 
Variable M (SD) Range p gender diff 
Education 15.77 (3.60) 8 – 25 .474 
Dream significance 5.01 (1.06) 2 – 7 .004 
Dream positivity 4.34 (1.10) 1 – 7 .030 
PD belief 5.34 (1.28) 1 – 7 .936 
Age of 1st PD 15.71 (9.37) 2 – 56 .714 
 Mdn (MAD)   
PD experience 7 (0) 1 – 7 .833 
PD frequency 2 (1.48) 1 – 5 .063 
Vividness of 1st PD 4 (1.48) 1 – 5 .544 
 
The mean age of 1st PD across all participants was not significantly different from 
15, 95% CI of mean [14.63, 16.79], t(290) = 1.29, p = .199, thus supporting H1 about 
the distribution of the Age of 1st PD experience variable. 
In order to test H2 and H3, several ordinal regression models were specified. 
Firstly, vividness of the 1st PD was regressed on PD frequency which was treated as a 
continuous variable. Secondly, Importance was added as a predictor to the first model. 
Model 3 extended the first model by including demographic variables as well as Dream 
significance. This was done in order to control for potential confounds. Similarly to 
Model 2, the final model included Importance in addition to the variables in the 
previous model. The significance of the effect of PD frequency on the vividness of 1st 
PD in models 1 and 3 was used to test H2.  
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H3 predicts a lack of this effect coupled with a significant effect of Importance. 
This was tested by models 2 and 4. 
Table 6.2 provides a summary of the four models. The analysis showed that PD 
frequency was a significant predictor of vividness of 1st PD experience regardless of 
whether or not demographic variables and Dream significance were controlled for, thus 
supporting H2. 
However, when Importance was added as a predictor to the models, the effect of 
PD frequency became non-significant, while Importance itself predicted vividness of 1st 
PD significantly. As before, this held true both with and without the additional variables 
included in the models. These findings were supportive of H3. 
6.3.3. Exploratory analysis 
Figure 6.1 shows that a substantial proportion of participants reported having had 
their first PD experiences rather early in their lives. Twenty-four percent reported 
having been younger than 10 and 8% reported being five years old or younger at the 
time of their experience. The peak was more prominent in participants aged 35 and 
older (see Fig. 6.1, panels B and C). We decided to explore this unexpectedly high 
frequency of childhood memory of PDs further. 
First we looked at the relationship between vividness and age of 1st PD, expecting to 
find a positive relationship, as events that happened more recently should elicit more 
vivid recollection. However, there was a small negative correlation between the 
variables, rs = −.12, p = .046. In order to ascertain the vividness of PDs experienced in 
childhood, we divided the age of 1st PD experience into 4 categories (<10, 10-20, 20-30, 
>30) and used the resulting categorical variable to predict vividness of 1st PD experience 
in an ordinal regression model, controlling for gender and age. As can be seen in Table 
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6.3, participants who reported having had their first PD experience between ages 10 and 
20 were 46% more likely to report a lower vividness of this experience. Those who had 
their first PDs later in life showed the same trend, however, these trends were not 
statistically significant. 
Next we explored the differences in PD frequency according to the categories 
pertaining to age of 1st PD. Another ordinal regression model was specified, predicting 
the frequency of PD by the 1st PD age category, again controlling for gender and age. 
The results are summarised in Table 6.4. As the table shows, participants who reported 
having had their earliest PD experience aged 10-20 were 57% more likely to report a 
lower PD frequency. Those whose first remembered PD occurred at age between 20 
and 30 were 51% more likely and those who reported having their first PD after the age 
of 30 were 87% more likely to report a lower PD frequency than those who had their 
first PD experience before the age of 10. 
Finally we investigated the relationship between the categorised age of 1st PD 
experience and importance of such experiences. An ordinal regression of the age 
category on Importance revealed no significant relationship between the two, OR = 










Figure 6.1. Distribution of age of first PD experience for A) all participants; B) those younger than 35; C) those aged 35 and older. 
 
Table 6.2 
Summary of the four ordinal regression models predicting vividness of 1st PD used to test H2 and H3 
Predictor 
 Model 1   Model 2   Model 3   Model 4  
 OR [95% CI] p  OR [95% CI] P  OR [95% CI] p  OR [95% CI] p 
PD frequency  1.37 [1.18, 1.60] 4×10−5  1.10 [0.93, 1.29] .272  1.31 [1.11, 1.55] .002  1.07 [0.90, 1.29] .406 
Importance     2.21 [1.76, 2.79] 2×10−11     2.32 [1.76, 3.07] 3×10−9 
Gender        0.72 [0.47, 1.09] .124  0.73 [0.47, 1.12] .145 
Age        1.02 [1.01, 1.04] .004  1.00 [0.98, 1.02] .842 
Education        0.95 [0.90, 1.00] .059  0.95 [0.90, 1.00] .059 





Summary of ordinal regression of Vividness on the listed variables 
 
b SE p OR [95% CI] 
Gender −0.198 0.22 .378 0.82 [0.53, 1.27] 
Age 0.016 0.01 .067 1.02 [1.00, 1.03] 
Age of 1st PD category     
10-20 −0.621 0.25  .013 0.54 [0.33, 0.87] 
20-30 −0.514 0.35 .139 0.60 [0.30, 1.18] 
>30 −0.582 0.44 .185 0.56 [0.24, 1.33] 
Note. Parameters of Age of 1st PD categories refer to change with respect to the first category (<10). 
 
Table 6.4 
Summary of ordinal regression of PD frequency on the listed variables 
 
b SE p OR [95% CI] 
Gender 0.447 0.23 .048 1.56 [1.00, 2.44] 
Age −0.005 0.01 .575 0.98 [0.98, 1.01] 
Age of 1st PD category     
10-20 −0.838 0.25  7×10−4 0.43 [0.26, 0.70] 
20-30 −0.721 0.33 .028 0.49 [0.25, 0.92] 
>30 −2.063 0.58 3×10−4 0.13 [0.04, 0.37] 
Note. Parameters of Age of 1st PD categories refer to change with respect to the first category (<10). 
 
6.4. Discussion 
The present study focused on the exploration of memories of earliest PD 
experiences. We formulated three hypotheses. Firstly, based on the work of Erikson 
(Erikson & Erikson, 1998) and Conway and colleagues (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 
2000; Conway & Holmes, 2004; Conway, 2005), we argued that if the belief that an 
experience of PDs is relevant to one’s self-concept, the distribution of age of the earliest 
such experience should be similar to the one consistently associated to identity-relevant 




Dividing the sample into younger and older participants and comparing the two 
distributions of the variable revealed that older participants tended to report having 
their first PD experience later in life than younger participants. However, a visual 
inspection of the plotted distribution, as well as comparison of trimmed and untrimmed 
means of the groups suggested that this difference is inflated by a small number of 
extreme cases where participants reported having the earliest PD experience around the 
age of 50. 
Secondly, we hypothesised that there would be a positive relationship between 
vividness of the earliest PD and the frequency with which one reports to experience 
these dreams. This hypothesis was also supported even when controlling for additional 
variables such as demographic characteristics and significance one ascribes to dreams in 
general. 
Finally, we hypothesised that the vividness one associates with one’s earliest PD 
experience is a function of how important these experiences are to one’s self-concept 
and that it is this importance that accounts for the relationship between PD frequency 
and vividness of 1st PD.  
This prediction also found support in the data. These results provide evidence that 
self-relevance of precognitive dream experiences motivates both reported PD frequency 
and construction of PD-related autobiographical memories. This claim is consistent 
with the theoretical framework of autobiographical memories as products of the Self-
Memory System (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000) as well as the empirical findings that 
significance ascribed to dreams inflates reported dream recall (Beaulieu-Prévost & 
Zadra, 2005) and that the recall of autobiographical memories can be influenced by 
manipulating people’s motivation to view themselves as possessing certain qualities 




Furthermore, given the rather large number of participants reporting their first PD 
experiences at a very early age (24% reported having been younger than 10 and 8% 
reported being only five years old or younger when they had their first PD), we decided 
to explore the relationship between the age of the earliest PD and its vividness, as well 
as reported PD frequency. We expected a positive relationship between age and 
vividness of 1st PD since memories of more recent events should be more vivid. 
However, we found that, contrary to this expectation first PD experiences reported 
from childhood were rated as more vivid than those from other periods of life; however 
this relationship was only significant for the 10-20 year old category. In addition, we 
found that a categorised age of 1st PD was a significant predictor of PD frequency, with 
participants who remembered having had their first PD experience before the age of 10 
reporting a higher PD frequency than the other categories. Taken together, these 
findings suggest that memories going back to childhood may be more likely to be 
influenced by motivational biases and perhaps even be confabulated. Due to the 
exploratory nature of these analyses, this evidence is, however, rather circumstantial and 
tentative and should be regarded as such. On the other hand, the assumption that the 
childhood memories are likely to be confabulated raises an issue: If it is true that these 
memories are constructed by the SMS as self-coherence maintaining evidence of one’s 
identity as a precognitive dreamer, why would people date these confabulations to a 
period prior to the one where identity is the most salient topic? This would seem at 
odds with the work of Conway and Holmes (2004). Granting validity to the findings of 
these authors, we suggest three ways of reconciling our results with theirs: firstly, it is 
possible that one’s identity as a precognitive dreamer develops as a consequence of a 
series of experiences construed as precognitive dreams, as opposed to the earliest one. 




would, in line with our hypothesis, allow for a wider interval in which to place the 
memory of such experience. This interval, however, should not stretch beyond the 
identity-formation period, which agrees with the general trend observed in the present 
study. If this is the case, asking participants to date their memory of their most 
impactful, rather than the earliest PD, might prove a better option. Alternatively, a 
future study could ask participants whether or not they consider themselves to be 
precognitive dreamers and if so, at what age they began identifying as such. 
Secondly, some people may be inclined to date their earliest PD experience to a 
very young age, motivated by the notion that the further back in one’s history such 
experiences reach, the stronger the claim of one’s precognitive dreamer identity is. 
Thirdly, it is also possible that these memories are not reconstructed in a biased 
way, nor confabulated. They might be true and accurately dated memories of 
subjectively extraordinary dream-related experiences that were construed as 
precognitive. Having had such experiences from an early age might, perhaps reinforced 
by adult authority figures sympathetic to the notion of the paranormal, make it more 
likely that a person would identify as a precognitive dreamer. This scenario may also 
explain the association between age and vividness of the earliest precognitive dream, the 
latter either being boosted by childish fantasy or rehearsal-induced imagination inflation. 
Both the second and the third explanations are, on the one hand, consistent with the 
relationship between age of 1st PD and general PD frequency but, on the other hand, 
they are not supported by the lack of a significant relationship between age of 1st PD 
and importance of PDs. More research into this topic is therefore required. 
This study is, naturally, not free of its limitations. Since the study used a subsample 
of a larger dataset used in Chapters IV and V, points regarding the recruitment method 




also apply for the present study. Two further issues need to be addressed. Firstly, as 
mentioned above, the use of memories of the earliest PD experiences may have, for the 
reasons stated earlier in the section, confounded the relationship we aimed to explore. It 
may be the case that the potential effects of motivational mechanisms brought about by 
the self-relevance of belief in one’s tendency to have precognitive dreams are more 
visible in memories of the most impactful or salient PD experience. Using items 
assessing these experiences in future studies might thus be worthwhile. Alternatively, or 
in addition to such items, asking participants whether they identify as precognitive 
dreamers, and if so, when they began doing so, could be equally useful. We 
hypothesised that PD experiences are either a result of misattribution of paranormal 
quality to subjectively unlikely or otherwise extraordinary parallels between one’s dreams 
and life events or a result of biased recall of one’s dreams after a significant event has 
taken place, in both cases caused by motivational mechanisms. In line with this 
hypothesis, we would predict that the age of most impactful PD experience or of self-
identification as a precognitive dreamer would fall within the period of adolescence, 
when identity is formed. Similarly, the vividness item in our study may have somewhat 
blurred the distinction between the vividness of the experience itself versus the 
vividness of the memory of this experience. There may be important differences in the 
representation of these two pieces of information: the former may be stored and 
recalled in terms of a knowledge-like proposition (e.g., “I know my first PD experience 
was a very vivid one”), while the latter may be retrieved by recalling the experience and 
assessing the vividness of the recalled memory. It is not clear whether there would be 
any measurable differences between an item assessing the vividness of the experience 
and one inquiring into the vividness of the memory of such experience, nor is it clear 




retrieving the relevant information, however, we suggest that it would be prudent for 
future studies exploring this issue to include both items. 
A second issue is that, just like with any study using a correlational design, interpreting 
the results in terms of causality is problematic. We discussed our findings through the 
prism of the mechanism we proposed in the introduction. Alternative interpretations 
are, however, possible and there are no means of adjudicating between several 








General discussion and conclusion 
 
The aim of this dissertation was to examine the topic of belief in and experience of 
precognitive dreams and to provide novel insight into potential psychological 
mechanisms underlying these phenomena. Since a large proportion of the general 
population endorses the belief in all sorts of paranormal and supernatural phenomena, 
whose existence is implausible and the evidence for it highly debatable, and since these 
convictions can have significant real-life consequences, understanding the origins of 
these beliefs and experiences is important. We chose precognitive dreams from amongst 
the wide array of supposed paranormal phenomena because it is one of the most widely 
believed and experienced of such phenomena. Furthermore, as we argued, there is a 
good reason to believe that paranormal beliefs and experiences are not a homogeneous 
entity but that various kinds of belief and experience can have different underlying 
psychological mechanics. Similarly we proposed that belief and experience be treated in 
their own right since, although often strongly related, they describe two distinct 
constructs which, despite it often being the case, should not be confounded. 
In the five empirical chapters, we presented studies investigating three possible 
explanations of precognitive dreams: that they are a genuine paranormal phenomenon; 
that dreams can and do contain information indicative of future events which one can 
be unaware of having obtained, even though this information has been gained through 
normal means; and that precognitive dream experiences are a result of various cognitive 




Prior to delving into various proposed psychological explanations of precognitive 
dream belief and experience, our first study, presented in Chapter II, addresses the topic 
of precognitive dreams from the point of view of testing the Psi hypothesis. We used 
this study to not only provide a dispassionate treatment of the valid, if largely 
unsupported, hypothesis that dreams actually contained information of unknown origin 
pertinent to future events, but also to give an example of standard research practices 
within the field of parapsychology and to discuss some of their potential theoretical and 
methodological pitfalls. 
Study 1 yielded a significant result: the video clips designated as targets by the 
random number generator were ranked by the judges as the most similar, compared to 
the decoy videos, to participants’ dream reports from the previous week more often 
than could be expected under the null hypothesis. However, since a significant result 
such as the one we found can be taken as supportive of the psi hypothesis only after 
accounting for any plausible normal explanations, we engaged in a thorough exploratory 
analysis of the findings. This analysis showed that one group of video clips was 
significantly more likely to receive a high similarity rating from the judges regardless of 
whether or not the given video was a target or a decoy, while the video clips in another 
group were relatively unlikely to be rated as similar to participants’ dream reports. 
Furthermore, targets that scored a hit were on average no more similar to the dream 
reports than those that did not. These findings suggest there was no qualitative 
difference between hits and misses, which is difficult to reconcile with the psi 
hypothesis. Additionally, when we explored the content of the dream reports and the 
least scoring group of video clips, we found that while the former contained relatively 
few references to animal imagery, there was a preponderance of such imagery in the 




While we acknowledged that the above-mentioned analyses were exploratory and their 
extent may seem unusual in a hypothesis-driven research, we argued that the negative 
definition of the subject of study as stated by the psi hypothesis makes this kind of post 
hoc exploration necessary. This being the case, we concluded that Study 1 did not show 
evidence of any anomalous cognition within participants’ dreams. It did, however, 
illustrate the potential theoretical and methodological issues with the psi hypothesis and 
the way it is habitually assessed. We recommend that future research in this area employ 
multiple levels of randomisation and a control condition rather than theoretical control 
in the form of the mean chance expectation. 
In Chapter III, we investigate the hypothesis that precognitive dreams arise as a 
product of unconscious inferences about salient information processed outside of 
awareness. In two studies, we tested some of the predictions of this hypothesis, which 
we dubbed the implicit processing hypothesis of precognitive dreams (IPH). Although 
the idea behind the IPH was first formulated by Aristotle, these studies constitute, to 
the best of our knowledge, the first and thus far the only empirical test of the hypothesis 
in the published literature. The first of these studies, Study 2, tested the prediction that, 
if precognitive dreams arise by the above-mentioned process, people who experience 
them relatively frequently should exhibit superior implicit perception compared to 
people who either don’t have precognitive dreams at all or experience them only rarely. 
This would mean that salient subtle cues from the environment, that carry information 
about events that are likely to occur in the future, have a higher likelihood of being 
picked up on by good “implicit perceivers” and subsequently making their way into their 
dream imagery. However, we did not find a significant relationship between a measure 
of precognitive dream experience – or belief – and the performance on an implicit 




prediction of the IPH, that is, that in the absence of a relationship between implicit 
processing ability and precognitive dream experience, it may be the case that a poorer 
ability to process environmental stimuli explicitly allows for more implicit perception to 
take place. Thus, precognitive dreams would be more likely to be experienced by people 
who do not tend to notice subtle cues explicitly. To test this, we employed a variation 
on a change detection task used in change blindness research that allowed for the 
assessment of both implicit and explicit detection performance. The results of Study 3 
did not support this prediction as the measure of explicit change detection was not 
related to precognitive dream experience. They did, however, provide a conceptual 
replication of the findings of Study 2, since we found, once again, no relationship 
between implicit detection and precognitive dream experience. Taken together, these 
results provide evidence against the IPH, although we proposed several hypotheses that 
could reconcile the broader premise of the IPH with our findings. Testing of these 
hypotheses would, however, necessitate a well-funded sleep laboratory study which is 
currently beyond our means. The difficulties, both logistical and methodological, 
associated with whis kind of research are illustrated by a recent study by Watt and 
colleagues (in press) that did not achieve the required statistical power to detect the 
hypothesised effect, even though the correlation found between prior precognitive 
dream experience and incorporation of external stimuli into dream narrative was .630. 
For this reason we decided to progress to focusing on the third explanation (see above) 
of precognitive dream experience, namely, that these phenomena are a result of 
misattribution of paranormal cause due to various cognitive and motivational biases. 
Chapter IV provides a bridge between these two families of explanations. On a 
moderately large sample, we explored several hypotheses. Firstly, following the second 




that an increased subjective frequency of these experiences will be associated with more 
erratic sleep behaviour. This hypothesis stems from the notion that such sleep 
behaviour, characterised by a higher frequency of nocturnal awakening and diurnal nap-
taking, leads to a higher incidence of borderline sleep states, during which people’s 
dream-like imagery is more sensitive to influence from external environmental stimuli. 
Thus, information about events that did not take place until after one went to sleep can 
figure in one’s dreams. Consistent with this hypothesis, we found that a higher 
subjective frequency of precognitive dreams was associated with more nocturnal 
awakenings, higher dream recall, lower overall sleep quality, and a higher likelihood of 
using sleep medication. Secondly, the sample size used in Study 4 was appropriate for 
exploring the previously discussed but seldom examined relationship between 
precognitive dream belief and experience. Although, as could be expected, we found 
these two to be strongly positively related, we argued that this relationship is not 
sufficient to gloss over the conceptual distinction between these constructs and that 
there was a need for researchers to consider them separately. Thirdly, the exploration of 
demographic data revealed that women were more likely to believe in the reality of 
precognitive dreams as well as experience them. This finding is in line with those of 
previous studies. There was also a negative relationship between completed years of 
formal education and the precognitive dream variables. Taken as a rough proxy measure 
of cognitive ability, this result too has some support in past research, although 
controversy remains on this issue. Somewhat more surprising was the finding that 
frequency of these experiences was positively related to age. Since we were not able to 
explain why this would be the case, we argued that subjective frequency may be 




Finally, we predicted that both precognitive dream belief and experience would be 
positively related to the subjective importance ascribed to one’s dreams in general. We 
found support for this hypothesis. Given the correlational nature of the study, there was 
no means of unambiguously disentangling the individual contributions of belief and 
experience to any of the detected relationships, nor of assessing the causal nature behind 
these associations. However, we cautiously argued that belief in precognitive dreams 
might be the primary factor driving experience of such dreams and that personal 
significance ascribed to these dreams may lead people to inflate their estimate of the 
frequency with which they experience them. This line of argument, which is in line with 
research on subjectively reported dream frequency, led us to the exploration of personal 
attitudes towards precognitive dream experiences. 
Since relatively little scientific attention has been focused on attitudinal and 
motivational aspects of paranormal belief and experience as well as the relationship 
between such attitudes and the frequency of paranormal experience, we dedicated the 
final two empirical chapters of the thesis to these topics. 
Firstly, a measure of attitudes towards precognitive dream experiences was needed. 
In Chapter V, we describe the development and validation of such a measure. We 
administered the new Attitudes towards Paranormal Experiences Scale (APES) to a 
subsample from the previous study, consisting exclusively of participants with prior 
precognitive dream experience. After eliminating items with unsatisfactory psychometric 
properties, we identified five dimensions of these attitudes with acceptable reliability. 
We then used additional variables in the data set to validate the derived dimensions. 
Overall, the predicted relationships were confirmed by the analyses, which indicates 
both convergent and divergent/discriminant validity of the questionnaire. Importantly, 




frequency with which they are experienced. Furthermore, we argued that the presence 
of unpredicted relationships in the data provides evidence of the heuristic potential of 
this instrument. We were thus able to use it to further explore the relationship between 
attitudes towards precognitive dreams and other variables of interest. 
The APES provided a means of expanding upon the findings regarding subjective 
importance of both general and precognitive dreams and precognitive dream belief and 
frequency discussed in chapters IV and V. Following the argument that personal 
significance of these dreams leads to inflated estimates of their frequency, in Study 6, 
the first study of the final empirical chapter of this thesis, we tested the hypothesis that 
the belief in one’s precognitive dream experiences tends to be self-relevant. Building on 
the literature on self-defining memories, we predicted that the earliest memories of PD 
experience usually date back to the period of identity formation. This prediction was 
supported by the data. In line with this argument, we also hypothesised that there would 
be a relationship between vividness of the memories of the earliest precognitive dreams 
and the frequency with which these phenomena are experienced in later life. 
Furthermore, we predicted that this relationship would be accounted for by the personal 
significance of precognitive dreams. We found evidence for both of these hypotheses. 
We interpreted these findings as evidence for the claim that reports of precognitive 
dream experiences are inflated by the effect of personal significance on the tendency to 
remember events in accordance with self-relevant attitudes. However, given the 
observational design of the study, this evidence is only circumstantial.  
In summary, this dissertation addressed several lines of research on precognitive 
dreams, providing novel findings in the field of psychology of paranormal belief and 
experience. Moreover, we are convinced that some of the findings and methods used in 




perception or cognitive and social psychology of memory. Last but not least, this thesis 
contributed to the ongoing debate regarding important conceptual and methodological 
issues in parapsychology. 
Specifically, from a methodological point of view, we contributed novel tools 
applicable both in and outside of the area of precognitive dream belief and experience. 
Firstly, we constructed an attitude-focused questionnaire with a well-interpretable factor 
structure, which is both valid and reliable, and has a demonstrable heuristic potential. It 
explores important aspects of precognitive dream experiences that have not been 
previously addressed. Given the likely multi-faceted underlying psychology of these 
experiences, a more fine-grained picture of the structure of an individual’s attitude 
towards them is undoubtedly useful. A further advantage of the APES is that, provided 
appropriate modifications to the wording of its items, it can be co-opted to assess other 
types of paranormal experience. Doing this would, apart from providing insights into 
the attitudinal structure of the experience in question, allow for the comparison of 
different types of paranormal experiences. Any such differences could inform further 
hypotheses about potential psychological factors of these sorts of experiences. 
Secondly, our modification of Rensink and colleagues’ (1997) flicker paradigm 
provides a novel way of assessing perception without awareness, a topic that has 
attracted both considerable attention and controversy. This task eschews the pitfalls of 
‘mindsightt’ research pointed out by Simons and colleagues (2005), since, as we show in 
Study 3, the implicit detection part of the task is not conflated with a liberal decision 
criterion (see section 3.2.3 for more detail). Thus, we believe this task could prove useful 
for research into the topics of perception, attention, and awareness. 
Thirdly, in our online dream precognition study (Study 1), we demonstrated the 




high level of scrutiny, results likely attributable to methodological or statistical artefacts 
can be mischaracterised as supportive of the psi hypothesis. Moreover, we made a case 
for the use of multiple randomisation on several levels of the experimental procedure. 
We recommended that, in addition to random selection of targets, it is important to 
randomise the presentation order of the stimuli in the judging stage. We also pointed to 
the possible effect of stimulus content on hit rate. We suggest that, if target pools are 
designed to include thematically orthogonal stimuli – a practice which is commonplace 
yet the justification for which is debatable – due care be taken to ensure that the 
individual themes are equally likely to figure in participants’ mentation. Finally, we 
advocated the use of a control condition in psi research as opposed to the reliance on 
the mean chance expectation. Doing so reduces the number of assumptions that are 
implicit in the analysis of this kind of experimental design. Many of the points we raised 
here are not novel and some of them have been brought to attention multiple times in 
the history of psi research (e.g., Kennedy, 1979). However, we believe that a repeated 
effort to raise consciousness of these issues is of value. 
The research reported in this thesis also yielded novel findings relevant for various 
areas of psychology. We conducted studies that constitute the first published empirical 
test of the implicit processing theory of precognitive dream experience. The findings of 
these studies suggest that individual differences in implicit processing ability or the 
propensity to implicit perception as a result of suboptimal explicit perception are not 
likely to be a strong factor in precognitive dream experience. We also proposed other 
testable predictions based on the IPH and would encourage any efforts to test them in 
the future. We will return to these research suggestions later on in this section. 
Other novel findings came from exploring the links between attitudes towards 




earliest precognitive dream experience. The results suggest that personal significance of 
one’s experiences leads to inflated reports of vividness of one’s first PD experience as 
well as the frequency of these experiences. Furthermore, we found that the earliest 
memories of PD experience tend to be dated to a period in individual development 
associated with identity-formation. This finding is consistent with the hypothesis that 
the self-relevance of the belief in one’s precognitive dreams exerts motivational pressure 
towards the above-mentioned memory inflation. It is also worth pointing out that, to 
the best of our knowledge, the exploration of the earliest precognitive dream is a novel 
way of approaching the topic of paranormal experiences. As we demonstrated, it is a 
potentially fruitful one. 
Finally, our Study 3 provided evidence of implicit change detection. The signal 
detection analysis showed that participants were, on average, able to detect the presence 
of a change in the stimulus, even though they had reported not having consciously 
noticed one with a greater accuracy that could be expected by chance. Furthermore, this 
ability to implicitly detect change could not be attributed to a liberal decision criterion, 
which is an objection that has been previously levied against studies in this area (Simons 
et al., 2005). Provided these findings stand up to replication, we believe they could 
contribute to the resolution of the ongoing debate regarding the existence of implicit 
perception (Destrebecqz & Cleeremans, 2001; Mitroff et al., 2002; Simons et al., 2005). 
Throughout this dissertation we also raised several theoretical points we believe 
deserve to be emphasised. We highlighted the importance of considering different kinds 
of supposed paranormal phenomena individually as opposed to treating them as a single 
homogenous concept of the paranormal as is often the case in psychological literature 
(see section 1.3.3.3). The reason for this, as we argued in line with others (e.g., Irwin, 




paranormal beliefs and experiences are likely to be underpinned by distinct 
psychological mechanisms. Addressing a general factor of the paranormal thus 
necessarily confounds these potential factors. We would certainly agree that it is of 
interest to look for general correlates of paranormal belief and experience but examining 
the issue in the way we suggest is equally important for a fuller understanding of these 
phenomena. 
Another point stressed in the thesis is that of a conceptual distinction between 
belief and experience. Although measures, such as the Australian Sheep-Goat scale 
contain items inquiring into both paranormal beliefs and experiences, this distinction is 
seldom made use of in a systematic way in psychological literature (see section 1.3.3.3). 
We believe that a focused effort should be made to explore the relationship between 
these concepts beyond that of a mere correlation. The research presented in this thesis 
suggests that apart from the intuitive causal relationship, where an experience of a 
phenomenon leads to the belief in its existence, the actual nature of the relationship 
between paranormal belief and experience may be more complex (see also Glicksohn, 
1990; Lawrence et al., 1995; Rattet & Bursik, 2001). In the face of our findings, it is 
plausible that there exists a feedback relationship where each of these things causes the 
other. It is even possible that it is belief, not experience, that is the driving force behind 
this relationship and that a pre-existing belief in the reality of a given paranormal 
phenomenon leads to the experience of it. Further research is thus needed to elucidate 
the mechanics of the interplay of paranormal belief and experience. We hope that our 
emphasis on the conceptual distinction between them will serve as a catalyst to this kind 
of research. 
Apart from the above-mentioned suggestion, the studies we conducted produced 




as well as more general areas in the field. Based on the findings reported in Chapter III, 
two lines of research appear potentially interesting. Firstly, we hypothesised, in line with 
the IPH, that, in the absence of differences in either implicit or explicit perception 
ability between those who experience precognitive dreams and those who do not, these 
experiences may be a result of the tendency of some people’s dream imagery to be 
influenced by external stimuli. Alternatively, it could be argued that the important 
difference lies in the tendency of the dream content to reflect previously gathered 
information as well as implicit insights. These predictions can be tested in a sleep 
laboratory setting. However, a relatively large sample size would be required in order to 
capture any relationships between the measure in question and precognitive dream 
experience (see Watt et al., in press). Given the constraints and demands posed by sleep 
laboratory research, conducting such a study may be rather costly. 
Secondly, in the discussion to Study 3, we consider the possibility that participants’ 
responses to implicit trials reflected situations when they were aware of a change having 
taken place but could not identify precisely what it was that changed. Setting aside the 
philosophical issue of what it means to notice a change if not noticing a point of 
discrepancy between two stimuli, it could be argued that these situations are possible 
due to a dual processing of global versus specific features. There is some evidence that 
in humans the processing of global and specific features is differentiated with respect to 
cerebral hemispheres (Han et al., 2002; Kimchi & Merhav, 1991, but see Blanca, & 
López-Montiel, 2009). It should thus be possible to test the dual processing account of 
our findings. Participants would complete our modified flicker task while fixating at the 
middle of the screen. In change trials, the position of the element of change would be 
randomised to appear either in the right or the left visual field. It would follow from the 




implicitly detected in trials, where the element of change appears in the half of the visual 
field that is primarily processed by the cerebral hemisphere associated with the 
processing of general features. 
In the discussion to the development of the APES questionnaire, we suggested that 
future research in the psychology of precognitive dream experiences would benefit from 
exploring the potential relationships between personality characteristics, such as 
narcissism or neuroticism and attitudes toward these experiences (Auton et al., 2003; 
Roe, & Morgan, 2002; Tobacyk & Mitchell, 1987). Given the variability we found in 
people’s attitudes toward their precognitive dreams, it is possible that the currently 
inconclusive findings from studies correlating personality traits and paranormal belief 
and experience (e.g., Dag 1999; Dudley, 1999; McGarry & Newberry, 1981; Newby & 
Davis, 2004) are a result of confounding different types of experiencers. The type of 
research we propose would disentangle these confounds. 
Finally, in the previous chapter, we proposed a study design for testing the 
hypothesis that a belief in precognitive dreams is capable of exerting motivational 
influence acting on a person’s recollection of their prior dreams, making them match 
supposedly confirmatory events more closely than they originally did. A study such as 
this one could also yield novel findings in the broader area of motivational biases 
affecting memory. It is therefore an avenue we aim to pursue in the future. 
In conclusion, we believe that this thesis provides novel theoretical, 
methodological, and empirical developments that contribute to the current state of 
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Appendix A: Study 1 materials 
A.1 Initial questionnaire 






3) Frequency of Dream Recall 
“How often have you recalled your dreams recently (in the past several months)? 
(check one)” 
a. Almost every morning 
b. Several times a week 
c. About once a week 
d. Two or three times a month 
e. About once a month 
f. Less than once a month 
g. Never 
 
4) “Do you believe that some individuals have dreams that predict future events, 
and that are not just coincidence?” 
A precognitive dream is defined as a dream that ‘comes true’ and meets the 
following 5 criteria (Bender, 1966): 
1. the dream must be recounted or recorded before its fulfilment (e.g., was it 
written down or described to another person before it ‘came true’?) 
2. the dream must include enough details to render chance coincidence unlikely 
3. the possibility of inference from actual knowledge must be excluded (i.e., the 
dream must refer to an unexpected or unpredictable event) 
4. self-fulfilling prophecies must be excluded (i.e., the person could not make 
the dream ‘come true’ through their own actions after the dream) 
5. telepathic influences should not be able to explain the occurrence of the 
precognitive dream (i.e., no one else could know the information in the dream at 





5) Frequency of Precognitive Dream Experience 
Based on the five criteria above, please indicate approximately how often you 
have had a precognitive dream over the last few years (check one) 
a. About once a week 
b. About once a month 
 
ii 
c. About once in six months 
d. About once a year 
e. Less than once a year 
f. Never 
 
Thank you for completing this initial questionnaire. You can now begin to record 
your personal dream diary for Trial 1. Over the next 5 mornings, please keep a 
detailed note of any dreams that you can remember on awakening. After 5 days, we 
will send you a link to a questionnaire that will ask you to type in an anonymous 
summary description of your week’s dreams. Remember that after we have received 
your dream summary you will be sent a "target" video clip to view. Every night, 
before you go to sleep, please take a few moments just to gently remind yourself 
that your dreams during the night will be linked to the target clip you are going to 
watch after we have received your dream summary. Sweet dreams! 
To exit, please click the following link, which will take you to the KPU home page: 
http://www.koestler-parapsychology.psy.ed.ac.uk/ 
 
A.2 Dream Summary 
1) Participant ID code 
 
2) Summary 
Please type in the space below an anonymous summary (max 300 words) of your 
remembered dreams over the past 5 days. Include not only descriptions of main 
content and themes that emerged in your dreams, but details such as emotional 
tone and the impact of the dream. You do not need to write anything that you 
would find embarrassing or that would make you uncomfortable to write. Please 
don’t provide any personally identifying details. 
[open response] 
 
3) Confidence rating 
Please rate how confident you are that your dreams over the past 5 days will 
relate to the target video clip that you will shortly be sent. (check one) 
a. Completely confident 
b. Very confident 
c. Somewhat confident 
d. Not very confident 
e. Not at all confident 
 
4) Please explain briefly the reason why you chose this particular level of 
confidence 
5) [open response] 
 
Thank you for submitting your dream summary and confidence rating. Next, you 
will be sent (drum roll…..) your target clip for this week. Good luck! 
To exit, please click the following link, which will take you to the KPU home page: 
 
iii 
A.3 Dream Similarity Rating Form 
1) Participant ID code 
 
2) Similarity Rating 
If you have not already done so, please view your target video clip. Now, please 
type in a number from 1-100 to indicate how much similarity you feel there is 
between your submitted dream summary for this week and your target video clip 
for this week. Please bear in mind not just dream content, but also associated 
themes and emotions. A rating of 1 indicates No Similarity, 100 indicates 
Complete Similarity. 
 
Thank you for submitting your Similarity rating. In a day or two, you will be sent a 
reminder to start your personal dream diary for the next week of the study. Thank 
you for your continued involvement in the study!  




Appendix B: Materials for Studies 4-6 
 
B.1 Demographic questionnaire 
First, please answer these few questions about yourself. 
 
1) Please indicate your gender: 
a. Female 
b. Male 
c. Other [free response] 
 
2) Where are you from? 
Please write down the name of the country in which you were raised. 
[free response] 
3) What is your age? 
 [free response]  
4) How many years of formal education (school, college, university) have you 
completed? 
 [list 8-25] 
5) How did you find out about this study? 
a. Social networks (Facebook, Twitter, etc.) 
b. Interest group/website/community 
c. From a family member 
d. Word of mouth 
 
6) If you answered 'Interest group/website/community' in the previous question, 
please write down the area of interest. For example spirituality, skepticism, 
psychology, paranormal phenomena, gardening etc. 
 [free response] 
B.2 Sleep characteristics questionnaire 
Here are a few questions about the quality of your everyday sleep. Please read each 
one carefully and respond accordingly. There are no right or wrong answers, so 
please answer as accurately as possible. 
(Items adapted from the Pittsburg Sleep Quality Index; Buysse et al., 1988) 
1) How long do you usually sleep? 
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a. Fewer than 5 hours 
b. 5 to 6 hours 
c. 7 to 8 hours 
d. 9 to 10 hours 
e. More than 10 hours 
 
2) How often do you tend to have naps during the day? 
a. Never 
b. Less than once a month 
c. About once a month 
d. A few times a month 
e. About once a week 
f. A few times a week 
g. Almost daily 
 
3) How often do you wake in the middle of the night (or too early in the morning)? 
a. Never 
b. Less than once a month 
c. About once a month  
d. A few times a month 
e. About once a week 
f. A few times a week 
g. Almost every night 
h. Once or several times every night 
 
4) How often do you take medicine (prescribed or “over the counter”) to help you 
sleep? 
a. Never 
b. Less than once a month 
c. About once a month 
d. A few times a month 
e. About once a week 
f. A few times a week 
g. Almost daily 
 
5) Have you been diagnosed with a sleep disorder? 
We realise this might be a sensitive topic but please bear in mind the 
questionnaire is completely anonymous. However, for your peace of mind, we 
included a 'I prefer not to say' option. 
a. Yes 
b. No 
c. I prefer not to say 
 
6) How would you rate your overall quality of sleep? 
Very bad 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very good 
7) How often have you recalled your dreams recently (in the past several months)? 
a. Never 
b. Less than once a month 
 
vii 
c. About once a month 
d. Two or three times a month 
e. About once a week 
f. Several times a week 
g. Almost every morning. 
 
B.3 Attitudes towards dreams scale 
The following section asks about your dreams. Please read carefully each statement 
and indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with it. Again, there are no 
right or wrong answers, so please answer as accurately as possible. 
(all items except for #6 and #20 selected from Inventory of Dream Experience and 
Attitudes; Beaulieu-Prévost, Charneau Simard, & Zadra, 2009) 
[7-point Likert scale from Completely disagree to Completely agree] 
 
1) My dreams do not seem to have a deeper meaning. 
2) In my dreams, I experience failure more often than success. 
3) Dreams are random products of the brain. 
4) I believe that dreams and spirituality are closely connected. 
5) In general, I feel safe in my dreams. 
6) Dreams don’t tell us anything important about ourselves. 
7) In my dreams, I am often running away or being followed. 
8) If I am affected by a dream, I try to find its meaning. 
9) If the opportunity presents itself, I would like to work on my dreams with an 
expert in order to find their meaning. 
10) I attach a lot of significance to my dreams. 
11) My dreams are more often pleasant than unpleasant. 
12) On occasion, I will consult a book to help interpret my dreams. 
13) I pay close attention to my dreams. 
14) In my dreams, I tend to be anxious more often than calm. 
15) I tend to read about dreams. 
16) Dream interpretation should NOT be part of psychology training. 
17) The most intense emotions I have experienced in my dreams are positive 
emotions. 
18) I feel that my dreams are about nothing in particular. 
19) In my dreams, I am more likely to be lucky than unlucky. 





B.4 Precognitive dream belief scale 
The following section asks about your beliefs about precognitive dreams, i.e. 
dreams that foretell the future. Please read carefully the criteria below as well as 
each question and respond accordingly. 
The following five criteria have been suggested as helping to define what is 
meant by a 'precognitive' dream.  
 
[Bender’s (1966) criteria we included here; see Appendix A.1.] 
 
Based on these criteria, please indicate how much the following statements apply to 
you. 
 
[7-point Likert scale from Completely disagree to Completely agree] 
 
1) Some individuals have dreams that can only be described as precognitive. 
2) It is NOT possible to predict the future through precognitive dreams. (reversed) 
3) Sometimes, dreams can provide information about the future that couldn’t have 
been received from any waking life source. 
4) Any information received from dreams can be explained without invoking 
precognition. (reversed) 
5) I have had at least one dream that came true and which (I believe) was 
precognitive. 
 
6) Please indicate which of these options has been the most relevant to you in 
forming your opinion on the existence, or otherwise, of precognitive dreams 
(choose one). 
a. Direct personal experience 
b. Knowledge of another person's experience 
c. Popular print or broadcast media 
d. Scientific evidence 
e. Other 
 
7) Approximately how often do you tend to have precognitive dreams? 
a. Never 
b. Less than once a year 
c. About once a year 
d. About once in six months 
e. About once a month 






Precognitive dreams are a fascinating topic. Unfortunately, very little is known 
about what people think about their precognitive dream experience. People like you 
can provide valuable information about this interesting yet under-explored area. We 
would really appreciate if you completed this final section of the questionnaire. 
This is the most important part of the study, so please try your best to focus. 
 
This questionnaire asks about your experience with precognitive dreams and 
your attitude towards them. First, please answer these three introductory questions. 
 
1) What age were you when you had your first precognitive dream? 
<Free response> 
2) How vivid is your recollection of this first dream? 
a. As vivid as real life 
b. Very vivid 
c. Fairly vivid 
d. Not very vivid 
e. Not at all vivid 
 
3) Which area of life did the dream concern? 
a. Personal pertaining to myself  
b. Personal pertaining to a significant other 
c. Local event/person 
d. National event/person 
e. International event/person 
 
Now, please read carefully each item and respond by indicating how much you 
agree or disagree with the given statement. Just like before, there are no right or 
wrong answers so please reply as accurately and truthfully as possible but do not 
ponder the items too much. 
 
[7-point Likert scale from Completely disagree to Completely agree] 
 
 
1) In a way, I feel blessed because of my precognitive dreams. (reversed)8 
2) People who have precognitive dreams need not hide them. (reversed) 
3) Society greatly benefit from exploring the potential of precognitive 
dreamers. 
4) Precognitive dreams run in my family. 
5) I am proud to have precognitive dreams. (reversed) 
6) I have previously benefited from heeding my precognitive dreams. 
                                                 
8 Items retained in the final version of APES-PD appear in boldface. 
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7) Everybody has precognitive dreams during their lives even though some people 
don't know it or deny it. (reversed) 
8) I can always recognise a dream is precognitive shortly after waking up. 
9) I am a person who is sometimes able to predict the future by extraordinary 
means. 
10) I have in the past ignored my precognitive dreams and afterwards came 
to regret it. 
11) A precognitive dream, as strong as it may be, is no reason to change your 
plans. (reversed) 
12) To have precognitive dreams is a rare thing. 
13) I believe that everyone has the potential to be a precognitive dreamer. (reversed) 
14) It is not for us to decide whether or not we will have precognitive dreams. 
(reversed) 
15) People who are too vocal about their precognitive dreams shouldn't be taken 
seriously. (reversed) 
16) I often share my precognitive dreams with others. (reversed) 
17) My precognitive dreams rarely come true. (reversed) 
18) Discovering I had precognitive dreams didn’t change how I see myself. 
(reversed) 
19) I don’t act upon my precognitive dreams. (reversed) 
20) To have precognitive dreams is an innate ability. 
21) Precognitive dreams shouldn't be very important for a person who has 
them. (reversed) 
22) Many of my relationships are connected to my having precognitive 
dreams in some way. 
23) When I have an alarming precognitive dream about someone close, I warn 
them. 
24) I like to keep the fact that I have precognitive dreams to myself. 
25) Only my closest friends and family know about my precognitive dreams. 
26) Sometimes it takes a bit of hindsight to realise a dream was precognitive. 
(reversed) 
27) My precognitive dreams come to me from some external source. (reversed) 
28) Precognitive dreamers don’t deserve any special credit for having their dreams. 
(reversed) 
29) Ever since I've been having precognitive dreams, I've felt a bit 'different' 
because of them. 
30) My precognitive dreams are a private matter. 
31) Only a few people know how to make use of their precognitive dreams. 
32) Precognitive dreaming is an ability that can be cultivated. 
33) Society mocks people who have precognitive dreams because it fears 
what it doesn't understand. 
34) People who don't have precognitive dreams just can’t appreciate what it's like. 
35) I know many people who have precognitive dreams. (reversed) 
36) To have precognitive dreams is a heavy burden. 
37) Sometimes my precognitive dreams get me in trouble. 
38) I know more people who respect my precognitive dreams than those who don't. 
(reversed) 
39) After my dream has come true I have usually little doubt about the connection 
between it and the event. 
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40) I would NOT call precognitive dreams a special ability. (reversed) 
41) I have felt distressed because of my precognitive dreams. 
42) I would describe myself as someone who has precognitive dreams. 
43) People who have precognitive dreams will carry on having them, even if they 
don’t want to. (reversed) 
44) My actions are often informed by my precognitive dreams. 
45) I have a lot to thank my precognitive dreams for. (reversed) 
46) My precognitive dreams, for better or worse, are a part of who I am. 
47) All my friends know I have precognitive dreams. (reversed) 
48) It would be nice if people could acknowledge my precognitive dreams. 
49) I don’t care what people think about my precognitive dreams. (reversed) 
50) If I could I would give up having precognitive dreams. 
51) If others knew about my precognitive dreams, they would think I am crazy. 
52) I can often accurately tell the meaning of my dream before it comes true. 
53) The message of the precognitive dream is often unclear until the dream comes 
true. (reversed) 
54) Sometimes I just want to make everyone see that my dreams can predict 
the future. 
55) Our materialist culture has no appreciation for precognitive dreamers. 
56) To have precognitive dreams is a gift. (reversed) 
57) If I had a strong dream about a plane crash, it would not make me cancel a 
flight. (reversed) 
58) You can get better at making use of your precognitive dreams. 
59) My precognitive dreams aren’t very reliable. (reversed) 
60) I get ridiculed by closed-minded people. 
61) People close to me have trust in my precognitive dreams. (reversed) 
62) I don’t take my precognitive dreams too seriously. (reversed) 




Appendix C: Study 4 supplementary material 
 
Table S1 
Summary of ordinal regression analysis of precognitive dream experience 
 
b SE p OR [95% CI] 
Gender −0.374 0.15 .012 0.69 [0.51, 0.92] 
Age 0.063 0.01 < 2 × 10−16 1.06 [1.05, 1.08] 




Summary of logistic regression predicting sleep medication use with sleep clusters treated as ordinal. 
 b SE p OR [95% CI] 
Age 0.012 0.01 .118 1.01 [1.00, 1.03] 
Cluster 2 −0.786 0.18 8 × 10−6 0.46 [0.32, 0.64] 
Cluster 3 0.250 0.18 .153 1.28 [0.92, 1.82] 
 
 
Figure S1. Dendrogram showing the results of a hierarchical cluster analysis using 




Appendix D: Study 5 supplementary material 
Table S3 
Comparison of factor loadings between the WLS and WLSMV-derived factor solutions 
Item Benefit Importance Neg. Emotion Credit Privacy 
01 (0.480)  −0.562 (−0.462) 0.393 (0.311)  
02   −0.329 (−0.364)  −0.394 (−0.418) 
03  0.397  (0.332) (−0.391) 
05 (0.397) (−0.307) −0.546 (−0.441) 0.505 (0.394)  
06 0.738 (0.703)     
10 0.368 (0.321)     
11  −0.559 (−0.626)    
16     −0.753 (−0.789) 
17  −0.555 (−0.592)    
21  −0.584 (−0.567)    
22 0.734 (0.755)     
24     0.748 (0.815) 
30     0.588 (0.654) 
33  0.478 (0.435)  (0.329)  
36  0.409 (0.461) 0.531 (0.628) 0.321 (0.490)  
37 0.511 (0.436)  0.488 (0.641)   
40    −0.638 (−0.669)  
41  0.423 (0.571) 0.550 (0.629)   
42 0.408 0.469 (0.515)    
44 0.751 (0.718)     
45 0.852 (0.913)     
46  0.493 (0.459)    
47 0.434 (0.328)    −0.545 (−0.581) 
48    0.588 (0.578) −0.304 (−0.348) 
50   0.705 (0.732)   
52 0.339 (0.336)    
54   (0.376) 0.582 (0.584)  
56 (0.346)  −0.416 0.613 (0.558)  
59  −0.595 (−0.712)    
61 0.449 (0.339) (0.317)    
62 −0.318 −0.581 (−0.650)    







Correlations between scale indices and factor scores based on WLS and WLSMV solutions 















Factor 1 2 3 4 5 
1  Benefit .976 .467 −.040 .514 −.148 1 .974 .619 .128 .477 −.222 
2  Importance .645 .966 −.168 .398 −.130 2 .664 .932 −.045 .494 −.317 
3  Neg. emotion −.286 −.336 .973 .001 .228 3 .039 .046 .970 −.263 .368 
4  Credit .416 .423 −.291 .972 −.205 4 .486 .458 −.101 .924 −.382 
5  Privacy −.328 −.135 .173 −.268 .976 5 −.342 −.349 .268 −.396 .970 
   
C. Scale indices x factor scores (WLS) D. Scale indices x factor scores (WLSMV)  
Factor 1 2 3 4 5 Factor 1 2 3 4 5 
1  Benefit .959 .528 −.022 .539 −.098 
 
1 .952 .653 −.162 .445 −.368 
2  Importance .576 .943 −.192 .444 −.235 
 
2 .642 .934 −.325 .575 −.332 
3  Neg. emotion .058 −.022 .943 .018 .308 
 
3 −.106 .099 .868 −.099 .156 
4  Credit .469 .427 −.238 .929 −.347 
 
4 .466 .248 −.167 .888 −.434 
5  Privacy −.271 −.219 .318 −.230 .959  5 −.320 −.183 .342 −.283 .954 




Item-level analysis of the WLSMV solution 
  Benefit M = 3.51, SD = 1.35, α = .84, 95% CI [.80, .89] 
Item α if deleted SE of α Item-total r MItem SD 
01 .84 .03 .59 4.33 1.92 
06 .81 .03 .77 4.04 2.11 
10 .84 .03 .59 3.44 2.14 
22 .82 .03 .69 3.04 2.05 
37 .84 .03 .57 2.55 1.82 
44 .80 .03 .81 3.29 1.83 
45 .80 .03 .85 3.43 1.92 
61 .83 .03 .65 4.00 1.84 
  
Importance M = 4.63, SD = 1.18, α = .82, 95% CI [.78, .87] 
Item α if deleted SE of α Item-total r MItem SD 
11 .82 .02 .56 3.66 1.90 
17 .81 .03 .58 2.73 1.63 
21 .81 .03 .62 3.06 1.65 
33 .81 .03 .58 2.88 1.75 
42 .79 .03 .72 3.37 2.04 
46 .81 .03 .57 4.29 1.90 
52 .80 .03 .69 2.67 1.76 
59 .80 .03 .70 3.59 1.82 
62 .79 .03 .77 4.05 2.01 
  
Negative emotion M = 3.22, SD = 1.13, α = .65, 95% CI [.55, .72] 
Item α if deleted SE of α Item-total r MItem SD 
01 .62 .05 .54 3.67 1.92 
05 .60 .05 .58 3.46 1.74 
36 .59 .05 .60 3.48 2.00 
37 .62 .05 .53 2.55 1.82 
41 .58 .05 .63 3.83 2.18 
50 .54 .05 .69 2.37 1.71 
  Credit M = 3.38, SD = 1.30, α = .68, 95% CI [.59, .78] 
Item α if deleted SE of α Item-total r MItem SD 
40 .63 .06 .71 3.75 1.92 
48 .59 .06 .74 3.08 1.82 
54 .62 .06 .71 2.30 1.75 
56 .63 .06 .70 4.40 1.79 
  
Privacy M = 4.01, SD = 1.25, α = .76, 95% CI [.70, .83] 
Item α if deleted SE of α Item-total r MItem SD 
02 .75 .04 .61 5.05 1.81 
03 .75 .04 .61 5.20 1.82 
16 .7 .04 .76 3.67 2.09 
24 .71 .04 .73 3.70 1.85 
30 .72 .04 .68 3.39 1.73 





Factor weights for deriving ten Berge factor scores for the WLS solution 
Item Benefit Importance Negative emo Credit Privacy 
01 0.050 −0.063 −0.218 0.107 0.021 
02 0.021 0.038 −0.072 −0.022 −0.136 
03 −0.037 0.108 −0.080 0.076 −0.140 
05 0.012 −0.057 −0.171 0.217 0.023 
06 0.157 0.027 −0.073 −0.049 −0.000 
10 0.078 0.041 0.006 0.065 −0.031 
11 0.004 −0.154 −0.020 0.006 0.034 
16 0.018 −0.007 0.031 −0.023 −0.372 
17 0.019 −0.160 0.037 0.116 −0.026 
21 0.068 −0.162 0.054 0.005 0.014 
22 0.149 −0.065 −0.012 −0.004 0.021 
24 0.060 0.008 0.052 0.134 0.327 
30 0.025 −0.005 −0.009 −0.020 0.176 
33 −0.018 0.125 0.068 0.039 0.017 
36 −0.003 0.137 0.203 0.208 0.005 
37 0.137 −0.050 0.236 0.078 0.030 
40 0.037 −0.067 −0.021 −0.233 −0.031 
41 0.051 0.129 0.179 0.025 0.011 
42 0.065 0.118 −0.038 −0.053 −0.019 
44 0.164 −0.040 0.127 −0.005 0.051 
45 0.365 −0.095 −0.084 0.030 0.016 
46 0.045 0.199 −0.100 −0.010 0.005 
47 0.133 −0.032 −0.022 0.023 −0.257 
48 −0.025 −0.040 0.074 0.190 −0.093 
50 −0.031 −0.193 0.325 0.016 −0.010 
52 0.040 0.026 0.022 0.042 0.048 
54 0.079 −0.030 0.126 0.317 −0.084 
56 −0.040 0.013 −0.097 0.248 0.098 
59 −0.020 −0.147 0.029 0.103 −0.072 
61 0.061 0.058 −0.006 −0.017 0.024 
62 −0.011 −0.207 −0.016 0.007 −0.013 
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bda; Wang, B. (2014). bda: Density Estimation for Binned/Weighted Data. R package 
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version 1.3-4. 
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http://CRAN.R-project.org/package=doBy. 
ez; Lawrence, M. A., (2013). ez: Easy analysis and visualization of factorial experiments. 
R package version 4.2-0. http://CRAN.R-project.org/package=ez. 
ggm; Marchetti, G. M., Drton, M., & Sadeghi, K. (2014). ggm: A package for Graphical 
Markov Models. R package version 2.0. http://CRAN.R-
project.org/package=ggm. 
ggplot2; H. Wickham, H (2009). ggplot2: elegant graphics for data analysis. Springer: New 
York. 
Hmisc; Harrell Jr, F. E., Dupont, C., et al. (2014). Hmisc: Harrell Miscellaneous. R 
package version 3.14-3. http://CRAN.R-project.org/package=Hmisc. 
lavaan; Rosseel, Y. (2012). lavaan: An R Package for Structural Equation Modeling. 
Journal of Statistical Software, 48(2), 1-36. 
lme4; Bates, D., Maechler, M., Bolker, B. & Walker, S. (2013). lme4: Linear mixed-
effects models using Eigen and S4. R package version 1.0-4. http://CRAN.R-
project.org/package=lme4. 
lmSupport; John Curtin (2013). lmSupport: Support for Linear Models. R package 
version 1.07.1. http://CRAN.R-project.org/package=lmSupport. 
lmtest; Zeileis, A. & Hothorn, T. (2002). Diagnostic Checking in Regression 
Relationships. R News 2(3), 7-10. 
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ltm; Rizopoulos, D. (2006). ltm: An R package for Latent Variable Modelling and Item 
Response Theory Analyses. Journal of Statistical Software, 17(5), 1-25. 
MASS; Venables, W. N. & Ripley, B. D. (2002) Modern Applied Statistics with S. Fourth 
Edition. Springer, New York. 
MBESS; Kelley, K. & Lai, K. (2012). MBESS: MBESS. R package version 3.3.3. 
http://CRAN.R-project.org/package=MBESS. 
nFactors; Raiche, G. (2010). nFactors: an R package for parallel analysis and non-
graphical solutions to the Cattell scree test. R package version 2.3.3. 
http://www.cran.r-project.org/package=nFactors/. 
nlme; Pinheiro, J. & Bates, D., DebRoy, S., Sarkar D., & the R Development Core Team 
(2012). nlme: Linear and Nonlinear Mixed Effects Models. R package version 3.1-
104. http://www.cran.r-project.org/package=nlme/. 
ordinal; Christensen, R. H. B. (2013). Ordinal: Regression Models for Ordinal Data R 
package version 2013.9-30 http://www.cran.r-project.org/package=ordinal/. 
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